their unity is not yet mutuated. We can see now the full force of the mutuated; each side remaining abstract, or separate, there is difference, duality, mutual inequality; but when it is seen that the voice still is in the note, Being still is in There-being, then reconciliation has taken place, the concrete truth is restored, the unity of the two sides is mutuated, is set. What follows about Finitude, Determinateness as such, relative and absolute Determinateness, is now easy. In Being-for-self, the Difference between Being and Determinateness or Negation is posited and equated'—this also is plain; the dif-ference between the two sides, Voice and Note, is mutuated and ausgeglichen, levelledout, equated.

Quality, Otherwiseness, Reality, Being-in-itself, Ought-to, &c., are the imperfect infigurations of the Negative into Being, &c.' The series of Notes is a series of infigurations, indentations, into the voice, and they are imperfect so long as they are held to be different from the voice. Einbildung, however, must be seen to imply its usual sense of subjective conceit and conceiting, as well as its literal meaning of infiguration: the assignments in question have that in them which approximates them to subjective fancies; they are not regarded in their truth when regarded as absolute. The application of our illustration to what follows may now be left to the reader. We may remark in passing on ungleich, ausgeglichen, and Einbildungen as examples of that favourite Hegelian irony in which the direct, literal, structural sense flirts or coquets with the reflex, figurative, and conventional one. Indeed, Setzen, Daseyn, Differenz, and even Vollendet, are in the same key: as regards Setzen, Hegel has gone back to its ancient idiomatic, collo

quial sense; Daseyn is to be seen both as There-ness and as this Being here below; the Differenz is the difference, as the Unter-schied is the inter-cern; and we are even to see that Vollendet applies to what is not only ended, but full. As we have seen, too, this verbal care of Hegel extends itself into a syllabic one: in Vergleichung, for example, we are perpetually made to see that it is a comparison. Then the terminations haft, ig, lich, sam, are never lost sight of; and, as regards the verbs, such prefixes as er, ver, zer, are his very instruments. As respects these, the student of Hegel ought to consult the more advanced grammars.

A.

BEING-FOR-SELF AS SUCH.

Here the notion Being-for-self is completely precised. The distinction between consciousness and selfconsciousness, which is wholly German, ought to be well borne in mind. The expression appearant is a translation of erscheinend which seems forced on us : we are to see that a certain duality is always implied in this word; there is an outer show or shine or seeming or appearance which appears other and independent, but which is still only a moment, only ideell in another and inner. Self-consciousness, though further advanced and more concrete than Being-for-self, is still abstract when compared with the Absolute Spirit.

a. Here-being (There-being), and Being-for-self.-b. Beingfor-One.

The distinctions here are subtle, but they are simple, and they are intelligibly put. In Being-for-self the real and the ideal sides, or the Finite and the Infinite;

that is to say, the Notes and the Voice, Daseyn and Seyn, have fallen equal, have fallen identical. So far as there is Notification, there is Voice; and so far as there is Voice, there is Notification; or so far as there is definite Being, there is infinite Being, &c. There is present but a single ideality, which, at the same time, is rather a single Many than a single One. We have before us, so to speak, a sentient material breadth; so far as there is sentiency there is matter, and so far as there is matter there is sentiency; the diffusion and the concentration, the extension and the intension, are coincident; but there is not properly a One on either side-there is only a Beingfor-One. We have, in fact, only a simple solution, in which solvent and solvend are co-extensive but such solution cannot be viewed as yet quite One; it is rather a self-identical breadth than a self-identical One.

From this there will now be little difficulty in reading (b.) the Being-for-One. There is only a Beingfor-Other;' the notification reflected into the voice is but a single system, a single Being-for-other, and so a Being-for-one. The notification is the sublated other; the voice is at once sublatedness of this other, and referent of itself to itself as to this sublated other: the voice, then, like the sublated notification, is also only for-One. The conclusion, God is, therefore, for himself, so far as he is himself that that is for him,' is not only of vast importance, but of simple intelligibleness.

REMARK.

What is said about the expression peculiar to the Germans when inquiring into the what sort or the quality of any man or thing, What for a man is he?What for a thing is it?--sheds a quite decisive light

on the distinction in question, the Being-for-One. The applicability of the phrase reflexion-into-self here comes out very clear. The general sense of this passage

enables us to see that Hegel's für is for, and not as; Seyn-für-Anderes, therefore, is Being-for-another, not as another. Nevertheless, what is for another is as that other; what is for consciousness is as consciousness, is in the form of consciousness, is consciousness;— there is a small dialectic here that would have pleased Hegel. The substitution of as instead of for in the relative expressions of the paragraph that follows will contribute towards the general light.

This light is Idealism, and there is that in the second paragraph here-as also in the first to render it irresistibly intelligible if not irresistibly convincing. One here can as little resist believing, as resist seeing, the object eclipsed into the subject, and both constitutive only of a single ideal Being-for-One.

In this Remark there follow further words of the most penetrative lucidity as regards Idealism in general, and the Idealisms of Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Kant, and Fichte in particular. In these critiques the strokes are few and single, but each is a creation, or each is a destruction. Philosophy is complete or incomplete only as it is complete or incomplete Idealism. This is plain, for the only quest of Philosophy is principles, unities; and it ought to be plain to us, as it has been very plain to Hegel, that such quest-to be complete can only terminate in the principle, the unity,a result which, as expressing all eclipsed into one, is and can be only Idealism. But has any Philosophy hitherto either seen this or done this? Of any Philosophy yet has the principle been anything else than an abstract conception, or just an abstract utterance, in

the face of which the actual still smiled unconjured? By here a stroke and there a stroke, Hegel demonstrates this to be the state of the case both with Spinoza and the Eleatics. Justice is done to the character and to the greater perfection of the scheme of Malebranche, at the same time that this latter is reluctantly undermined and respectfully removed. It is impossible to praise too highly the extraordinarily pregnant, lucid, and comprehensive summary here, or the equally extraordinary dexterity with which, a support or two being undone, the whole structure is made to crumble and vanish before our eyes. It is as if art wonderfully lit up a sudden universe,-as wonderfully, as suddenly, to withdraw it again.

The critique of Leibnitz is equally masterly. The incongruities, the gaping edges, the incoherences, the general gratuitousness of the entire scheme, are all touched into such intensity of light that the whole vanishes. Such episodes as these assist us greatly as regards an understanding, as well of the painful abstractions of the text, as of the aims and objects of Hegel in general. By this Idealism lying more within the limit of the abstract notion,' is probably meant that it is more an affair of abstract notions, and just of subjective imagination in general, than the Idealism of Malebranche, which followed nearer the stream of the actual. 'Should one remind us that this movement of thought falls itself within an ideating monad, &c. :'--the ideating monad alluded to is, of course, Leibnitz himself—Leibnitz, too, conceiving other monads the same as himself.

The remark ends with a single but effective word as regards the Thing-in-itself of Kant, and the Anstoss of Fichte, the appulse, the unimaginable stone of offence, the reflecting plane from which the Ego's own energy