SERMON XI. UPON THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. Preached on Advent Sunday, ROм. xiii. 9. And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly compre hended in this faying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. It is commonly obferved, that there is a difposition in men to complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they live, as greater than that of former ones; which is usually followed with this further observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the fame in all times. Now, not to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts of hiftory; thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly takes different turns, and fome particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages than in others: and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much Serm. XI. much the distinction of the present to profess a contracted fpirit, and greater regards to selfintereft, than appears to have been done formerly. Upon this account it seems worth while to inquire, whether private interest is likely to be promoted in proportion to the degree in which felf-love engroffes us, and prevails over all other principles; or whether the contracted affection may not poffibly be fo prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own end, private good. And fince, further, there is generally thought to be fome peculiar kind of contrariety between self-love and the love of our neighbour, between the pursuit of public and of private good; infomuch that when you are recommending one of these, you are supposed to be fpeaking against the other; and from hence arifes a fecret prejudice against, and frequently open fcorn of all talk of public spirit, and real good-will to our fellow-creatures; it will be neceffary to inquire what refpect benevolence hath to felf-love, and the purfuit of private intereft to the purfuit of public: or whether there be any thing of that peculiar inconfiftence and contrariety between them, over and above what there is between felf-love and other paffions and particular affections, and their respective pursuits. Thefe inquiries, it is hoped, may be favour ably ably attended to: for there fhall be all poffible conceffions made to the favourite paffion, which hath fo much allowed to it, and whofe cause is fo univerfally pleaded: it shall be treated with the utmoft tenderness and concern for its interests. In order to this, as well as to determine the forementioned questions, it will be neceffary to confider the nature, the object, and end of that felf-love, as diftinguished from other principles or affections in the mind, and their reSpective objects. Every man hath a general defire of his own happiness; and likewise a variety of particular affections, paffions, and appetites to particular external objects. The former proceeds from, or is felf-love; and feems infeparable from all fenfible creatures, who can reflect upon themselves and their own intereft or happiness, so as to have that interest an object to their minds: what is to be faid of the latter is, that they proceed from, or together make up that particular nature, according to which man is made. The object the former pursues is fomewhat internal, our own happiness, enjoyment, fatisfaction; whether we have, or have not, a distinct particular perception what it is, or wherein it confifts: the objects of the latter are this or that particular external thing, which the affections tend towards, and of which it hath always a particular idea or perception. The principle we call felf-love never feeks any thing external for the fake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or good particular affections reft in the external things themselves. One belongs to man as a reasonable creature reflecting upon his own intereft or happiness. The other, though quite diftinct from reafon, are as much a part of human nature. That all particular appetites and paffions are towards external things themselves, diftinct from the pleasure arifing from them, is manifefted from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior fuitablenefs between the object and the paffion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another, from eating food more than from fwallowing a stone, if there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than another. Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour, is as really our own affection, as felf-love; and the pleasure arifing from its gratification is as much my own pleasure, as the pleasure self-love would have, from knowing I myself should be happy fome time hence, would be my own pleasure. And if, because every particular affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arifing from its gratification his own own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such particular affection must be called felf-love; according to this way of fpeaking, no creature whatever can poffibly act but merely from felflove; and every action and every affection whatever is to be refolved up into this one principle. But then this is not the language of mankind: or if it were, we should want words to exprefs the difference, between the principle of an action, proceeding from cool confideration that it will be to my own advantage; and an action, fuppofe of revenge, or of friendship, by which a man runs upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another. It is manifest the principles of these actions are totally different, and fo want different words to be distinguished by: all that they agree in is, that they both proceed from, and are done to gratify an inclination in a man's felf. But the principle or inclination in one case is selflove; in the other, hatred or love of another. There is then a distinction between the cool principle of felf-love, or general defire of our own happiness, as one part of our nature, and one principle of action; and the particular affections towards particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and another principle of action. How much foever therefore is to be allowed to felf-love, yet it cannot be allowed to be the whole of our inward N 2 |