صور الصفحة
PDF
النشر الإلكتروني

358 Priestley's Doctrine of Philofophical Necessity illustrated.

preceded and directed by motives; and if they were told of any determination of the mind not produced by motives, good or bad, they would never be brought to think there could be any thing moral, any thing virtuous or vicious in it, any thing that could be the proper object of praife or blame, reward or punishment.'-On the other hand he contends, that the doctrine of philofophical liberty, or of an arbitrary felf-determining power, uninfluenced by motives, intirely difqualifies a man from being the proper fubject of blame or approbation.-An appofite example with which he enforces and illuftrates his arguments on this head deferves to be given entire. We fhall tranfcribe the greater part of it.

[ocr errors]

'Let us fuppofe,' fays the Author, two minds conftructed, as I may fay, upon the principles of the two oppofite schemes of liberty and neceffity; all the determinations of the one being invariably directed by its previous difpofitions, and the motives prefented to it, while the other fhall have a power of determining, in all cafes, in a manner independent of any such previous difpofition or motives; which is precifely the difference between the fyftems of neceffity and liberty, philofophically and strictly defined. To avoid circumlocution, let us call the former A. and the latter B. I will farther fuppofe myself to be a father, and thefe two my children; and, knowing their inward make and conftitution, let us confider how I fhould treat them.

'My object is to make them virtuous and happy. All my precepts, and the whole of my difcipline, are directed to that end. For the ufe of difcipline is, by the hope of fomething that the fubjects of it know to be good, or the fear of fomething that they know to be evil, to engage them to act in fuch a manner as the person who has the conduct of that discipline well knows to be for their good ultimately, though they cannot fee it.-'

"Now, fince motives have a certain and neceffary influence on the mind of A. I know that the profpect of good will certainly incline him to do what I recommend to him, and the fear of evil will deter him from any thing that I wish to diffuade him from; and therefore I bring him under the courfe of difcipline above described with the greatest hope of fuccefs. Other inAuences, indeed, to which he may be expofed, and that I am not aware of, may counteract my views, and thereby my object may be fruftrated; but, notwithstanding this, my difcipline will, likewife, have its certain and neceffary effect; counteracting in part, at leaft, all foreign and unfavourable influence, and therefore cannot be wholly loft upon him. Every promife and every threatening, every reward and every punifhment, judiciously adminiftered, works to my end. If this difcipline be fufficient to overcome any foreign influence, I engage my fon in a train of proper actions, which, by means of the mechanical

Aruciure

ftructure of his mind, will, at length, form a ftable habit, which infures my fuccefs.'

But in my fon B. I have to do with a creature of quite another make. Motives have no neceflary or certain influence upon his determinations; and in all cafes where the principle of freedom [or exemption] from the certain influence of motives takes place, it is exactly an equal chance whether my promifes or threatenings, my rewards or punishments, determine his actions or not. The felf-determining power is not at all of the nature of any mechanical influence, that may be counteracted by influences equally mechanical; but is a thing with refpect to which I can make no fort of calculation, and against which I can make no provifion. Even the longest continued feries of proper actions will form no habit that can be depended upon; and therefore, after all my labour and anxiety, my object is quite precarious and uncertain."

If we suppose that B. is, in fome degree, determined by motives, in that very degree, and no other, is he a proper fubject of difcipline; and he can never become wholly fo, till his felfdetermining power be intirely difcharged, and he comes to be the fame kind of being with A. on whom motives of all kinds have a certain and neceffary influence. Had I the making of my own children,' fays the Author, they fhould certainly be all conftituted like A. and none of them like B.'

[ocr errors]

With respect to the trimming scheme, if we may fo call it, alluded to in the laft paragraph-which is adopted by fome, who, at the fame time that they are conftrained to allow that motives have an influence on the human mind, allege neverthelefs that it is poffeffed likewife of a felf-determining power, which acts arbitrarily, and independently of motives-the Author obferves that the two fchemes, of liberty and neceffity, admit of no medium between them; that all the virtue and merit, all the foundation for praife, take place just fo far as neceffity takes place; and fail juft to far as this imaginary liberty of choice, acting independently of motives, interferes to obftruct it.'

As this queftion hath, as the Author obferves, been rendered. more obfcure than perhaps any other in the whole compafs of philofophical difcuffion, by an unfair and improper manner of ftating it; we fhall prefent our readers with another view of it, in which Dr. Prieftley undertakes to fhew that there is all the foundation that we can wifh, for a proper accountableness, and for praife and blame, on the doctrine of neceffity; and not fo much as a fhadow of any real foundation for them upon any other fuppofition."

When I, or the world at large,' fays he, we tell him we admire his excellent difpofition, which all good motives have a certain and

5

praife my fon A. in confequence of. never-failing ir

Auence

fluence upon his mind, always determining his choice to what is virtuous and honourable; and that his conduct is not directed either by mere will, or the authority of any other person, but proceeds from his own virtuous difpofition only; and that his good habits are fo confirmed, that neither promifes nor threatenings are able to draw him afide from his duty.

In this representation I am confident that I keep back nothing that is cffential. The ideas of mankind in general never go beyond this, when they praise any perfon, nor, philofophically peaking, ought they to do it. Praife that is founded on any other principles is really abfurd; and if it was understood by the vulgar, would be reprobated by them, as intirely repugnant to their conceptions of it. This will clearly appear by confidering the cafe of my fon B.

*

We have fuppofed that A has done a virtuous action, and has been commended, becaufe it proceeded from the bent of his mind to virtue; fo that whenever proper circumstances occurred, he neceffarily did what we wifhed him to have done. Let us now fuppofe that B does the very fame thing; but let it be fairly understood, that the cause of his right determination was not any bias or difpofition of mina in favour of virtue, or because a good motive influenced him to do it; but that his determination was produced by fomething within him (call it by what name you please) of a quite different nature, with respect to which, motives of any kind have no fort of influence or effect, a mere arbitrary pleafure, without any reafon whatever (for a reafon is a motive) and I apprehend he would no more be thought a proper fubject of praife, notwithstanding he should do what was right in itself, than the dice, which, by a fortunate throw, fhould give a man an estate. It is true the action was right, but there was not the proper principle, and motive, which are the only juft foundations of praife.

In fhort, where the proper influence of motives ceafes, the proper foundation of praife and blame difappears with it; and a felf-determining power, fuppofed to act in a manner independent of motive, and even contrary to every thing that comes under that defcription, is a thing quite foreign to every idea that bears the leaft relation to praife or blame. A good action produced in this manner is no indication of a good difpofition of mind, inclined to yield to the influence of good impreffions, and therefore is nothing on which I can depend for the future. Even a feries of good actions, produced in this manner, gives no fe

Such feems to have been the neceffity of acting virtuously, afcribéd to Cato by Paterculus, as quoted by Hobbes and the Author. Patercules praifes him because he was good by nature-et quia aliter effe non potuit.

curity for a proper conduct in future inftances; becaufe fuch actions can form no habit, i. e. no neceflary tendency to a particular conduct; but every thing is liable to be reverfed by this felf determining principle, which can turn a deaf ear to all motives,

and all reafons.'

Among the objections to the doctrine of neceffity, it has been urged, that men firmly perfuaded of the truth of it, or convinced that no action or event could have been, or can poffibly be, otherwife than it has been, is, or is to be, must be wholly indifferent with refpect to their conduct in life. The Author anfwers that this would be the cafe if their own actions and determinations were not neceffary links in this chain of caufes and events, and if their good or bad fuccefs did not, in the ftricteft fenfe of the word, depend upon themselves.' - Nay, he affirms that, in fact, the fyftem of neceffity makes every man the maker of his own fortune, in a stricter fenfe than any other fyftem whatever." The following example is given to illuftrate this part of his doctrine.

The Author premifes that, according to the established laws of nature, our provifion for the next year and all the events relating to it, are, in fact, abfolutely fixed, and nothing can interfere to make them otherwife than they are to be: But will any farmer,' fays he, believing this ever fo firmly, neglect, on this account, to fow his fields, and content himfelf with faying, "God knows how I shall be provided for the next year: I cannot change his decree, and let his will be done?" We fee, in fact, that fuch a perfuafion never operates in this manner; because, though the chain of events is neceffary, our own determinations and actions are neceffary links of that chain. This gives the farmer the fulleft affurance, that if it be decreed for him to ftarve, it is likewife decreed for him to neglect to fow his fields; but if he do fow his fields, which depends intirely upon himself, that then, fince the laws of nature are invariable, it will be evident that no fuch unfavourable decree had gone forth.'

After fhewing the moral advantages derived from a belief in the doctrine of neceffity, the Author anfwers an objection to it, the folving of which Mr. Hume confidered as "having been found hitherto to exceed all the fkill of philofophy;" that is, to use his own words, " to explain diftinctly how the Deity can be the mediate caufe of all the actions of men, without being the author of fin, and moral turpitude" [Effays, vol. ii. fect. 8, pag. 114, edit. in 8vo. But did not this writer know,' fays Dr. Priestley, what is known to all the world, that the motive or intention with which a thing,is done, is the circumftance that principally conftitutes its morality? Men who act from a bad intention are certainly vicious; but though God may be the ultimate cause of that bad difpofition, yet, fince he produces it from a good motive, in order to bring good out of REV. May, 1778.

B b

it,

-

it, he is certainly not vicious, but good, and holy in that re fpect.'-It should be confidered too, he adds, that upon any fcheme that admits of the divine prefcience, God must appear the proper caufe of evil, as much as on the fcheme of neceffity:- for ftill God is fuppofed to foresee, and permit, what was in his power to have prevented, which is the very fame thing as willing and directly caufing it.'-Indeed they who have attempted to account for the origin of evil in general, either by fhewing that it is, in the end, productive of greater good, or in any other manner, have by their folutions anticipated this difficulty; at least, the neceffarian fcheme does not increase it.

In the remaining fections the Author fhews how far the fcriptures are favourable to the doctrine of neceffity, and in what refpects the latter differs from the predeflination of the Calvinifts; clofing the performance with an answer to the author of the Letters on Materialism, &c. *-With respect to the treatise itselfthe pretty large extracts which we have given from it will be fufficient to afford our Readers a general notion of some of the Author's arguments and illuftrations, and of the popular or familiar manner in which he has treated this abftrufe fubject. We have declined making any obfervation with respect to the queftion itself;-efpecially as we learn that Dr. Price and the Author have entered into an amicable controverfy on the fubject, the result of which will foon be prefented by them jointly to the Public. B...y.

[ocr errors]

ART. X. ANDERSON's Obfervations on the Means of exciting a Spirit of national Industry, concluded. See Review for laft Month. N two former numbers we explained the outlines of that plan for the improvement of his native country, fketched out by our patriotic Author. In the twelfth and following letters he anfwers feveral objections that had been made to fome facts which he had mentioned; and is at great pains to fhow that it was not from inadvertence that he had afferted that English wool is now of a quality much inferior to what it was in former times. To prove that this is actually the cafe, he gives a fuccinct review of the trade in wool, and of the progrefs of our woollen manufacture from the earliest period to the prefent time. This part of the book will be particularly interefting to our English readers; as he here brings to light fome facts which have been overlooked by political writers in general, and corrects many erroneous opinions adopted by hiftorians on this fubject. It is indeed but of late that hiftorians have lent much if any attention to the progrefs of ufeful arts, fo that it is no wonder if they fometimes fall into mistakes, or adopt with too little caution, vulgar prejudices that have been generally received.

For an account of those Letters, fee the first Article in our Review for February, 1777.

- Instead

« السابقةمتابعة »