the defendant applied to the Court to direct the arbitrator to refund the difference: Held, that he came too late.-Brazier v. Bryant, 3 Moo. & Sc. 844.

6. (Making order of reference a rule of Court.-Award, how far controlled by recital.-Attachment for non-performance.) A judge's order for referring a cause may be made a rule of Court, though the defendant gave no authority to his attorney to consent to its being made a rule of Court. Where a cause and all matters in difference are referred, a recital in the award that the action was referred (not mentioning the other matters in difference) does not constitute an objection to the award on the face of it; such an objection should be made the ground of a separate application to set aside the award, supported by affidavits showing what were the other matters in difference. An attachment for non-performance of an award will not be granted if an action has been commenced, except on the terms of discontinuing the action and paying the costs. (1 B. & P. 81.)—Paull v. Paull, 2 C. & M. 235; 2 D. P. C. 340.

7. (Motion to set aside award, when made.) A motion to set aside an award made under an order of nisi prius, must be made within the first four days of the next term, though it is for objections on the face of the award.-Sell v. Carter, 2 D. P. C. 245.

8. Where a cause was referred, and the plaintiff attended before the arbitrator by counsel, without giving distinct notice to the opposite party that he intended to do so, the Court ordered the cause to be referred back to the arbitrator, and disallowed the plaintiff his costs of the day. In such a case the rule nisi objecting to the award ought to specify the grounds of the motion. (1 M'Clel. & Y. 394.) — Whatley v. Morland, 2 D. P. C. 249. 9. (Setting aside award, time for.) A motion to set aside an award made under a judge's order must be made promptly after the party knows of the award being made. Where such a motion was made after a lapse of two terms, the Court discharged it with costs, though it was alleged by the party applying that he did not believe that the other party intended to proceed upon the award, as there had been a previous revocation.-Worrall v. Deane, 2 D. P. C. 261.

And see ATTORNEY, 3.

ARREST.

(Privilege of Suitor from.) Where a party to a cause is arrested on process oissuing out of one Court, while attending at nisi prius in another Court in a expectation of a cause coming on, he must apply for relief to the judge at nisi prius, or to the Court out of which the process issues, and not to the Court in which the cause is.-Pitt v. Evans, 2 D. P. C..223. And see AMBASSADOR; PROCESS; PRACTICE, 7.

ARSON.

17

་རྗ

1. A score of faggots, piled one upon another in a loft, which was made by means of a temporary floor laid over an archway roofed in between two houses: Held not to be a stack of wood within 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 17.Rex v. Aris, 6 C. & P. 349.

G

21 Ascart hovel, consisting of a stubble roof supported by uprights, in a field at a distance from other buildings, is not an outhouse within the meaning of the statute 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 2. -Rex v. Parrot, 6 C. & P. 402. *

ASSAULT.:

(Certificate of Justices under 9 G. 4, c. 31, s. 27.) A certificate given by two justices under this statute is not available for the defendant in an action for the same assault, unless specially pleaded. Harding v. King, 6 C. & P. 427.

ASSUMPSIT.

1. (Consideration.) The plaintiff, an attorney conducting a fiat of bankruptcy, and having received a debt due to the bankrupt, undertook to pay to the defendant, the bankrupt's solicitor, the surplus that should remain of the sum so received after defraying certain charges incurred by the plaintiff, in consideration that the defendant would pay the costs of conducting the commission: Held, that there was not a sufficient consideration to support assumpsit on the defendant's promise to pay such costs, inasmuch as the plaintiff's engagement was one which he had not legally the power to perform. (3 Lev. 161; 3 T. R. 17.)-Haslam v. Sherwood, 10 Bing. 540.

2. (Consideration.) No action lies (for want of consideration apparent on the face of it) upon the following undertaking: :-"As you have a claim on my brother for £5 for shoes, I hereby undertake to pay the amount within six weeks from this date." (5 East, 10; 1 C. & J. 461; 6 Bing. 201; 7 B. Moore, 252.)-James v. Williams, 3 N. & M. 196.

ATTORNEY,

1. (Re-admission.) The Court will, on payment of a moderate fine, readmit an attorney who had inadvertently practised without a certificate through the omission of a clerk usually employed to take it out. (4 B. & Ald. 90.)—Exp. Rigby, 1 N. & M. 593.

2. (Duty of, as to deeds deposited with him.) An attorney with whom deeds are deposited by a client to obtain an advance of money on them, is bound on inquiry by the client to inform him where they are; and if, having placed them without the client's knowledge in the hands of a party from whom he has obtained such advance of money, he is unable to give him such information, he is chargeable with having mislaid them.Wilmott v. Elkington, 1 N. & M. 749.

3. (Lien for costs.) Two causes at the suit of the same plaintiff were referred, costs to abide the event; and the arbitrator in his award directed that the damages in one should be set off against the costs in the other : Held, that this could only be done subject to the lien of the plaintiff's attorney for his costs in the first cause. (Reg. Gen. H. T. 2 Will. 4, s. 93.) Cowell v. Betteley, 10 Bing. 432.

4. (Liability of, for negligence.) An attorney employed by a vendor to settle on his part the assignment of a term, allowed him to execute an unusual covenant (an unqualified covenant for quiet enjoyment,) without explaining to him the liability incurred thereby: Held, that he was responsible

1

to him for consequent loss, even though the client himself was at the time of his execution aware of the fact from which the liability arose (the death of a cestui que vie.)—Stannard v. Ullithorne, 10 Bing. 491.4

5. (Taxation of bill.) A defendant's attorney, having delivered to his client his bill of costs, from which more than one sixth is taxed off, cannot afterwards alter that proporition by adding on both sides of the account a sum received by him from his client, and paid into Court. (1 Taunt. 536 ; and see post, pl. 17.)-Hays v. Trotter, 3 N. & M. 174.

6. (Liability for costs of action brought without client's consent-Withdrawing juror.) An attorney brought an action without his client's authority; at the trial a juror was withdrawn. The Court refused to order the attorney to pay the defendant's costs.-Hammond v. Thorpe, 1 C. M. & R. 64. 7. (Application against, when to be made.) A rule calling on an attorney to answer the matters of an affidavit, cannot be moved for so late as four days before the end of the term, nor can cause be shown against such a rule on the last day of the term.-Exp. 2 D. P. C. 227.

8. (Attorney and client.) Where a client obtained an order that his attorney should deliver him an account of all monies received on his behalf, and he accordingly delivered an account, the Court refused to grant an attachment against him on affidavits impeaching the correctness of the account. Exp. Lawrence, 2 D. P. C. 230.

19. (Attorney and client.) An attorney has no right, as against his client, to retain in his hands money which he has received as his attorney, even though it be the proceeds of an execution against a defendant who objects to the amount levied, and who has a rule pending before the master, calling on the plaintiff or his attorney to refund the money.-Sibley v. Leicester, 2 D. P. C. 234.

10. (Attorney and client-Summary jurisdiction.) The Court will not interfere to compel an attorney to pay over money, the right to which depends upon the existence or non-existence of a special agreement between the client and the attorney, which the attorney disputes.-Hodson v. Terrill, 2 D. P. C. 264.

11. (Lien for costs.) A verdict was obtained in an action of trover for £200, to be reduced to 1s. if the goods were delivered up. The plaintiff became insolvent; but the defendant, on the application of the assignee, delivered up the goods to him: Held, that the plaintiff's attorney had no claim in respect of his lien for the costs, either against the assignee or the defendant, without either showing express notice, or making out a case of fraud.-Bloomfield v. Blake, 2 D. P. C. 272.

12. (Privilege of.) Since the Uniformity of Process Act, an attorney sued with an unprivileged person does not lose his privilege, and cannot be arrested. (1 Tyr. 274.)-Pitt v. Pocock, 2 C. & M. 146; Keep v. Biggs, 2 D. P. C, 278.

13. (Taxation of bill.) Several persons having agreed with a plaintiff to share the expense of an action (a feigned issue,) and he having paid the attorney's bill, and brought an action against one of those persons for

contribution, the Court, on that person's application, ordered the attorney's bill to be taxed, although it had been paid, and the defendant had paid his full share of the money into Court.-Grover v. Heath, 2 D. P. C, 285. 14. (Service on.) An attorney residing within a mile of the Exchequer Office is bound to enter in the proper book either his place of abode, or some other proper place where notices, &c. may be served upon him: if he reside beyond one mile, and within ten, he must enter some proper place within one mile; entering his place of abode, in such case, is not a sufficient compliance with the rule of Court (Exchequer) M. 1 Will. 4, pl. 8.-That rule extends to pleadings and all other proceedings, though only "notices, summonses, orders, and rules," are mentioned in it.Blackburn v. Peat, 2 C. & M. 244; 2 D. P. C. 293.

15. An attorney who has been employed by one party in a cause, and then discharged, is not therefore prevented from acting as the attorney of the opposite party, unless some case of misconduct be made out against him. (9 Bing. 1; 1 Jac. 300; 19 Ves. 261.)-Johnson v. Marriott, 2 C. & M. 183; 2 D. P. C. 343.

16. (Separate bills of costs.) Where several defendants defend separately by different attorneys, but all the business is in fact conducted by one, they are not entitled to charge by separate bills of costs, but must make a joint charge.-Nanney v. Kenrick, 2 D. P. C. 334.

17. (Taxation of bill.) A defendant's attorney, who receives from his client the amount of the debt and costs for the purpose of being paid over to the plaintiff, is not entitled to make that sum an item in his bill, so as to increase the amount of it, whereby less than one sixth may appear to be struck off on taxation.- Woollison v. Hodgson, 2 D. P. C. 360.

18. (Re-admission of Welsh attorney.) An attorney of Great Sessions in Wales, who had been once in practice, but had discontinued practising for more than six months before the passing of the 11 Geo. 4 and 1 Will. 4, c. 70, is not entitled to be admitted under that act, (s. 15, 16; 1 B. & Ad. 957.)-Erp. Garratt, 2 D. P. C. 376.

19. (Costs of taxation of bill.) In taxing an attorney's bill, if a full sixth be taken off, the attorney is always liable to the costs of taxation; if less than a sixth be taken off, it is still in the discretion of the Court to make him pay the costs or not; and where a large sum, very nearly a sixth, was taxed off, and the master charged the attorney with the costs, the Court declined to interfere. (8 Bing. 83.)—Baker v. Mills, 2 D. P. C. 382. 20. (Costs of taxation of bill.) An attorney took a bill of exchange from his client in payment of a bill of costs, but the bill of exchange not being paid, the attorney was sued upon it. The Court allowed him to pay the costs of taxing his bill (more than a sixth having been taken off) to the holder of the bill, in part-payment, instead of to his client.-Woollison v. Hodgson, 2 D. P. C. 351.

21. (Taxation of bill.) The master, to whom a bill of costs is réferred for taxation, has no power to inquire into the fact whether the business

charged for was agreed to be done for costs out of pocket.-Evans v. Taylor,

2 D. P. C. 349.

22. (Taxation of bill.) Where an action was brought by an attorney for his bill of costs, and the defendant obtained a judge's order to tax the bill, but which order did not contain any direction to the defendant to pay what should be found due, though he signed the usual consent in the judge's book; and another order was afterwards made for reviewing the taxation, which also contained no direction to the defendant to pay what was due; and the master found a sum of money to be due to the plaintiff, who made the latter order only a rule of Court: Held, that an attachment obtained thereupon was irregular, as that order contained no direction for the defendant to pay.-Ryalls v. Emerson, 2 D. P. C. 357. 23. (Privileged communication by prisoner to.) A prisoner in close custody on a charge of forgery, wrote to a friend" to ask Mr. G., or some other attorney, if the punishment was the same whether the names forged were those of real or fictitious persons." Mr. G. was not then or afterwards his attorney: Held, not a privileged communication.-Rex v. Brewer, 6 C. & P. 363.

24. (Right of, to discontinue action.) If an attorney has reasonable and probable grounds for commencing an action, and desists from prosecuting it, because he has subsequently discovered that it cannot be successfully proceeded with, he is entitled to recover his costs from his client.Lawrence v. Potts, 6 C. & P. 428.

And see INSOLVent, 3.

BAIL.

1. (Extent of their liability.) Under rule 21 of Hilary Term, 2 W. 4, the two bail together are liable only to the amount specified in their recognizance.-Vansandau v. Nash, 10 Bing. 329; 3 Moo. & Sc. 834.

2. (Liability of, after cognovit given.) The defendant, with consent of the bail, gave a cognovit with stay of execution, but did not pay the debt within the time limited. The plaintiff gave the bail no notice of this default. Half-a-year afterwards the defendant died: Held, that the plaintiff could not then proceed against the bail. (9 B. & C. 422.)-Surman v. Bruce, 10 Bing. 434.

3. (Render of principal in case of bankruptcy.) In the case of a London commission, the Court will not enlarge the time of the render of the principal until after his final examination before the commissioners of bankrupt. (4 Bing. 80.)-Coombs v. Dod, 3 Moo. & Sc. 817.

4. (Where put in.) A defendant arrested on an alias capias must put in bail in the county wherein he is arrested.-Rer v. Sheriff of Essex, in Levy v. Paine, 3 Moo. & Sc. 870.

5. (Acceptance of, a waiver of objection to affidavit of debt.) If the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, accepts without opposition bail named by the defendant, the defendant cannot afterwards move to discharge the bail on