the body either at the moment of its generation, or afterwards This view is held by several Eastern theologians and by Jerome, who appeals to the unceasing creative activity of God (John v. 17). It required the assumption that the soul, which must proceed pure from the hand of the Creator, becomes sinful by its connection with the naturally generated body. Pelagius and his followers were creationists.'

3. The theory of Pre-existence, which was originated by Plato and more fully developed by Origen, supposes that the soul, even before the origin of the body, existed and sinned in another world, and has been banished in the body as in a prison, to expiate that personal Adamic guilt, and by an ascetic process to be restored to its original state. This is one of the Origenistic heresies, which were condemned under Justinian. Even Gregory of Nyssa, although, like Nemesius and Cyril of Alexandria, he supposed the soul to be created before the body, compares Origen's theory to the heathen myths and fables. Origen himself allowed that the Bible does not directly teach the pre-existence of the soul, but maintained that several passages, such as the strife between Esau and Jacob in the womb, and the leaping of John the Baptist in the womb of Elizabeth at the salutation of Mary, imply it. The only truth in this theory is that every human soul has from eternity existed in the thought and purpose of God.'

Augustine emphatically rejects the doctrine of pre-existence, without considering that his own theory of a generic

1 Jerome says, appealing to John v. 17; Zech. xii. 1; Ps. xxxiii. 15: “Quotidie Deus fabricatur animas, cujus velle fecisse est, et conditor esse non cessat." Pela gius, in his Confession of Faith, declares for the view that souls are made and given by God Himself.

The oua interpreted as oñua (sepulchre). Origen appeals to the groaning of the creation, Rom. viii. 19.

'Lately the theory of pre-existence has found in America an advocate in Dr. Edward Beecher, in his book: The Conflict of Ages, Boston, 1853. Wordsworth bas given it a poetic garb in his Ode on Immortality:

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:

The soil that rises with us, our life's star,

Hath had elsewhere its setting,

And cometh from afar."

De civit. Dei, xi. 23. Ad Oros. c. Priscill. et Orig. c. 8. In his earlier work De libero arbitrio (about 395), he spoke more favorably of Pre-existentianism.

pre-existence and apostasy of all men in Adam is really liable to similar objections. For he also hangs the whole fate of the human race on a transcendental act of freedom, lying beyond our temporal consciousness; though, it is true, he places this act in the beginning of earthly history, and ascribes it to the one general ancestor, while Origen transfers it into a previous world, and views it as an act of each individual soul.'

But between creationism and traducianism Augustine wavers, because the Scriptures do not expressly decide. He wishes to keep both the continuous creative activity of God and the organic union of body and soul.

Augustine regards this whole question as belonging to science and the schools, not to faith and the church, and makes a confession of ignorance which, in a man of his speculative genius, involves great self-denial. "Where the Scripture," he says, "renders no certain testimony, human inquiry must be ware of deciding one way or the other. If it were necessary to salvation to know anything concerning it, Scripture would have said more."

1

Comp. BAUR, Vorlesungen über die Dogmengeschichte, Bd. i. Th. ü. p. 31: "What essentially distinguishes the Augustinian system from that of Origen, consists only [?] in this, that in place of the pretemporal fall of souls we have the Adamie apostasy, and that what in Origen bears yet a heathen impress, has in Augustine assumed a purely Old Testament [certainly, however, also a Pauline] form."

2 De peccatorum mer. et remiss. 1. ii. c. 36, § 59. He still remained thus unde cided in his Retractations, lib. i. cap. 1, § 3 (Opera, tom. i. f. 4), where he honestly acknowledges: "Quod attinet ad ejus [animi] originem... nec tunc sciebam, nee adhuc scio." He frequently treats of this question, e. g., De anima et ejus origine; De Genesi ad literam, x. 23; Epist. 190 ad Optatum; and Opus imperf. iv. 104. Comp. also Gangauf, 1. c. p. 248 ff. and John Huber, Philosophie der Kirchenväter. p. 291 ff. Huber gives the following terse presentation of the Augustinian doctrine: "In the problem of the origin of the soul Augustine arrived at no definite view, In his earlier writings he is as yet even unsettled as to the doctrine of pre-existence (De lib. arbitr. i. 12, 24; iii. 20 and 21), but afterwards he rejects it most decidedly, especially as presented by Origen, and at the same time criticises his whole theory of the origin of the world (De civit. Dei, xi. 23). In like manner he declares against the theory of emanation, according to which the soul has flowed out of God (De Genes ad. lit. vii. 2, 3), is of one nature (Epist. 166 ad Hieron. § 3) and coeternal (De civ. Dei, x. 31). Between creationism and generationism, however, he can come to no de cision, being kept in suspense not so much by scientific as by theological consider tions. As to generationism, he remembers Tertullian, and fears being compelled

The three theories of the origin of the soul, we may remark by way of concluding criticism, admit of a reconciliation. Each of them contains an element of truth, and is wrong only when exclusively held. Every human soul has an ideal preexistence in the divine mind, the divine will, and we may add, in the divine life; and every human soul as well as every human body is the product of the united agency of God and the parents. Pre-existentianism errs in confounding an ideal with a concrete, self-conscious, individual pre-existence; traducianism, in ignoring the creative divine agency without which no being, least of all an immortal mind, can come into existence, and in favoring a materialistic conception of the soul; creatianism, in denying the human agency, and thus placing the soul in a merely accidental relation to the body.

§ 155. Arguments for the Doctrine of Original Sin and Hereditary Guilt.

We now pass to the proofs by which Augustine established his doctrine of original sin and guilt, and to the objections urged by his opponents.

1. For Scriptural authority he appealed chiefly and repeatedly to the words in Rom. v. 12, ép ♣ távтes ñμapтov, which

like him, to affirm the corporeality of the soul. He perceives, however, that this theory explains the transmission of original sin, and propounds the inquiry, whether perchance one soul may not spring from another, as one light is kindled from another without diminution of its flame (Ep. 190 ad Optatum, 4, 14-15). But for creationism the chief difficulty lies in this very doctrine of original sin. If the soul is created directly by God, it is pure and sinless, and the question arises, how it has deserved to be clothed with corrupt flesh and brought into the succession of original sin. God Himself appears there to be the cause of its sinfulness, inasmuch as he caused it to become guilty by uniting it with the body (De an. et ejus orig. i 8, 9; ii. 9, 13). All the passages of Scripture relevant to this point agree only in this, that God is the Giver, Author, and Former of souls; but how he forms themwhether he creates them out of nothing or derives them from the parents, they do not declare (Ib. iv. 11, 15).-His doctrine, that God created everything together as to the germ, might naturally have inclined him rather to generationism, yet he does not get over his indecision, and declares even in his Retractations (i. 1, 3), that he Leither know previously nor knows now, whether succeeding souls were descended rom the first one or newly created as individuals.

are erroneously translated by the Vulgate: in quo' omnes peccaverunt. As Augustine had but slight knowledge of Greek, he commonly confined himself to the Latin Bible, and here he referred the in quo to Adam (the "one man" in the beginning of the verse, which is far too remote); but the Greek e must be taken as neuter and as a conjunction in the sense: on the ground that, or because, all have sinned." The exegesis of Augustine, and his doctrine of a personal fall, as it were, of all men in Adam, are therefore doubtless untenable. On the other hand, Paul unquestionably teaches in this passage a causal connection between sin and death, and also a causal connection between the sin of Adam and the sinfulness of his posterity, therefore original sin. The proof of this is found in the whole parallel between Adam and Christ, and their representative relation to mankind (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 45 f.), and especially in the πάντες ἥμαρτον, but not in the ἐφ ̓ ᾧ as translated by the Vulgate and Augustine. Other passages of Scripture to which Augustine appealed, as teaching original sin, were such as Gen. viii. 21; Ps. li. 7; John iii. 6; 1 Cor. vii. 14; Eph. ii. 3.

2. The practice of infant baptism in the church, with the customary formula, "for remission of sins," and such accompanying ceremonies as exorcism, presupposes the dominion of sin and of demoniacal powers even in infancy. Since the child, before the awakening of self-consciousness, has committed no actual sin, the effect of baptism must relate to the forgive

'Which presupposes év &. The whole verse reads in the Vulgate: "Propterea, sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt." Comp. Augustine, De peccat. merit, et remissione, i. 8, 10; Op. imperf. ii. 63; Contra duas ep Pel. iv. 4; De nupt. et concup. ii. 5. Pelagius explained the passage (ad Rom. 7. 12): "In eo, quod omnes peccaverunt, exemplo Adæ peccant," or per imitationem in contrast with per propagationem. Julian translated p' & propter quod Comp. Contra Jul. vi. 75; Op. imperf. ii. 66.

'Ep' & (= ép' ols) is equivalent to el ToÚT 8Ti, on the ground that, presup posing that, propterea quod. So Meyer, in loco, and others. R. Rothe (in an extremely acute exegetical monograph upon Rom. v. 12-21, Wittenberg, 1836) and Chr. Fr. Schmid (Bibl Theol. ii. p. 126) explain èp' & by ¿rì Tobre Gore, i e under the more particular specification that, inasmuch as. Comp. the Coinmen taries.

ness of original sin and guilt. This was a very important point from the beginning of the controversy, and one to whick Augustine frequently reverted.

Here he had unquestionably a logical advantage over the Pelagians, who retained the traditional usage of infant baptism, out divested it of its proper import, made it signify a mere ennobling of a nature already good, and, to be consistent, should have limited baptism to adults for the forgiveness of actual sins.

The Pelagians, however, were justly offended by the revolting inference of the damnation of unbaptized infants, which is nowhere taught in the Holy Scriptures, and is repugnant to every unperverted religious instinct. Pelagius inclined to assign to unbaptized infants a middle state of half-blessedness, between the kingdom of heaven appointed to the baptized and the hell of the ungodly; though on this point he is not positive.' He evidently makes salvation depend, not so much upon the Christian redemption, as upon the natural moral character of individuals. Hence also baptism had no such importance in his view as in that of his antagonist.

Augustine, on the authority of Matt. xxv. 34, 46, and other Scriptures, justly denies a neutral middle state, and meets the difficulty by supposing different degrees of blessedness and damnation (which, in fact, must be admitted), corresponding to the different degrees of holiness and wickedness. But, con

' Comp. De nuptiis et concup. i. c. 26 (tom. x. f. 291 sq.); De peccat. mer. et remiss. i. c. 26 (§ 39, tom. x. fol. 22); De gratia Christi, c. 32, 33 (x. 245 sq.), and other passages. The relation of the doctrine of original sin to the practice of infant baptism came very distinctly into view from the beginning of the controversy. Some have even concluded from a passage of Augustine (De pecc. mer. iii. 6), tha the controversy began with infant baptism and not with original sin. Comp. Wiggers, i. p. 59.

2 "Quo non eant scio, quo eant nescio," says he of unbaptized children. H ascribed to them, it is true, salus or vita æterna, but not the regnum cœlorum. Aug. De pecc. mer. et remissione, i. 18; iii. 3. In the latter place Augustine says, that it is absurd to affirm a "vita æterna extra regnum Dei." In his book, Da hæresibus, cap. 88, Augustine says of the Pelagians that they assign to unbaptized children "æternam et beatam quandam vitam extra regnum Dei," and teach tha children being born without or'ginal sin, are baptized for the purpose of being admitted "ad regnum Dei," and transferred "de bono in melius."