often can be no more than inadequately expressive of the things signified), or if they substitute human errors in the room of divine truth, why may not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that evidence which really is seen by others—as a like turn of mind, with respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right understanding, in matters of common speculation and practice, which more fair and attentive minds attain to? And the effect will be the same whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of religion, and their indirect behaviour with regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the grosser vices; or whether it be owing to this, that forms, and figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, administer occasions of ridicule, when the things intended and the truth itself would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general, levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice, do hinder us from being rightly informed with respect to common things; and they may in like manner, and perhaps in some farther providential manner, with respect to moral and religious subjects—may hinder evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it is. The Scripture* does declare that every one shall not understand. And it makes no difference by what providential conduct this comes to pass-whether the evidence of Christianity was, originally and with design, put and left so as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it, and that honest-minded persons should; or whether it comes to pass by any

other means.

Farther, The general proof of natural religion and of Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men-even those the greatest part of whose time from childhood to old age is taken up with providing for themselves and their families the common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life-those, I mean, of this rank who ever think at all of asking after proof, or attending to it. Common men, were they as much in earnest about religion as about their temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced, upon real evidence, that there is a God who governs the world; and they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are capable not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see that there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many appearing completions of prophecy. But though this proof is real and

*Dan. xii. 10. See also Isaiah xxix. 13, 14; Matth. vi. 23, and xi. 25, and xiii. 11, 12; John iii. 19; John v. 44: 1 Cor. ii. 14; and 2 Cor. iv. 4; 2 Tim. iii. 13; and that affectionate, as well authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, He that hath ears to hear, let him here.' Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say that the proof given us of Christianity was less than might have been, for this very purpose So that the Scripture might be, as it were, a touchstone for trying the docility and soundness of man's mind.'-De Ver. R. C. L. 2, towards the end.

K

conclusive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be run up into difficulties, which, however, persons who are capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable also of seeing through— that is, not of clearing up and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity-for of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to any one thing in nature-but capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion, with regard to these objections, which cannot be the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and, from the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as time and attention, to see how the evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. Now if persons who have picked up these objections from others, and take for granted they are of weight, upon the word of those from whom they receive them, or by often retailing of them, come to see, or fancy they see, them to be of weight, will not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a competent degree of knowledge, or will not give that time and attention to the subject which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such information-in this case they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error; in the same way as they must, with regard to common sciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed in them.

But still, perhaps, it will be objected, that if a prince or common master were to send directions to a servant, he would take care that they should always bear the certain marks who they came from, and that their sense should be always plain, so as that there should be no possible doubt, if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning of them. Now the proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to Him who is the governor of the world, and particularly that he does not afford us such information with respect to our temporal affairs and interests, as experience abundantly shows. However, there is a full answer to this objection from the very nature of religion; for the reason why a prince would give his directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such an external action should be done, without concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it is done-that is, he regards only the external event, or the thing's being done, and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the action, whereas the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in action itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if the prince be supposed to regard only the action-that is, only to desire to exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant, he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. It may be proper to add that the will of God respecting morality and religion may be considered either as absolute or as only conditional. If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act virtuously in such given circumstances, not that we should be brought to act

so by his changing of our circumstances. And if God's will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will, which is a most weighty consideration. Or his will may be considered only as conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded, if otherwise, punished, of which conditional will of the Author of Nature the whole constitution of it affords most certain instances.

Upon the whole: that we are in a state of religion, necessarily implies that we are in a state of probation; and the credibility of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be just as it is in those respects which are above objected against. There seems no pretence, from the reason of the thing, to say that the trial cannot equitably be anything, but whether persons will act suitably to certain information, or such as admits no room for doubt, so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For since ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty, and since the two former are to be put to the same account as difficulties in practice, men's moral probation may also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration, and afterwards, whether they will act as the case requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubtful; and this we find, by experience, is frequently our probation (pages 43, &c. and 158, &c.) in our temporal capacity. For the information which we want with regard to our worldly interests is by no means always given us of course without any care of our own; and we are greatly liable to selfdeceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of others, so that to be able to judge what is the prudent part often requires much and difficult consideration. Then, after we have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high degree. And the constitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what will be the consequence, are often naturally, that is, providentially, altogether as fatal as misconduct, occasioned by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion.

Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men; but if the persons for whose sake they are made think so-persons who object as above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence-I desire them to consider again, whether their thinking so be owing to anything unintelligible in these observations, or to their own not having such a sense of religion and serious solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism does in all reason require? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of these persons that our nature and condition necessarily require us, in the daily course of life,

to act upon evidence much lower than what is commonly called probable to guard not only against what we fully believe will, but also against what we think it supposable may, happen-and to engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against success, if it be credible that possibly we may succeed in them.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.

THE presumptions against revelation, and objections against the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it, being removed, there remains to be considered what positive evidence we have for the truth of it-chiefly in order to see what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections against it or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of objections against it, that we have in the case before

us,

Now in the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things of great weight, not reducible to the head either of miracles or the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs; and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the collateral proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argument-the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other works of art a result from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view. I shall therefore, first, make some observations relating to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy, and consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought against this evidence. And, secondly, I shall endeavour to give some account of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument-this being the kind of proof upon which we determine most questions of difficulty concerning common facts, alleged to have happened, or seemingly likely to happen, especially questions relating to conduct.

First, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections alleged against it.

I. Now the following observations, relating to the historical evi