with, and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into endless confusion. Now, this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the same authority, that in certain conjunctures it is impossible to obey both-that the former is moral; that is, a precept of which we see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular case before us, but that the latter is positive; that is, a precept of which we do not see the reasons-it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the former, because there is an apparent reason for this preference, and none against it. Farther, positive institutions, I suppose all those which Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral end; and the end must be acknowledged more excellent than the means. Nor is observance of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter, but will perhaps be found less applicable to practice than may be thought at first sight.

And therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of consideration, and taking the words moral law and positive institutions in the popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed command as positive institutions are-for the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect, then, they are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts-interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of the Author of it which is to be preferred when they interfere.

But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of this question as some persons seem to think, nor are we left to reason alone to determine it. For, first, though mankind have in all ages been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts, yet, without making any comparison at all between them, and, consequently, without determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion, as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scripture, and likewise to the most express particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God without moral virtue. Secondly, upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the latter, and never upon the former, which, though no sort of allowance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the latter, yet it is a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter are to be preferred. And, farther, as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion anywhere rather than upon virtue, lest both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly. Our Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation of

positive institutions arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and moral precepts, when the Pharisees censured him for eating with publicans and sinners, and also when they censured his disciples for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath-day. Upon this comparison he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it general—I will have mercy, and not sacrifice (Matth. ix. 13, and xii. 7). The propriety of the word proverbial is not the thing insisted upon, though I think the manner of speaking is to be called so. But that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the determination general, is surely indisputable. For, had it in the latter case been said only that God preferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, most justly might we have argued that he preferred mercy likewise to the observance of other ritual institutions, and, in general, moral duties to positive ones; and thus the determination would have been general, though its being so were inferred and not expressed. But as the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is much stronger; for the sense, and the very literal words of our Lord's answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a comparison between positive and moral duties, as to this upon which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought that justice is to give place to them. It is remarkable, too, that as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are introduced on both the fore-mentioned occasions with a declaration that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. This, I say, is very remarkable; for since it is scarce possible for the most ignorant person not to understand the literal sense of the passage in the Prophet (Hos. vi.), and since understanding the literal sense would not have prevented their condemning the guiltless (see Matth. xii. 7), it can hardly be doubted that the thing which our Lord really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had not learned from it, as they might, wherein the general spirit of religion consists—that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as distinguished from forms and ritual observances. However, it is certain we may learn this from his divine application of the passage in the Gospel.

But as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of greater importance than the other, to consider this other as of scarce any importance at all, it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves how great presumption it is to make light of any institutions of divine appointment-that our obligations to obey all God's commands whatever are absolute and indispensable, and that commands merely positive, admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them-an obligation moral in the strictest and most proper sense.

To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now

given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us the obligation of searching the Scriptures, in order to see what the scheme of revelation really is, instead of determining beforehand, from reason, what the scheme of it must be (see chap. iii.) Indeed, if in revelation there be found any passages the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural religion, we may most certainly conclude such seeming meaning not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine which the light of nature cannot discover, or a precept which the law of nature does not oblige to.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDEred AS MIRACULOUS.

HAVING shown the importance of the Christian revelation, and the obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth or its credibility, the next thing in order is, to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in general, which shall be the subject of this chapter, and the objections against the Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of some following ones (chap. iii. iv. v. vi.) For it seems the most natural method to remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it, and the objections against that evidence (chap. vii.)

It is, I think, commonly supposed that there is some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian scheme of things, at least against miracles, so as that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them than would be sufficient to convince us of other events or matters of fact. Indeed the consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought very insignificant by many persons, yet, as it belongs to the subject of this treatise, so it may tend to open the mind, and remove some prejudices, however needless the consideration of it be upon its own account.

I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, that God created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ, and by him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness-that is, render to every one according to his works-and that good men are under the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or are not, to be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about words, or, however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises any presumption against this general scheme of Christianity, it must be either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience, or else because it is unlike that course of nature which is. But analogy raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme upon either of these accounts.

First, There is no presumption from analogy against the truth of

it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or experience. For, suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most improved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of natural philosophy and natural religion, such a one could not but be sensible that it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system of the universe which he was acquainted with. He could not but be sensible that there must be innumerable things in the dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible government over the world at present carrying on, and in what is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant (page 96, &c.), and which could not be discovered without revelation. Whether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or not, it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And doubtless that part of it which is opened to our view is but as a point, in comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout eternity, past and future, in comparison of what is even now going on in the remote parts of the boundless universe-nay, in comparison of the whole scheme of this world. And, therefore, that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties is no sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them; because it is certain there are innumerable things, in the constitution and government of the universe, which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties. Secondly, analogy raises no presumption against any of the things contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon account of their being unlike the known course of nature. For there is no presumption at all, from analogy, that the whole course of things, or divine government, naturally unknown to us, and everything in it, is like to anything in that which is known, and therefore no peculiar presumption against anything in the former, upon account of its being unlike to anything in the latter. And in the constitution and natural government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we see things, in a great degree, unlike one another, and therefore ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible. However, the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of nature, as will appear in the following part of this treatise:

The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines, and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There are also invisible miracles -the Incarnation of Christ, for instance-which, being secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission, but require themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation itself too is miraculous, and miracles are the proof of it; and the supposed presumption against these shall presently be considered. All which I have been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call everything in the dispensations of Providence, not discoverable without revelation, nor like the known course of things, miraculous, and whether the general Christian dispensation now mentioned is to be called so, or