inhabitants and other excesses. He sent the intelligence of the revolt by an express to General Washington, who, considering the number of the mutineers and the apparent justice of their complaints, recommended to him not to use force, which might inflame their passions, increase opposition, keep alive resentment, and tempt them to turn about and go to the enemy, who would not fail to hold out alluring offers. He advised General Wayne to draw from them a statement of their grievances, and promise to represent the case faithfully to Congress and the State of Pennsylvania, and endeavour to obtain redress.

These judicious counsels had the effect desired. A committee of Congress, joined by the President of Pennsylvania, met the revolters at Trenton, and made proposals to them, which were accepted, and they gave up their arms. An ambiguity in the written terms of enlistment was one of the principal causes of dissatisfaction. The agreement on the part of the soldiers was, to serve for three years or during the war. By the interpretation, which the officers gave to these expressions, they bound the soldiers to serve to the end of the war; whereas the soldiers insisted, that they engaged for three years only, or during the war if it should come to an end before the three years had elapsed. Accordingly they demanded a discharge at the expiration of that period. This construction being allowed, it was the means of disbanding a large part of the Pennsylvania line for the winter, but it was recruited again in the spring to its original complement. The revolters were indignant at the suspicion of their going to the enemy, and scorned the idea, as they expressed it, of turning Arnolds. Two emissaries sent among them with overtures from Sir Henry Clinton were given up, tried by a court-martial, and executed.

Not knowing how far this example might infect the troops generally, the sufferings of all of whom were not less than those of the Pennsylvania line, General Washington took speedy measures to prevent the repetition of such a scene as had just occurred. He ordered a thousand trusty men to be selected from the regiments in the Highlands, and held in readiness to march, with four days' provisions, at the shortest notice. The wisdom of this precaution was soon put to the proof; for news came, that the New Jersey troops, stationed at Pompton and Chatham, were in a state of mutiny, having risen in arms against their officers, and threatened to march to Trenton, where the legislature of the State was then in session, and demand redress at the point of the bayonet. The case required promptness and energy. Six hundred men were put under the command of General Howe, with orders to march and crush the revolt by force, unless the men should yield unconditional submission and return to their duty. These orders were faithfully executed. Taken by surprise, the mutineers were compelled to parade without their arms, make concessions to their officers, and promise obedience. To impress them with the enormity of their guilt, and deter them and others from future acts of the kind, two of the ringleaders were tried by a field court-martial and shot. By this summary proceeding the spirit of mutiny in the army was subdued.

In the midst of these distracting events Washington was employed, at the request of Congress, in affording important counsels to Colonel John Laurens, who had been appointed on a mission to France, for the purpose of obtaining a loan and military supplies. Such was the deranged state of the currency, so low had the resources of the country been drained, and

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so feeble was the power of drawing them out, that, in the opinion of all, the military efforts of the United States could not be exerted with a vigor suited to the exigency of the occasion, nor even with any thing more than a languishing inactivity, unless sustained by succours from their allies both in money and supplies for the army. The sentiments of Washington, communicating the fruits of his knowledge, experience, and judgment, with the weight of his name, were thought essential to produce a just impression on the French cabinet. He wrote a letter to Colonel Laurens, remarkable for its appropriateness and ability, containing a clear and forcible representation of facts, with arguments in support of the application of Congress, which was first presented by that commissioner to Dr. Franklin, and afterwards laid before the ministry and the King. The influence of this letter, in procuring the aids solicited from the French government, may be inferred from the circumstance of the loan being accompanied with the suggestion, that the money to be appropriated for the army should be left at the disposal of General Washington.

The existence of an army, and the prosecution of war, depend on the power of the civil head of a nation, as well as on its resources. So loose were the ties by which the confederacy was bound together, so limited was the control exercised by Congress over the States, and so little inclined were the parts to unite in a consolidated whole, that, from imbecility on the one hand and public apathy on the other, Washington became more and more fearful of the consequences. "The great business of war," said he, "can never be well conducted, if it can be conducted at all, while the powers of Congress are only recommendatory. While one State yields obedience, and another refuses it, while a third mutilates

VOL. I.

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