PART I.

OF NATURAL RELIGION.

CHAPTER I.

OF A FUTURE LIFE.

STRANGE difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of our existing now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments; which, whoever thinks it worth while, may see considered in the first Dissertation at the end of this Treatise. But, without regard to any of them here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, and the several changes which we have undergone, and those which we know we may undergo without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may or may not have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable that we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life and perception.

I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own species that the same creatures, the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment, and suffering, in one period of their being, greatly different from those appointed them in another period of it. And in other creatures the same law holds. For the difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) and in maturity-the change of worms into flies, and the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change-and birds and insects bursting the shell, their habitation, and by this means entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; these are instances of this general law of nature. Thus, all the various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration here. But the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly, in the womb and in

our infancy, are almost as different from our present, in mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees of life can be. Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy of nature-according to a natural order, or appointment of the very same kind, with what we have already experienced. II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness and misery; for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure, and suffering pain. Now, that we have these powers and capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after death; indeed a probability of it sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living powers-because there is in every case a probability that all things will continue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to think they will be altered. This is that kind of presumption, or probability from analogy, expressed in the very word continuance, which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the world will continue to-morrow as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only reason for believing that any one substance now existing will continue to exist a moment longer-the self-existent substance only excepted. Thus, if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, there would be no apprehension that any other power, or event, unconnected with this of death, would destroy their faculties just at the instant of each creature's death-and therefore no doubt but that they would remain after it; which shows the high probability that our living powers will continue after death, unless there be some ground to think that death is their destruction. For if it would be in a manner certain that we should survive death, provided it were certain that death would not be our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive it if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction.

Now, though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, there would arise a general confused suspicion that, in the great shock and alteration which we shall undergo by death, we, that is,

* I say kind of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the same degree of conviction that our living powers will continue after death, as there is that our substances will.

Destruction of living powers is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous, and may signify either the destruction of a living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all, or the destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. The loss of a man's eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being, endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.

our living powers, might be wholly destroyed; yet even prior to those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground or reason for this apprehension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it must arise either from the reason of the thing, or from the analogy of Nature.

But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that death is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is in itself, but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones. And these effects do in no wise appear to imply the destruction of a living agent. And besides, as we are greatly in the dark upon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon— the powers themselves as distinguished not only from their actual exercise, but also from the present capacity of exercising them, and as opposed to their destruction; for sleep, or, however, a swoon, shows us not only that these powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion does in inanimate matter, but shows also that they exist, when there is no present capacity of exercising them; or that the capacities of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain undestroyed. Since, then, we know not at all upon what the existence of our living powers depends, this shows farther there can no probability be collected from the reason of the thing, that death will be their destruction; because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death-upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors-so that there is nothing more certain than that the reason of the thing shows us no connection between death and the destruction of living agents. Nor can we find anything throughout the whole analogy of Nature to afford us even the slightest presumption that animals ever lose their living powers, much less, if it were possible, that they lose them by death; for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes of them. This event removes them from our view. It destroys the sensible proof which we had before their death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least reason to believe that they are then, or by that event, deprived of them.

And our knowing that they were possessed of these powers, up to the very period to which we have faculties capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of their retaining them beyond it. And this is confirmed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very great and astonishing changes which we have experienced; so great, that our existence in another state of life of perception and of action will be but according to a method of providential conduct, the like to which has been already exercised, even with regard to ourselves, according to a course of nature, the like to which we have already gone through.

However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible how difficult it is

to silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case, as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge that forward delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere of some assistance, indeed, to apprehension, but the author of all error, as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted with what, indeed, we are wholly ignorant of—it may be proper to consider the imaginary presumptions that death will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early and lasting prejudices, and to show how little they can really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. And,

I. All presumption of death's being the destruction of living beings, must go upon supposition that they are compounded and so discerptible; but, since consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so too. For, were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not to exist-that is, part of this matter to move, and part to be at rest-then its power of motion would be indivisible, and so also would the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle of matter; for if this could be divided into two, one part might be moved, and the other at rest, which is contrary to the supposition. In like manner it has been argued,* and, for anything appearing to the contrary, justly, that since the perception, or consciousness, which we have of our own existence is indivisible, so as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here, and the other there, the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is indivisible too, and consequently the subject in which it resides, that is, the conscious being. Now, upon supposition that living agent each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving, than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is the proof now mentioned, it follows that our organised bodies are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter around us. And it is as easy to conceive how matter, which is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which our present bodies are, as how we can receive impressions from, and have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive that we may exist out of bodies, as in them; that we might have animated bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now given us, and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies variously modified and organised, as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as our present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these several organised bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively animated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy the living beings, ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of perception and of action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving im

*See Dr Clarke's Letter to Mr Dodwell, and the defences of it.

pressions from, and making use of for the common occasions of life.

II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot, indeed, from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental observations; but as these fall in with the supposition of its unity, so they plainly lead us to conclude certainly that our gross organised bodies, with which we perceive the objects of sense, and with which we act, are no part of ourselves, and therefore show us that we have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours, even without determining whether our living substances be material or immaterial. For we see by experience that men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. And persons can trace up the existence of themselves to a time when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small in comparison of what it is in mature age; and we cannot but think that they might then have lost a considerable part of that small body, and yet have remained the same living agents, as they may now lose great part of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain that the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux, from that never-ceasing attrition which there is in every part of them. Now, things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish between these living agents, ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in which we are very nearly interested since these may be alienated, and actually are in a daily course of succession, and changing their owners, whilst we are assured that each living agent remains one and the same permanent being. (See Dissertation I.) And this general observation leads us on to the following ones:-

First, That we have no way of determining by experience what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself; and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible.

Secondly, From our being so nearly related to, and interested in, certain systems of matter, suppose our flesh and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them-the living agents, ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed, notwithstanding such alienation, and consequently these systems of matter not being ourselves-it follows further, that we have no ground to conclude any other, suppose internal systems of matter to be the living agents ourselves, because we can have no ground to conclude this, but from our relation to, and interest in, such other systems of matter; and therefore we can have no reason to conclude, what befalls those systems of matter at death to be the destruction of the living agents. We have already, several times over, lost a great part, or perhaps the whole, of our body, according to certain common established laws of nature, yet we remain the same living agents: when we shall lose as

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