Lastly, if Limit (End) is the proper nature of Something, Something is evidently the Finite, or that which is of an ended nature-ended and endable, inasmuch as there is reference to a negating Other.

The remark that follows is prompted by this-that Hegel in the second chapter has passed into the moment of the Ur-theil, and he excuses the affirmative nature of the findings under the first division A-affirmative though the moment is negative-by pointing out that, if in the first instance we had a positive verdict, and the Urtheil almost in the form of the Begriff, we shall now, under the second division, find all as negative as can be wished, and the Urtheil fairly as Urtheil.

Bestimmung

Terms here are thus explained. emerging from the development as the Qualification or what sort which it is, is accurately defined; and Beschaffenheit no less so. Immanent is in every English Dictionary.

a. Something and an Other.

This is certainly very difficult thinking; but it is, at the same time, perhaps, the deepest, the most penetrating, the most comprehensive, which the modern world has ever witnessed. Under the first moment, marked 1, there are three sub-moments: Firstly, to Simple Apprehension, both (Something and Other) are Something; secondly, to Judgment, both are Other; thirdly, to Reason, the Other is the Other for itself, and just so also is it, at the same time, Something, or the Something. That both are Something, and that both are relatively Other, we may take this as quite plain, without more explanation; but the Other isolated and for itself is more difficult. Yet this is not so very difficult when the true point of

view is attained to. The Other belongs not to the Somethings themselves; it is quite external to them; it is something else than they, then; something independent, sui generis, and on its own account: it may be isolated, then, and considered for itself, and so on. Then the Other as Other must just be this externality as such of Nature it is always to Spirit its Other, and nothing but its Other, at the same time that it is in its own nature simply the Other as such. Then this Other by self-reflexion sublates itself, and otherness remains simply a distinguishedness-a relativity, not a substantiality and positivity. These are great thoughts: they are the truth of Idealism, or, rather, they are that idealistic Realism which is the only True, and which extends to each moment of the antithesis its own rights, in such manner that each is seen to be but the necessary complementary reciprocal of the other.

Under number 2, we are to expect a moment of distinction; and that it proves to be, for the poles of the single antithesis, which were at first Being and Nothing, are now distinguished as Being-in-self and Being-for-other. So far as words are concerned, Hegel's own seem sufficient. We may just point out in passing, that a firm view of Non-There-being may be procured by considering the constitution of There-being, in which the element of Negation, which was still, however, There-being, is what is now referred to as the Non-There-being. Again, we may remark that we have all our materials still before us, and need not move from the spot, neither to please Haym, who will have it that we do move, nor Rosenkranz, who certainly, in all conscience, moves enough, and never thinks, indeed, of staying by the spot. The phrase 'their truth is their reference,' or 'their reference is

their truth,' is understood at once when the Something is thought as othering itself in itself; for the other and the reflexion to self are very plainly mutual complements, true only in their sum. Again, it is well worthy the reader's deepest consideration, how it is that Being is just reference to self: there is a little corner in these paragraphs whence there is a good glimpse into this. Certainly, we are not limited to our own materials, but the findings will be found true for all materials: it is true, for instance, of all Somethings, and of all Others, that their truth is their reference.

Under number 3, as is natural to expect now, we shall find the moments which have been but just disjoined re-united again. There is no difficulty here, indeed, to those who have followed what precedes : the most of the space, in fact, is taken up with certain explanations. What we see first is, that the Other is still in the Something, though this latter has gone into itself. Circumstance has been chosen expressly to translate Umstand, which is here the Being-for-other. The sense of In-itself is made very plain here. We have spoken of it as implying latent potentiality; but this we see now is a secondary nuance. The In-itself is, first of all, just the counter-reflexion to Being-forother; but then, In-itself without Being-for-other is only abstract-is only potential. The Being-for-other, in fact, as regards the constitution of any Something, is in the In-itself, or just is in it, and is truly the Something, is truly the In-itself, or is just truly it. This is all amply illustrated in the text;-especially striking is it that In-itself as a characterisation simply abstract is simply also external. There is no allowance to be made, then, for what we are in ourselves, unless in relation to what we are-or have manifested ourselves -for others.

The Thing-in-itself is here made plain; and the simple trick Reflexion plays itself in such distinctions is very simply and happily exposed. The true In-itself is the Notion, whether as Totality or individual detail: this, however, we see, requires Setzen, requires position ; for the an sich is just at first the abstract Begriff. That suggests the special meaning of Gesetztseyn, which is so difficult to render in English. We are here in seyn, Being; but Being is the reference to self, and each of its moments, therefore, will be as bëent or self-referent. A character of self-substantiality will attach to cach, and movement among them will be but a passing from one to the other. But the result of self-reference is Being-in-self, or the In-itself; and so it is that Being is so much or so wholly Ansichseyn. The moments, then, here are rather set or posited, than that they set or posit each other; which latter movement is that peculiar to Wesen or Essence. This Hegel illustrates by examples from both spheres. If it is difficult to translate, we are not allowed, then, nevertheless, to fail to understand. Under Being, the action of Setzen is to explicate, or to make the implicit explicit. This is a process of evolution, expression, realisation, statement, and it is usually named logical position. Under Essence or Wesen, the moments of evolution become overtly reciprocal, or the one posits, sets, or stakes the other. As we have seen, right sets left, left right, &c. Anything thus set, then, is not independent and selfsubsistent; it is derivative, representative, vicarious, subdititious, surrogative, pronominal; it is a reaction, a recoil, a rebound or redound, a replication, a reflexion, a reciprocation, it is an exinvolute, an eximplicate, an occasionate. In this way, one can see the meaning of ein Gesetztes. Again, Gesetztseyn just expresses the

abstract quality of all this: it is posititiousness, adjectitiousness, ascriptitiousness, attributiveness, assertiveness, &c. &c. In short, we are to see the universal presence of reflexion and reciprocation, of relativity and correlativity, or of the relative inference already spoken of. No doubt, Hegel sees in Setzen, to set, or stake, or put in place of, and from this the rest derives. In reference to the Metaphysical methods that preceded his own, he has good, right to say that this element of mutuation and reflexion never entered, and that the whole effort was to maintain something positive. We may fancy Hegel teasing out substantial unity into a whole world of reflexion; and then, in that case, one might say, What is, is Gesetztseyn, mere reflexion, mutuation, mutuatitiousness.

b. Qualification, Talification, and Limit.

We have seen the Being-for-other declared in the Something, in it, rather than in its in-itself. This is a dredging or deepening of abstract In-itself, into a capability of the Being-for-other. Or the Being-forother being reflected into the In-itself, this In-itself is now be-mediated (concretely furnished) thereby. It is no longer abstract latent potentiality which is before us as the In-itself; the Being-for-other seems now reflected into its depths, and to lie within it, mediating it, or giving it a concrete interior. Nevertheless, the In-itself is still abstract in that it holds in it a mere reflexion of the Being-for-other, and is still provided with negation or with Being-for-other. But what is mirrored here is just inner qualification, inner determination proper, or peculiar inner nature. One can understand this, and how the notion of capacity or capa