simple quantitative determinateness under a severality of such intensities as are diverse, each only simple self-reference, but, at the same time, in essential reference to one another in such wise that each has in this continuity with the others its own determinateness. This reference of degree through itself to its other renders ascent and descent in the scale of degrees, a continuous process, a flux, that is an uninterrupted indivisible alteration; each of the severals, which are distinguished in it, is not divided from the others, but has its determinedness only in these. As self-referent quantitative determination, each of the degrees is indifferent to the others; but it is no less in itself referred to this externality, it is only through this externality what it is; its reference to itself is at the same time the non-indifferent reference to the External, has in this (latter) reference its quality.'

The majority of readers will find all this very supersubtle and very superfluous. Reflexion, however, will convince some that it is necessary to bring to account all these myriad distinctions which pass current daily without inquiry. The Hegelian exposition is not only an explanation in the ordinary sense; but it lifts into sunlight all the secret maggots of our very brainsthose hidden powers whose we are, rather than that they are ours.

b. Identity of Extensive and Intensive Magnitude.

'Degree, the degree, is not within itself a something external to itself. But it is not the indeterminate One, the principle of Number in general, which is no Amount, unless only the negative Amount to be no Amount. The intensive magnitude is, in the first place, a simple unit of the several; there are several degrees; deter

mined, however, they are not, neither as simple unit nor as several, but only in the co-reference of this selfexternalness, or in the identity of the unit and the several. If, then, the several as such are indeed out of the simple degree, the determinateness of each simple degree consists still, in its reference to them, the several; the simple degree, therefore, implies Amount. Just as twenty, as extensive magnitude, implies the twenty ones as discrete within itself, so such particular degree contains the ones as continuity, which continuity this particular severality simply is; it is the 20th degree; and is the 20th degree only by means of this amount, which as such is external to it.

The determinateness of intensive magnitude is, therefore, to be considered on two sides. It is determined through other intensive Quanta, and is in continuity with its otherwiseness, so that in this reference to that (or them) consists its determinateness. So far now as it is, firstly, simple determinateness, it is determined counter other degrees; it excludes them out of itself, and has its determinateness in this exclusion. But, secondly, it is determined in itself; it is this in the amount as its amount, not in it as what is excluded, or as amount of other degrees. The twentieth degree contains the twenty in itself; it is not only determined as distinguished from the nineteenth, the twentyfirst, &c., but its determinateness is its amount. But so far as the amount is its, and the determinateness is, at the same time, essentially as amount, degree has the nature of extensive Quantity, is extensive Quantity.

Extensive and intensive magnitude are thus one and the same determinateness (characterisedness, specificity) of the Quantum; they are only distinguished by this,

x 2

that the one has the amount as within it, the other as without it. The extensive magnitude passes over into the intensive because its many in and for itself collapses into the unity, out of which the many stands. But conversely this unity has its determinateness only in the amount, and that too as its; as indifferent to the other intensities, it has the externality of the amount in itself; intensive magnitude is thus equally essentially extensive magnitude.

'With this identity, qualitative Something re-appears ; for this identity is self-through the negation of its differences -to self-referent unity, and it is these differences that compose the there-beënt quantitative determinateness; this negative identity is, therefore, Something, indifferent, too, to its quantitative determinateness. Something is a Quantum, but now the qualitative There-being as it is in itself is explicit as indifferent to this consideration of Quantum. It was possible to speak of Quantum, of Number as such, &c., without a Something that were their substrate. But now there steps in Something opposite these its determinations,— through their negation be-mediated with itself, and as there-beënt for itself,—and, in that it has a Quantum, as that which has an extensive and intensive Quantum. Its one determinateness, which it as Quantum has, is explicit in the diverse moments of the Unity and the Amount; this determinateness is not only in itself one and the same, but its explicitation or expression in these differences, as extensive and intensive Quantum, is return into this unity, which unity as negative is the explicitly set Something indifferent to them (the differences).'

The interpretation of the above rests so evidently on principles which we have so often stated at full length

already, that it may here be dispensed with, especially as something of résumé will be necessary again. The supersubtlety will still appear to most readers the objectionable element; and it is to be confessed that, in very weariness of the flesh, one is again and again tempted to turn away eyes of irritation from these quick and evanescent needle-points, this ceaseless toand-fro of an all but invisible shuttle from identity into difference, and from difference into identity again, and throw one's exhausted body and vexed heart on the kindly breadth of the ready concrete: but again, and indubitably, this is subtlety, but not supersubtlety, what we are asked to look at is the veritable inner fibres of the very essence of things.

6

REMARK 1.

Examples of this Identity.

The distinction of extension and intension is generally taken so, that it is supposed there are objects only extensive and others only intensive. Then we have in physics the new dynamical view which, to the contrary mechanical one that would fill space, &c., by extension or a more, opposes an intension that would reach the same end through degree. The mechanical theory assumes independent parts subsistent out of each other, and only externally combined into a whole; while opposed to this, the notion of Force is the core of the dynamical theory. What-as in the occupation of space-results under the former theory from a multiplicity of mutually external atoms, is produced under the latter by the manifestation of a single force. In the one instance, then, we have the relation of Whole and Parts; in the other, that of Force and its Realisation;

and the consideration of both finds special place further on. Force and Realisation, it may be said here, however, are certainly a nearer truth than Whole and Parts; but still Force is no less one-sided than Intension itself: its Realisation, Manifestation, Utterance, or outerance, is but as the outwardness of Extension, and is inseparable from the Force; one and the same Intent is common to both forms, to that that is as Extensive, as to that that is as Intensive.'

One gets a striking view here of the fundamental Hegelian truth; element succeeds element in gradual ascent towards the ultimate unity, but in each element precisely the same moments reappear as constitutive : Continuity and Discretion, Extension and Intension, Whole and Parts, Force and its Realisation, Outer and Inner-running through the whole of these, we can see the same moments and the same idea.

'The extensive Quantum sublates itself into Degree, which in turn is wholly dependent on the former; the one form is essential to the other, and the quantitative constitution of every existence is as well extensive as intensive.

Take Number as the example: it is amount, and so extensive; but it is also One, a twenty, a hundred, &c., and the many gone into this unality is of the nature of intension. One is extensive in itself, it can be conceived as any number of parts. The tenth, &c., is this one that has its virtue in an outward several different to it; or the intension comes from the extension. Number is ten, twenty, &c.; but it is at the same time the tenth, the twentieth in the numerical system: both are the same determinateness, the same constitutedness.

The unit of the circle is named degree, because any one part of the circle has its determinateness in the