sequently the proof of religion?' By no means.

For we find that

happiness and misery are not our fate, in any such sense as not to be the consequences of our behaviour, but that they are the consequences of it (chap. ii.) We find God exercises the same kind of government over us with that which a father exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and necessity, it evidently appears to us that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority, or government, to a being who can have no competitions, or interfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects.

But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties, which run up into the most abstruse of all speculations, and as the opinion of necessity seems to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself, it may be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion.

The proof, from final causes, of an intelligent Author of Nature, is not affected by the opinion of necessity, supposing necessity a thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of things (page 86, &c.) And it is a matter of fact, independent of this or any other speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards and punishments (chap. ii.); and also that he hath given us a moral faculty by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert. (Dissertation II.) Now this moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind, for it carries in it authority and a right of direction-authority in such a sense, as that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned. And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a rule to us, are, moreover, the laws of God-laws in a sense including sanctions may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule, or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of considering it as given them by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direction of the Author of Nature, given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him; and a command from him necessarily includes in it at least an implicit promise in case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the sense or perception of good and ill desert (Dissertation II.) which is contained in the moral discernment renders the sanction explicit, and makes it appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of government is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. For he must have given us this discernment and sense of things, as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter; that is, by way of infor

mation beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this world. There is, then, most evident ground to think that the government of God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which he has given us; and that, in the upshot and issue of things, happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice respectively; as he has already, in so peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our minds. And from hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious worship, were it only to be considered as a means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God, and securing our obedience to it; which yet is an extremely imperfect view of that most important duty.

Now I say no objection from necessity can lie against this general proof of religion-none against the proposition reasoned upon, that we have such a moral faculty and discernment, because this is a mere matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is thus constituted-none against the conclusion, because it is immediate, and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion, that God will finally reward the righteous, and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit* that he should, but from its appearing that he has told us he will. And this he hath certainly told us in the promise and threatening which, it hath been observed, the notion of a command implies, and the sense of good and ill desert which he has given us more distinctly expresses. And this reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in some degree even verified, by other facts-by the natural tendencies of virtue and of vice (page 57) -and by this, that God, in the natural course of his providence, punishes mischievous actions, as mischievous to society, and also mischievous actions, as such, in the strictest sense (page 52, &c.); so that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even upon the wild supposition which we are arguing upon.

It must likewise be observed farther, that natural religion hath, besides this, an external evidence, which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be true, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the observations and reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion--that there is a God who made the world, who is the moral governor and judge of mankind, and will, upon the whole,

*However, I am far from intending to deny that the will of God is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case, though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say that it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness, then fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end to be the ground of the preference, as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not, therefore, appear that moral right is any more relative to perception than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth as thus founded.

deal with every one according to his works; I say suppose a person convinced of this by reason, but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind, it would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive what was the history of this system of doctrine—at what time, and in what manner, it came first into the world—and whether it were believed by any considerable part of it. And were he, upon inquiry, to find that a particular person, in a late age, first of all proposed it as a deduction of reason, and that mankind were before wholly ignorant of it, then, though its evidence from reason would remain, there would be no additional probability of its truth from the account of its discovery. But, instead of this being the fact of the case, on the contrary, he would find what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth; first, that somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions and alterations, hath been professed in all ages and countries of which we have any certain information relating to this matter; secondly, that it is certain historical fact, so far as we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief, that there is one God, the creator and moral governor of the world, and that mankind is in a state of religion, was received in the first ages; and, thirdly, that as there is no hint or intimation in history that this system was first reasoned out, so there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation. Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The first of them, general consent, shows this system to be conformable to the common sense of mankind. The second—namely, that religion was believed in the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that there were then any superstitious or false additions to it, cannot but be a farther confirmation of its truth; for it is a proof of this alternative—either that it came into the world by revelation, or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will consider how inapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will perhaps from hence alone be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And as it is shown in the second part (chap. ii.) of this treatise that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the beginning of the world as there is supposed to be against subsequent ones, a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pretences to revelation, than by supposing some real original one from whence they were copied. And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the system of religion being taught mankind by revelationthis must be admitted as some degree of real proof that it was so taught. For why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a fact against which there is no presumption? And this proof is mentioned here, because it has its weight to show that religion came into the world by revelation, prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book sup

posed to contain it, and even prior to all consideration, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down and related, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus, the historical account which we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of necessity; and the external evidence, even of natural religion, is by no means inconsiderable.

But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This, indeed, proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical faculties of perception-against their being intended by nature to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are to behave, and what we are to expect in consequence of our behaviour. Yet our liableness, in the degree we are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious admonition to us to be upon our guard with respect to what is of such consequence as our determinations concerning virtue and religion; and particularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of honour, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to mankind, for the only moral rule. (Dissertation II.)

The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the thing, and the history of religion, amount, when taken together, to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted-such a proof as, considering the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the actions of men, who act upon thought and reflection, if it were admitted that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be said, 'There are many probabilities which cannot indeed be confuted—that is, shown to be no probabilities—and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities on the other side-much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may be clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such arguments at all, but leaving them just as they are (pages 21 and 24). Now the method of government by rewards and punishments, and especially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert, as such, respectively, must go upon supposition that we are free, and not necessary agents. And it is incredible that the Author of Nature should govern us upon a supposition as true, which he knows to be false, and therefore absurd to think he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter, especially that he will do it under the notion that they are of good or ill desert.' Here, then, the matter is brought to a point. And the answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded: that the whole constitution and course of things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows, beyond possibility of doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false, wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom, indeed, clearly shows where, in supposing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free, agents.

But upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished. But that, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, is most certain. For it is fact that God does govern even brute creatures by the method of rewards and punishments in the natural course of things. And men are rewarded and punished for their actions, punished for actions mischievous to society, as being so, punished for vicious actions as such, by the natural instrumentality of each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay, even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the rewards and punishments following from them, which in general are to be considered as natural, that is, from the Author of Nature—these rewards and punishments, being naturally annexed to actions considered as implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill desert; these natural rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction to the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a more exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert as such. So that, if it be incredible that necessary agents should be thus rewarded and punished, then men are not necessary, but free; since it is matter of fact that they are thus rewarded and punished. But if, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have been arguing upon, it be insisted that men are necessary agents, then there is nothing incredible in the farther supposition of necessary agents being thus rewarded and punished, since we ourselves are thus dealt with.

From the whole, therefore, it must follow that a necessity supposed possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, does in no sort prove that the Author of Nature will not, nor destroy the proof that he will, finally, and upon the whole, in his eternal government, render his creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in words conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy of nature shows us that the opinion of necessity, considered as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the supposition above mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of revealed.

From these things, likewise, we may learn in what sense to understand that general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is essentially destructive of all religion: first, in a practical sense, that by this notion atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to all religion; and, secondly, in the strictest sense, that it is a contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, and to what we may every moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns everything. But by no means is this assertion to be understood, as if necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things, and with what we experience, were not also reconcilable with religion, for upon this supposition it demonstrably is so.