sufficient to oppose to this inference, the general sense of the transaction, and the wideness of meaning which the term in question had attained. The proposal made to Christ was evidently allusive, in the mind of the speakers, to the general subject of matrimony. It arose from the universal practice that had prevailed in divorces after full marriage; and the Saviour would not have given an answer inapplicable to the purpose. At all events, if so minute a part of the obligation had been exclusively intended, there can be no doubt, I think, that Christ, who was now repeating an important part of his own moral law, would have stated it with that precision which became the subject, and which Moses had so particularly observed.-He would not have declared himself merely on the preliminary state of marriage, which was so short in duration, and therefore liable to so few accidents, and left the marriage itself,

a point of so much higher consequence, to a tacit and indirect inference of an opposite nature. No: his answer is given generally; and whether the Sponsalia are involved in it, or not, it manifestly comprehends the full condition of marriage. Besides, there is sufficient warrant from the known use of the term here disputed, to apply it openly to the case of adultery.

Selden observes the Hellenistic meaning of it in the first age of the Gospel, and that it was descriptive of every kind of impure connection. Omnimodum incestum, seu illicitum concubitum. St. Paul himself describes the sin of incest by it. 1 Cor. v. 1. Chrysostom uses it in characterising adultery itself:*—and, to mention but a single profane instance, Dio fixes the word on the conduct of one, at the bare mention of whose name, all married virtue turns pale,

*

Merà уáμov Tоgvεúwv. Vol. V. Disc. 50.

-Messalina.* The choice of the word, therefore, could not have been made with the view alleged. It is rather a generic term, comprehending the sin of licentiousness in general; and, by the nature of the transaction in question, easily applicable to the purpose particularly required.

Such, then, is the nature of the two institutions. By the Law of Moses, divorce for

* Ἐμοιχεύετο καὶ ἐπορνεύετο. In Vit. Claud.—The most portentous interpretation of Togveia, was that of Milton, who made it mean any thing which should be to the husband as grievous and intolerable as whoredom!— Milton was too well acquainted with Hillel. Indeed, all that he has written on this subject is warped with prejudice; and his great judgment was overborne by his greater passions. There is one master-sophistry which runs through the whole of his Tetrachordon: with the general precept of Charity in his mouth, he destroys the particular obligation of the marriage institution.-It is obvious, that the same might be done with every other duty in the Bible. Scripture might be employed in its self-annihilation, and the awfulness and sanctity of its commands might be explained away by its own liberality of spirit, and its merciful condescension to human weakness.

inferior causes was allowed, with full liberty to both parties, of marrying again. By the Law of Christ it was restrained to the cause of adultery only. But what is to be understood of the liberty of re-marriage? Does the divorce obtained by the innocent against the offending party, liberate fully the persons of both? Or, does an incapacity of all subsequent marriage attach to the crime of adultery committed against the first nuptial vow? Here is the great question upon the measure to be proposed to you, as it springs from Scripture. And, since a very learned and zealous Prelate, to whom I have before alluded, has thought proper that the nation should see the sentiments he expressed in Parliament, concerning it, and has thus made them publici juris,-I may take the liberty, I hope, of questioning his positions in any way that may be conducive to the proper examination of the subject. Allow me, therefore,

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to change for awhile the mode of my address, and to request the particular attention of the learned Prelate himself to this part of my statement.

your

My Lord, the question I venture to treat with you is not an exclusive one concerning the marriage of the adultress with her seducer, (though, for an obvious reason, you have made it the prominent part of argument,) but it equally applies to any other marriage contracted by her with one who may not have partaken in her first crime. This is the extent of your principles: and your inference is, that every such marriage, whether with a guilty or an innocent person, is a complete and gross adultery in both,-contracted and maintained in defiance of the Divine prohibition, and therefore incurring the pains of eternal damnation. This follows from your interpretation of the "Whosoever shall put away passage, "his wife, except it be for fornication, and