seems to employ indifferently. Sin or moral evil, however justly reprobated on earth, has no demerit (we tremble in transcribing such impiety) with respect to our Maker. He views, with equal complacency, the bad and the good, pestilence and plenty, the just man and the murderer, as engines for advancing the wisdom of the human species. The world, in short, is nothing but a great whetstone for minds. Such is this philosopher's hypothesis with respect to the proper object of human pursuit! a hypothesis replete, not only with paradox, but with contradictions; at war with truth, and at war with itself; but yet developed with plausibility, and maintained with an imposing boldness. The very first thing that must strike a reader of Mr. Forsyth, is, that in constructing his hypothesis, he has overlooked a distinction, of which in one or two places he seems partly aware, the distinction between the ultimate object of human pursuit, and the leading rule of human conduct; between the ground of moral obligation, and the master-principle of morality. Ask a rational man on what principle his whole conduct proceeds; perhaps he will tell you, that his principle is to obey God. Enquire farther, why he chooses to obey God, and he will possibly reply, because he is convinced that this is the only road to ultimate happiness. Interrogate him once more, why he desires happiness, and probably he may say, that he cannot tell, but that he is formed to desire it by the inexplicable constitution of his nature. In this man's opinion, it is evident that obedience to God ought to be the great rule of conduct, and that the prize of happiness is the ultimate object of pursuit and from the illustration it is equally plain, that the ultimate object of human pursuit is that object which is sought no man can possibly tell why; and that if a reason could be assigned for pursuing it, it could not possibly be the ultimate object. In strictness therefore, it is absurd to ask, "what ought to be the ultimate object of human pursuit ?” since the question supposes that some reason can be assigned, why it ought to be so. The ultimate object is that which nature compels us to pursue, without deigning to assign her reasons for prescribing it, or to consult us whether it ought or ought not to be prescribed. Mr. Forsyth affirms that the gratification of an involuntary feeling can never be "an ultimate object of human pursuit and a supreme rule of action." It certainly ought not to be a supreme rule of action, but it must be an ultimate object of pursuit. The ground of moral obligation is necessarily an involuntary feeling; a feeling, that is, universal, indestructible, and inexplicable. Mr. This is not a mere verbal controversy. A number of philosophers, as Mr. Forsyth remarks, have taken the universal desire of happiness as the basis of their philosophy, some contending that the attainment of happiness should be the immediate object of every action, but all assuming that it must be the ultimate object of human conduct. Forsyth argues against them all indiscriminately, on the ground that happiness is, after all, unattainable; forgetting, that the whole question respects a fact; that these philoso phers do not all say, man ought to pursue happiness," but, "man will pursue happiness;" that the ultimate principle of action can no more be attacked by arguments, than it can be supported by them; and that if the desire of happiness be really of this nature, it is as vain to warn men against obeying it, because it cannot be gratified, as to expostu late with a squirrel fascinated by a rattlesnake, or to warn a man falling from a mast-head against the danger of fracturing his own when he reaches the quarter-deck. On the other hand, this philosopher assigns two or three reasons why intellectual perfection should be our great object of pursuit. Now since reasons can be assigned for this, it is plain that the desire of intellectual perfection cannot be the ultimate principle of action, or the ground of moral obligation. What then is the ground of moral obligation? This question our author no where directly answers; thus displacing the desire of happiness, without substituting any thing in its room. The reasons, however, which Mr. Forsyth urges in favour of the pursuit of intellectual excellence, must be supposed to involve, in some way or other, the ultimate principle of action; the last appeal must be to some involuntary feeling common to all mankind, for there is no reasoning without data. Let us then cxamine the reasons in question. 1. It is contended that our utmost efforts can only procure for us a very limited degree of happiness; while the progress in intellectual improvement needs not to terminate but with life; and reason points out to us the propriety of bestowing our labour only where it will be productive. If nature imperatively enjoins us to pursue felicity, we have already observed, that it is idle to argue against it; but without particularly recurring to this observation, we may ask, whether it be a sufficient inducement to the pursuit of any object, to know that it can be attained? Mr. Forsyth allows that, although the search after happiness is fruitless, yet we may very easily succeed in making ourselves miserable; and if that which may be found, ought therefore to be sought, we may expect some future philosopher to maintain that pain is the chief good, and to have his phi: losophy to himself. labourer, whose whole exertions only procure him eight or nine shillings per week, must trust to chance for acquiring "the intrepidity, the perseverance, the skill, the foresight, and all the best energies of the human mind," excepting in that limited degree, in which these qualities are forced on him by the very nature of his humble profession. 2. The very form of the world, the vicissitudes of seasons and of events, the varieties of soil, climate, surface, and produce, the hostility of tempests, and seas and deserts, all combine, in this writer's opinion, to prove, that it was intended by its Creator, not as a scene of happiness, but as a grand nursery for our intellectual energies; and "we cannot (he remarks) go far wrong if we pursue what Supreme Wisdorn is pursuing." We happen to think that finite wisdom may go very far wrong, in pursuing what Supreme Wisdom pursues; but contenting ourselves with simply suggesting this distinction, we shall make our stand on another ground. Let it be granted (and Mr. Forsyth, who explodes the idea of future rewards and punishments, would find it hard to extort this concession from some men) that we ought to do that which God intends us to do. But are we left to collect the Divine intentions from a survey of the world? Have we not in our hands a book, proved to be a divine revelation by all the laws of evidence which the constitution of our nature leads us to obey? Is it not likely that the intentions of the Deity with respect to man can be collected at least as clearly, as fully, and as safely, from his word, as from his works? or is it not, to give it the mildest appellation, supreme trifling, to waste our time and toil in searching' the little sphere of our observation to Besides, it is incorrect to assert that the indefinite improvement of intellect is in every man's power, merely because every man has a find out God,' when He has himcapacity for improving indefinite- self thrown open to us the doors of ly. A considerable portion of our the sanctuary, which is enriched species have not the power, though with sensible emanations from the they have the capacity. The field-excellent glory to be erecting our perishable fabrics of osiers upon earth, when the new Jerusalem' itself has come down from God out of heaven?' We have strangely misread the Sacred Scriptures, if they point out intellectual excellence as the chief good of man; but as we shall afterwards enlarge farther on that subject, we need only say at present, that a system of philosophy, which has nothing for its basis but a very imperfect view of natural religion, must be itself imperfect indeed. 3. Of all the objects which the universe contains, mind (says Mr. Forsyth) is the most excellent. To endeavour to produce highly improved minds, is therefore, the most excellent employment of human industry." What is meant by the excellence of mind, we can as little understand, as Mr. Forsyth can understand the systems of those phiJosophers who have made propriety, truth, or fitness the foundation of virtue; and for the same reason, that excellence is a relative term. Perhaps the author intends here to imply what he elsewhere expresses, that mankind, after all, instinctively disapprove of such conduct, either in themselves or in others, as proceeds merely from a selfish desire of personal happiness, and that they instinctively admire that greatness of soul which disdains ease and comfort, and courts difficulty and danger. If so, there seem to be two or three distinctions, which he has overlooked. He seems, in the first place, to have overlooked the distinction between a conscious, formal, and deliberate pursuit of happiness, and that instinctive pursuit of happiness or (which is the same thing) agreeableness, that is implied in every act of volition. We do not always consciously act with a view to increase our own future ease and enjoyment; but all voluntary action necessarily supposes that we seek what is agreeable to us, and this is inevitably implied in all the words choice, prefeCHRIST. OBSERV. No. 53. rence, will, and their numerous synonimes or shades. A good man does a virtuous action without the smallest regard to consequences, that is, from a sense of duty alone; but it cannot be doubted that, in obeying this sense of duty, he does what is agreeable to him. Nor does this account by any means resolve moral approbation into a mere feeling; for judgment and reasoning may be pre-supposed. Those philosophers who have entertained the largest and grandest conceptions of the intrinsic beauty of virtue (such, for example, was the excellent and sensible Dr. Reid,) have yet held that the perception of moral beauty conveys pleasure to a well-tuned mind, as that of visual beauty conveys pleasure to a tasteful eye. Nearly allied to the distinction already noted, is another which our author seems also to have overlooked,-between selfishness and the pursuit of happiness. By a selfish man, we generally understand a man who can be happy at the expence of others, or at least who can enjoy solitary happiness, and is solicitous only for himself; but it is quite a mistake, therefore to infer, that a benevolent man is one who ministers to the happiness of others at the expence of his own. This may be said in popular language; but, in reality, the benevolent man is one who finds his own happiness in that of others, and who cannot be happy otherwise. Still more; our whole approbation of his conduct proceeds on the idea, that he is thus making himself happy, and if we could be persuaded that he sought the happiness of mankind from any other reason than because he found the search agreeable to himself, our approbation would die away. In the same manner, the patriot is a man who finds toil, danger, and death, less painful to him, than the uneasy consciousness of deserting his duty to his country; and the martyr is one, to whom torture itself is not so tormenting, as the idea of abandoning the cause of truth and of God. Rr theft. We may add, that our author apparently deserts his own principles, when he recommends self-approbation as a proper object of human pursuit ; for what is self-approbation but one of the noblest and most rational of pleasures? Indeed Mr. Forsyth not unfrequently (and it was inevitable) thus forgets him Whenever, therefore, we say of such characters that they "sacrifice their own happiness" to some other consideration, we must be understood to signify, that they sacrifice such pleasures as are commonly the most esteemed to other pleasures of a nobler and more elevated species. It sometimes, however, happens, even in common language, that we cha-self, and shews signs of his not beracterise their virtue more justly. ing perfectly weaned from what he Of a benevolent man, we say, "It considers as the universal "prejudice” is his greatest pleasure to do good;" in favour of happiness. and an eminent poet, with equal correctness and force, applies a similar phraseology to the martyr: "Did Shadrach's zeal my glowing breast inspire, "To weary torture, and rejoice in fire." That we have an intuitive admiration of natural fortitude, courage, sagacity, and similar qualities bespeaking strength of mind, we should not perhaps be very reluctant to admit ; nor shall we stop very curiously to enquire whether this admiration be a mode of that more general delight always conveyed to our minds by the idea of power, or to compute how much of the exchangeable value of these qualitiesin the great market of human life, is resolvable into the element of rarity. But from our experiencing this admiration, (which, by the way, is on this principle, an involuntary feeling,) it no more follows that we ought to practise what we admire, than it follows, that, because we admire a rope-dancer, we ought to move from place to place in a succession of capers and somersets. But that such great qualities as we have described, considered in themselves, can ever be the objects of moral approbation, that is, of any faculty, original or acquired, which can be called a moral sense, we beg leave utterly to deny; nor shall any reasoning ever convince us, that a rational agent feels the saine sort of regret when he has made a bull, or committed a blunder, or started at a flash of lightning, as when he has broken a promise, or perpetrated a One great and unanswerable objection to Mr. Forsyth's system (for we shall now consider this system, distinctly from his arguments in its favour,) is, that it tends to confound all moral distinctions. The author, indeed, disclaims this consequence, and, we are willing to believe, disclaims it honestly, but with what justice, it may be worth considering. He explicitly asserts that moral evil is, on the whole, necessary to the improvement of the intellect of the human species, and that, in this view, bad men "are useful to society at large." With no less explicitness does he pronounce virtue to consist entirely and solely in the promotion of intellect, whence it follows that the promotion of intel lect, as it is the only characteristic mark, must be the only test of virtue. Now to say that moral evil, in the mass, improves human intellect more than it would otherwise be im proved, is only to say that crimes in general (for these make up moral evil) improve human intellect more than it would otherwise be improv. ed. But to effect this improvement, happens to be the very characteristic property and sole test of virtue: and where then is the line between virtue and crimes? It is no answer, to allege that, though virtue and crimes both promote the progress of intel lect, yet a virtuous conduct always affords the best chance of the two, and should therefore be adopted. It is manifest that, if all men acted on this principle, all the wholesome benefits which the world derives from moral evil, would be lost, What we commonly call virtue is more effective in promoting intellectual improvement than what is commonly called vice; but yet, according to Mr. Forsyth, both together do more than virtue could accomplish alone; nor is there, on his system, a grain too much of iniquity in the world. Will it be said that it is intention alone which constitutes virtue, and that, as crimes increase the mass of intellect only unintentionally, the bad man cannot be accounted virtuous? It may be an ample reply, that the question does not respect the intentions with which crimes have been committed. Perhaps no wicked deed has ever been perpetrated from the sage motive of advancing the interests of mind (unless indeed the armed expedition of the French sçavans to Egypt may be thought an instance of this nature); but we have to enquire, whether crimes ought not to be pretty frequently committed by those who have the progress of intellect much at heart? If atrocities be necessary engines for the improvement of mind, with what face can the improvers of mind neglect to employ them? The question becomes the more emphatic, when it is recollected that, according to the genuine spirit of this philosophy, "even general rules ought, as far as possible, to be laid aside; and we ought to endeavour to act, not from the rule, but from the reason of the rule." (p. 309.) Keeping in mind this truth, the hero of Mr. Forsyth's school will, in every individual case, consider how he may best promote the interests of mind, whether by truth or falsehood, sobriety or intemperance, almsgiving or robbery; and from principle, not from passion, will take his measures accordingly. He may perhaps find, on some occasions, that a murder will go farther than a lecture; that the intellects of his pupils thrive wonderfully under a dry beating and breaking of bones; and that the rapidity of their progress is incredibly accelerated by casting, at intervals, one or more of them into a well. Sometimes his virtue may spread a bolder wing: he may perceive that the setting a village on fire in three places on a windy night, will make the survivors excellent philosophers; and that wisdom will be more extensively diffused by poisoning a river, than by publishing an octavo volume on the principles of moral science. Should all this be censured as exaggeration, let it at least be remembered, that the tendency to promote intellectual improvement is by no means a perfect test of virtue; and to illustrate this, let us examine what in fact would be that sort of character which the book before us is intended to create. It is obvious that we can notice only its more prominent peculiarities. One of the greatest objects of the virtuous man of this philosophy will, it seems, be gradually to divest himself of all the relative affections, as such, and to attain the art of valuing men, purely in proportion to their intellectual excellence. He must therefore, we suppose, love Confucius in China better than his aged mother who lives with him, unless he thinks her wiser than Confucius, which, it is to be presumed, very few aged mothers are. p. 228. He is to fight a duel, whenever it seems to him that the refusal of a challenge would destroy his influence in society, and consequently frustrate his plans for the improvement of mind. p. 241. He is to kill himself only when his death seems necessary to the welfare or moral improvement of mankind; and he would, it appears, quote the conduct of Samson in justification of his own; (with what propriety let the reader judge, after he has referred to some good commentator on the history of Samson). p. 266. He will make continual approaches to a state of complete emancipation from the influence of hope, fear, joy, and grief,-to a state, in which he can hear of the deaths of those |