And first of all, it were very much to be wished that this did not take up fo great a part of conversation; because it is indeed a fubject of a dangerous nature. Let any one confider the various interefts, competitions, and little misunderstandings which arise amongst men; and he will foon fee, that he is not unprejudiced and impartial; that he is not, as I may speak, neutral enough, to trust himself with talking of the character and concerns of his neighbour, in a free, careless, and unreferved manner. There is perpetually, and often it is not attended to, a rivalship amongst people of one kind or another, in respect to wit, beauty, learning, fortune, and that one thing will infenfibly influence them to speak to the disadvantage of others, even where there is no formed malice or ill defign. Since therefore it is fo hard to enter into this fubject without offending, the first thing to be obferved is, that people fhould learn to decline it; to get over that strong inclination most have to be talking of the concerns and behaviour of their neighbour.

But fince it is impoffible that this fubject fhould be wholly excluded conversation; and fince it is neceffary that the characters of men fhould be known: the next thing is, that it is a matter of importance what is faid; and therefore, that we should be religiously scru

pulous and exact to fay nothing, either good or bad, but what is true. I put it thus, because it is in reality of as great importance to the good of fociety, that the characters of bad men fhould be known, as that the characters of good men should. People, who are given to scandal and detraction, may indeed make an ill use of this obfervation; but truths, which are of service towards regulating our conduct, are not to be disowned, or even concealed, because a bad ufe may be made of them. This however would be effectually prevented, if these two things were attended to. First, That, though it is equally of bad confequence to fociety, that men should have either good or ill characters which they do not deserve; yet, when you say somewhat good of a man which he does not deferve, there is no wrong done him in particular; whereas, when you fay evil of a man which he does not deferve, here is a direct formal injury, a real piece of injuftice done him. This therefore makes a wide difference; and gives us, in point of virtue, much greater latitude in speaking well than ill of others. Secondly, A good man is friendly to his fellowcreatures, and a lover of mankind; and so will, upon every occafion, and often without any, fay all the good he can of every body: but, fo far as he is a good man, will never be dif

pofed

posed to speak evil of any, unless there be fome other reafon for it, befides barely that it is true. If he be charged with having given an ill character, he will scarce think it a fufficient justification of himself to say it was a true one, unless he can also give fome farther account how he came to do so: a just indignation against particular instances of villainy, where they are great and scandalous; or to prevent an innocent man from being deceived and betrayed, when he has great trust and confidence in one who does not deserve it. Justice must be done to every part of a subject when we are confidering it. If there be a man, who bears a fair character in the world, whom yet we know to be without faith or honefty, to be really an ill man; it must be allowed in general, that we shall do a piece of service to society, by letting fuch an one's true character be known. This is no more than what we have an instance of in our Saviour himself d; though he was mild and gentle beyond example. However, no words can exprefs too strongly the caution which should be used in such a cafe as this.

Upon the whole matter: If people would obferve the obvious occafions of filence, if they would fubdue the inclination to tale

bearing, and that eager defire to engage attention, which is an original disease in some minds; they would be in little danger of offending with their tongue; and would, in a moral and religious fenfe, have due government over it.

I will conclude with fome precepts and reflections of the Son of Sirach upon this fubject. Be Swift to hear; and, if thou hast understanding, answer thy neighbour; if not, lay thy hand upon thy mouth. Honour and Shame is in talk. A man of an ill tongue is dangerous in his city, and he that is rash in his talk shall be hated. A wife man will hold his tongue till he fee opportunity; but a babbler and a fool will regard no time. He that useth many words fhall be abhorred; and he that taketh to himSelf authority therein, fhall be hated. A backbiting tongue hath difquieted many; Strong cities hath it pulled down, and overthrown the houfes of great men. The tongue of a man is his fall; but if thou love to hear, thou shalt receive understanding.

SERMON

SERMON V.

UPON COMPASSION.

ROM. xii. 15.

Rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them

that weep.

EVERY man is to be confidered in two capacities, the private and public; as defigned to pursue his own interest, and likewife to contribute to the good of others. Whoever will confider, 'may see, that in general there is no contrariety between these; but that from the original conftitution of man, and the circumstances he is placed in, they perfectly coincide, and mutually carry on each other. But, amongst the great variety of affections or principles of action in our nature, fome in their primary intention and design seem to belong to the single or private, others to the public or social capacity. The affections required in the text are of the latter fort. When we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and compaffionate their diftreffes, we, as it were, fubftitute them