SUBSECT. II. Love's Beginning, Object, Definition, Division. . "Lah, beset with thorns," and for that cause, which OVE'S limits are ample and great, and a spatious walk it Scaliger reprehends in Cardan, "not lightly to be passed over." Least I incur the same censure, I will examine all the kinds of love, his nature, beginning, difference, objects, how it is honest or dishonest, a vertue or vice, a naturall passion, or a disease, his power and effects, how far it extends: of which, although something has been said in the first Partition, in those Sections of Perturbations (" for love and hatred are the first and most common passions, from which all the rest arise, and are attendant," as Picolomineus holds, or as Nich. Caussinus, the primum mobile of all other affections, which carry them all about them) I will now more copiously dilate, through all his parts and severall branches, that so it may better appear what Love is, and how it varies with the objects, how in defect, or (which is most ordinary and common) immoderate, and in excess, causeth melancholy. Love universally taken, is defined to be a Desire, as a word of more ample signification: and though Leon Hebreus, the most copious writer of this subject, in his third Dialogue make no difference, yet in his first he distinguisheth them again, and defines love by desire. "Love is a voluntary affection, and desire to enjoy that which is good. "Desire wisheth, Love enjoyes; the end of the one is the beginning of the other: that which we love is present; that which we desire is absent." "It is worth the labour," saith Plotinus, "to consider well of Love, whether it be a God or a Divell, or passion of the minde, or partly God, partly Divell, partly passion." He concludes Love to participate of all three, to arise from desire of that which is beautifull and fair, and defines it to be "an action of the mind desiring that which is good." Plato calls it the great Divell, for its vehemency, and sovereign.y over all Exerc. 301. Campus amoris maximus et spinis obsitus, nec levissimo pede transvolandus. Grad. 1. cap. 29. Ex Platone, primæ et Communissimæ perturbationes ex quibus ceteræ oriuntur et earum sunt pedissequæ. 'Amor est voluntarius affectus et desiderium rc bona fruendi. "Desiderium optantis, amor eorum quibus fruimur; amoris principium, desiderii finis, amatum adest. *Principio 1. de amore. Operæ pretium est de amore considerare, utrum Deus, an Dæmon, an passio quædam animæ, an partim Deus, partim Dæmon, passio partim, &c. Amor est actus animi bonum desiderans. Magnus Dæmon onvivio. other 66 a other passions, and defines it an appetite, "by which we desire some good to be present." Ficinus in his Comment addes the word Fair to this definition, Love is a desire of enjoying that which is good and fair. Austin dilates this common definition, and will have love to be a delectation of the heart, " for something which we seek to win, or joy to have, coveting by desire, resting in Joy." Scaliger Exerc. 301. taxeth these former definitions, and will not have love to be defined by Desire or Appetite; "for when we enjoy the things we desire, there remains no more appetite:" as he defines it, "Love is an affection by which we are either united to the thing we love, or perpetuate our union;" which agrees in part with Leon Hebreus. Now this love varies as its object varies, which is alwayes Good, Amiable, Fair, Gracious, and Pleasant. "All things desire that which is good," as we are taught in the Ethicks, or at least that which to them seems to be good; quid enim vis nali (as Austin well inferres) dic mihi? puto nihil in omnibus actionibus; thou wilt wish no harm I suppose, no ill in all thine actions, thoughts or desires, nihil mali vis; * thou wilt not have bad corn, bad soil, a naughty tree, but all good; a good servant, a good horse, a good son, a good friend, a good neighbour, a good wife. From this goodness comes Beauty; from Beauty, Grace, and comeliness, which result as so many rayes from their good parts, make us to love, and so to covet it: for were it not pleasing and gracious in our eyes, we should not seek. "No man loves (saith Aristotle 9. mor. cap. 5.) but he that was first delighted with comlines and beauty." As this fair object varies, so doth our love; for as Proclus holds, Omne pulchrum amabile, every fair thing is amiable, and what we love is fair and gratious in our eyes, or at least we do so apprehend and still esteem of it. ❝e Amiableness is the object of love, the scope and end is to obtain it, for whose sake we love, and which our minde covets to enjoy." And it seems to us especially fair and good; for good, fair, and unity, cannot be separated. Beauty shines, Plato saith, and *Boni pulchriq; fruendi desiderium. Godefridus, 1. 1. cap. 2. Amor est delectatio cordis, alicujus ad aliquid, propter aliquod desiderium in appetendo, et gaudium perfruendo per desidera currens, requiescens per gaudium. b Non est amor desiderium aut appetitus ut ab omnibus hactenus traditum; nam cum potimur amata re, non manet appetitns; est igitur affectus quo cum re amata aut unimur, aut unionem perpetuamus. Omnia appetunt bonum. * Terram non vis malam, malam segetem, sed benam arborem, equum bonum, &c. Nemo amore capitur nisi qui fuerit ante forma specieq; delectatus. • Amabile objectum amons et scopus, cujus adeptio est finis, cujus gratia amamus. Animus enim aspirat ut eo fruatur, et formam boni habet et præcipue videtur et placet. Picolomiueu», grad. 7. cap. 1. et grad. 8. cap. 35. by f by reason of its splendor and shining causeth admiration; and the fairer the object is, the more eagerly it is sought. For as the same Plato defines it," Beauty is a lively shining or glittering brightness, resulting from effused good, by ideas, seeds, reasons, shadowes, stirring up our minds, that by this good they may be united and made one. Others will have beauty to be the perfection of the whole composition, " caused out of the congruous symmetry, measure, order and manner of parts, and that comeliness which proceeds from this beauty is called grace, and from thence all fair things are gratious.' For grace and beauty are so wonderfully annexed, "h SO sweetly and gently win our souls, and strongly allure, that they confound our judgement and cannot be distinguished. Beauty and Grace are like those beams and shinings that come from the glorious and divine Sun," which are diverse, as they proceed from the diverse objects, to please and affect our severall senses: " As the species of beauty are taken at our eyes, ears, or conceived in our inner soul," as Plato disputes at large in his Dialogue de pulchro, Phædro, Hyppias, and after many sophistical errours confuted, concludes that beauty is a grace in all things, delighting the eyes, ears, and soul it self;. so that as Valesius infers hence, whatsoever pleaseth our ears, eys, and soul, must needs be beautifull, fair, and delightsome to us. "And nothing can more please our ears then musick, or pacifie our minds.' Fair houses, pictures, orchards, gardens, fields, a fair Hawk, a fair horse is most acceptable unto us; whatsoever pleaseth our eys and ears, we call beautifull and fair; "Pleasure belongeth to the rest of the senses, but grace and beauty to these two alone." As the objects vary and are diverse, so they diversly affect our eys, ears, and soul it self. Which gives occasion to some, to make so many several kindes of love as there be objects: One beauty ariseth from God, of which and divine love S. Dionysius* with many Fathers and Neotericks, have written just volumes, De amore Dei, as they term it, many parænetical discourses; another from his crea tures; there is a beauty of the body, a beauty of the soul, a Forma est vitalis fulgor ex ipso bono manans per ideas, semina, rationes, umbras effusus, animos excitans ut per bonum in unum redigatur. & Pulchritudo est perfectio compositi ex congruente ordine, mensura et ratione partium consurgens, et venustas inde prodiens gratia dicitur et res omnes pulchræ gratiosæ. Gratia et pulchritudo ita suaviter animos demulcent, ita vehementer alliciunt, et admirabiliter connectuntur, ut in unum confundant et distingui non possunt, et sunt tanquain radii et splendores divini solis in rebus variis vario modo fulgentes. Species pulchritudinis hauriuntur oculis, auribus, aut concipiuntur interna mente. * Nihil hinc magis animos conciliat quàm musica, pulchræ picturæ, ædes, &c. In reliquis sensibus voluptas, in his pulchritudo et gratia. Lib. 4. de divinis. Convivio Platonis. VOL. II. M beauty quam beauty from vertue, formam martyrum, Austin calls it, videmus oculis animi, which we see with the eys of our minde, which beauty, as Tully saith, if we could discern with these corporeal eys, admirabile sui amores excitaret, would cause admirable affections, and ravish our souls. This other beauty which ariseth from those extreme parts, and graces which proceed from gestures, speeches, severall motions, and proportions of creatures, men and women (especially from women, which made those old Poets put the three Graces still in Venus' company, as attending on her, and holding up her train) are infinite almost, and vary their names with their objects, as love of mony, covetousness, love of Beauty, Lust, immoderate desire of any pleasure, concupiscence, friendship, love, good-will, &c. and is either vertue or vice, honest, dishonest, in excesse, defect, as shall be shewed in his place: Heroicall love, Religious love, &c. which may be reduced to a twofold division, according to the principall parts which are affected, the Braine and Liver: Amor & amicitia, which Scaliger exercitat. 301. Valesius and Melancthon warrant out of Plato Piev and igav from that speech of Pausanias belike, that makes two Vencres and two loves. m One Venus is ancient without a mother, and descended from heaven, whom we call colestial; the younger, begotten of Jupiter and Dione, whom commonly we call Venus." Ficinius in his comment upon this place, cap. 8. following Plato, calls these two loves, two Divels, or good and bad Angels according to us, which are still hovering about our souls." The one rears to heaven, the other depresseth us to hell; the one good, which stirs us up to the contemplation of that divine beauty, for whose sake we perform Justice, and all godly offices, study Philosophy, &c. the other base, and though bad, yet to be respected; for indeed both are good in their own natures: procreation of children is as necessary as that finding out of truth, but therefore called bad, because it is abused, and withdrawes our soul from the speculation of that other, to viler objects;" so far Ficinus.. S. Austin lib. 15. de civ. Dei & sup. Psal. 64. hath delivered as much in effect. "Every creature is good, and may be loved well or ill:" and "Two cities make two loves, Jerusalem and Babylon, the love of God the one, the love of the Dux Vencres duo amores; quarum una antiquior et sine matre, cœlo nata, qi im cœlestem Vencrem nuncupamus; altera vero Junior à Jove et Dione prognata, quam vulgarem Venerem vocamus. Alter ad superna erigit, alter deprimit ad inferna. • Alter excitat hominem ad divinam pulchritudinem lustrandam, cujus causa philosophiæ studia & justitiæ, &c. creatura cum bona sit, et bene amari potest et male. faciunt amores; Jerusalem facit amor Dei, Babylonem amor sæculi; unusquisq; se quid amet interroget, et inveniet unde sit civis. P Omnis Duas civitates duo world world the other; of these two cities we all are Citizens, as by "Dogmata divini memorant si vera Platonis, If divine Plato's tenents they be true, Rules whom she will, both where and when. Bero. This twofold division of Love, Origen likewise followes in his Comment on the Canticles, one from God, the other from the Divell, as he holds, (understanding it in the worser sense) which many others repeat and imitate. Both which (to omit all subdivisions) in excesse or defect, as they are abused, or degenerate, cause melancholy in a particular kinde, as shall be shewed in his place. Austin, in another Tract, makes a threefold division of this love, which we may use well or ill: "God, our neighbour, and the world: God above us, our Alter mari ortus, ferox, varius, fluctuans, inanis, juvenum, mare referens, &c. Alter aurea catena cœlo demissa bonum furorem mentibus mittens, &c. Tria sunt, quæ amari à nobis benè vel malè possunt; Deus, proximus, mundus; Deus supra nos; juxta nos proximus ; infra nos mundus. Tria Deus, duo proximus, unum mundus habet, &c. M2 neighbour |