After all it must be confeffed, that a noble and triumphant merit often breaks through and diffipates thefe little spots and fullies in its reputation; but if by a mistaken pursuit after fame, or through human infirmities, any falfe ftep be made in the more momentous concerns of life, the whole scheme of ambitious defigns is broken and difappointed. The smaller stains and blemishes may die away and disappear amidft the brightnefs that furrounds them; but a blot of a deeper nature cafts a fhade on all the other beauties, and darkens the whole character. How difficult therefore is it to preferve a great name, when he that has acquired it is fo obnoxious to fuch little weaknesses and infirmities as are no fmall diminution to it when difcovered, efpecially when they are fo industriously proclaimed, and aggravated by fuch as were once his fuperiors or equals; by fuch as would fet to fhow their judgment or their wit, and by fuch as are guilty or innocent of the fame flips or misconducts in their own behaviour..

But were there none of thefe difpofitions in others to cenfure a famous man, nor any fuch mifcarriages in himself, yet would he meet with no fmall trouble in keeping up his reputation in all its height and fplendor. There must be always a noble train of actions to preferve his fame in life and motion. For when it is once at a ftand, it naturally flags and languishes. Admiration is a very fhort-liv'd paffion, that immediately decays upon growing familiar with its object, unless it be ftill fed with freth discoveries, and kept alive by á perpetual new fucceffion of miracles rising up to its view. And even the greatest actions of a celebrated perfon labour under this difadvantage, that however furprising and extraordinary they may be, they are no more than what are expected from him; but on the contrary, if they fall any thing below the opinion that is conceived of him, though they might raife the reputation of another, they are a diminution to his.

One would think there fhould be fomething wonderfully pleafing in the poffeffion of fame, that, notwithftanding all thefe mortifying confiderations, can engage a man in fo defperate a purfuit; and yet if we confider P 6

the

the little happiness that attends a great character, and the multitude of difquietudes to which the defire of it fubjects an ambitious mind, one would be still the more furprized to fee fo many reflefs candidates for glory.

Ambition raises a fecret tumult in the foul, it inflames the mind, and puts it into a violent hurry of thought: it is fill reaching after an empty imaginary good, that has not in it the power to abate or fatisfy it. Moft other things we long for can allay the cravings of their proper fenfe, and for a while fet the appetite at reft; but fame is a good fo wholly foreign to our natures, that we have no faculty in the foul adapted to it, nor any organ in the body to relish it; an object of defire placed out of the poffibility of fruition. It may indeed fill the mind for a while with a giddy kind of pleasure, but it is fuch a pleasure as makes a man reftlefs and uneafy under it, and which does not fo much fatisfy the prefent thirft, as it excites fresh defires, and fets the foul on new enterprises. For how few ambiti ous men are there, who have got as much fame as they defire, and whofe thirft after it has not been as eager in the very height of their reputation, as it was before they became known and eminent among men? There is not any circumflance in Cæfar's character which gives me a greater idea of him, than a faying which Cicero tells us he frequently made ufe of in private converfation, That he was fatisfied with his fare of life and fame. Se fatis vel ad naturam, vel ad gloriam vixiffe. Many indeed have given over their pursuits after fame, but that has proceeded either from the difappointments they have met in it, or from their experience of the little pleasure which attends it, or from the better informations or natural coldness of old age but feldom from a full fatisfaction and acquiefcence in their prefent enjoyments of it..

Nor is fame only unfatisfying in itfelf, but the defire of it lays us open to many accidental troubles which thofe are free from who have not fuch a tender regard for it. How often is the ambitious man cast down and difappointed, if he receives no praife where he expected it? Nay how often is he mortified with the very praifes he receives, if they do not rife fo high as he thinks they

ought,

ought, which they feldom do unless increafed by flattery, fince few men have fo good an opinion of us as we have of ourselves? But if the ambitious man be fo much grieved even with praise itself, how will he be able to bear up under fcandal and defamation? For the fame temper of mind which makes him defire fame, makes him hate reproach. If he can be tranfported with the extraordinary praises of men, he will be as much dejected by their cenfures. How little therefore is the happiness of an ambitious man, who gives every one a dominion over it, who thus fubjects himself to the good or ill speeches of others, and puts it in the power of every malicious tongue to throw him into a fit of melancholy, and deftroy his natural reft and repofe of mind? efpecially when we confider that the world is more apt to cenfure than applaud, and himself fuller of imperfections than virtues.

We may farther obferve, that fuch a man will be more grieved for the lofs of fame, than he could have been pleased with the enjoyment of it. For though the prefence of this imaginary good cannot make us happy, the abfence of it may make us miferable: because in the enjoyment of an object we only find that share of pleafure which it is capable of giving us, but in the lofs of it we do not proportion our grief to the real value it bears, but to the value our fancies and imaginations fet upon it.

So inconfiderable is the fatisfaction that fame brings along with it, and fo great the difquietudes to which it makes us liable. The defire of it ftirs up many uneafy motions in the mind, and is rather inflamed than fatisfied with the prefence of the thing defired. The enjoy ment of it brings very little pleasure, though the lofs or want of it be very fenfible and afflicting; and even this little happiness is fo very precarious, that it wholly depends on the will of others. We are not only tortured by the reproaches which are offered us, but are disappointed by the filence of men when it is unexpected ; and humbled even by their praifes..

The fame Subject continued.

[Spec. No. 257.]

HAT I might not lofe myfelf upon a fubject of

T fo great extent as that of fame, I have treated it

in a particular order and method. I have first of all confidered the reafon why providence may have implanted in our minds fuch a principle of action. I have in the next place fhewn from many confiderations; First, that fame is a thing difficult to be obtained, and eafily loft; Secondly, that it brings the ambitious man very little happiness, but fubjects him to much uneafinefs and diffatisfaction. I fhall in the last place fhew, that it hinders us from obtaining an end which we have abilities to acquire, and which is accompanied with fulness of fatisfaction. I need not tell my reader, that I mean by this end that happiness which is referved for us in another world, which every one has abilities to procure, and which will bring along with it fulness of joy and pleafures for evermore.

How the purfuit after fame may hinder us in the attainment of this great end, I fhall leave the reader to collect from the three following confiderations.

Firft, Because the strong defire of fame breeds feveral vicious habits in the mind.

Secondly, Because many of those actions, which are apt to procure fame, are not in their nature conducive to this our ultimate happiness.

Thirdly, Because if we should allow the fame actions to be the proper inftruments, both of acquiring fame, and of procuring this happiness, they would neverthelefs fail in the attainment of this laft end, if they proceeded from a defire of the first.

These three propofitions are felf-evident to those who are verfed in fpeculations of morality. For which reafon I fhall not enlarge upon them, but proceed to a point of the fame nature, which may open to us a more uncommon field of fpeculation.

From what has been already obferved, I think we may have a natural conclufion, that it is the greatest folly to feek the praife or approbation of any being,

befides

befides the Supreme, and that for these two reafons; because no other being can make a right judgment of us, and esteem us according to our merits; and because we can procure no confiderable benefit or advantage from the esteem and approbation of any other being.

In the firft place, no other being can make a right judgment of us, and efteem us according to our merits. Created beings fee nothing but our outfide, and can therefore only frame a judgment of us from our exterior actions and behaviour: but how unfit these are to give us a right notion of each other's perfections, may appear from several confiderations. There are many virtues, which in their own nature are incapable of any outward reprefentation: many filent perfections in the foul of a good man, which are great ornaments to human nature, but not able to difcover themselves to the knowledge of others; they are tranfacted in private ; without noife or fhow, and are only visible to the great fearcher of hearts. What actions can exprefs the entire purity of thought which refines and fanctifies a virtuous man? That fecret reft and contentedness of mind, which gives him a perfect enjoyment of his prefent condition; that inward pleasure and complacency, which he feels in doing good; that delight and fatisfaction which he takes in the profperity and happiness of another? Thefe and the like virtues are the hidden beauties of a foul, the fecret graces which cannot be discovered by a mortal eye, but make the foul lovely and precious in his fight, from whom no fecrets are concealed. Again, there are many virtues which want an opportunity of exerting and thewing themselves in action. Every virtue requires time and place, a proper object and a fit conjuncture of circumftances, for the due exercise of it. A flate of poverty obfcures all the virtues of liberality and munificence. The patience and fortitude of a martyr or confeffor lye concealed in the flourishing times of Chriflianity. Some virtues are only feen in affliction, and fome in profperity: fome in a private, and others in a public capacity. But the great Sovereign of the world beholds every perfection in its obfcurity, and not only fees what we do, but what we would do.

He