represent all the ground-thoughts descriptive and constructive of the universe-will be the Middle, or the matter comprehended between the first and last. For a First, then, Hegel sees that he must find the most abstract universal, or the most universal abstract; or that he must find that trinity which shall exhibit the Notion in its most abstract or universal form. In a word, he must find the most abstract universal identity (the genus), the most abstract universal difference (the differentia), and the most abstract universal community of identity and difference (the species), or however else we may name-and the names are Legion — the several constituent moments of the Notion. But Hegel has actually before him other categories and many remarks of Kant for his express guidance and direction in this whole industry. Some of these, as in relation to Something and Nothing, &c., we have seen already; and here, from the Kritik of Pure Reason,' are a few more, which the reader will now see must have contained much matter eminently suggestive to Hegel:

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It is to be observed that the Categories, as the true Stammbegriffe (root-notions) of pure understanding, possess their equally pure derivatives, which can by no means be omitted in a complete system of Transcendental Philosophy, but with whose mere mention I may be content in a mere critical preliminary inquest.

Hegel, then, could see what he had to do for the construction of a system. Poor Kant, like a hen that had hatched ducks, was never done with cluck-clucks of consternation over the mad fashion in which his rash brood-Fichte and the rest-dashed into the bottomless water of speculation, - never done with cluck-clucks of consternation and of fervid warning to return to the solid land of kritical procedure, for

which he pathetically assured them their excellent 'Darstellungsgabe' (say style) could do so much. It is questionable if he could have recognised in Hegel that return to his own results which he so ardently longed for and so unweariedly called for. It is quite certain now, however, that the whole work of Hegel was simply to furnish that complete system of the Transcendental Philosophy' indicated by Kant.

Let me be permitted (the veteran proceeds) to name these pure but derivative notions, the predicables of pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments). If we have the original and primitive notions, the derivative and subaltern may be easily added, and the family-tree of pure understanding completely delineated. As I have here to do, not with the completion of the system, but only with that of the principles towards it, I may be allowed to postpone the addition of such a complement to another work. This object, however, may be pretty correctly reached, if any one but take in hand the ordinary ontological text-books, and set, for example, under the category of Causality, the predicables of power, action, passion, &c. ; under Reciprocity, those of the present, resistance, &c.; and under Modality, origin, decease, &c. &c. The categories combined with the modi of pure sense [Time and Space], or with one another, furnish a great number of derivative à priori notions, &c.

Hegel was thus directly referred to the very manner in which he should set about his task; and his task was comparatively easy, for, as Kant himself points out,

The great compartments (Fächer) are once for all thereit is only necessary to fill them up; and a systematic Topik, like the present, does not readily permit us to miss the places to which each notion properly belongs, at the same time that it causes us readily to remark those which are still empty.*

*The above quotations are from the K. of P. R. § 10; those that follow, from § 11, same work.

Kant proceeds:

As regards the Table of the Categories, some curious remarks may be made which may have, perhaps, advantageous results as respects the scientific form of all rational truths. For that this Table, in the theoretic part of philosophy, is uncommonly serviceable, nay indispensable, in order completely to project a plan towards the Whole of a Science, so far as this science is to rest on à priori notions, as well as mathematically to distribute the same according to definite principles, appears directly of itself from this, that said Table contains at full all the elementary notions of understanding, and even the form of a system of the same in the human understanding, and consequently furnishes direction and guidance to all the moments of any contemplated speculative science, and even to their order, as indeed I have already given elsewhere an example in proof (s. Metaphys. Anfangsgr. der Naturwissensch'). Here now are some of these remarks.

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The first is that this Table, which contains four classes of Categories, parts first of all into two Divisions, the first of which is directed to objects of Perception (pure as well as empirical); the second, again, to the Existence of these objects (whether as referred to one another or to the understanding) [Quantity' pure,' Quality' empirical,' Relation mutual reference,' Modality reference to the understanding '].

The first class I would name that of the mathematical, the second that of the dynamical, Categories. The first class, as is evident, has no correlates, which are found only in the second. This difference must have its reason [as Hegel has well investigated] in the nature of the understanding.

2nd Remark. That in every case there is a like number -three of the categories of every class, which summons to reflection [and Hegel reflected and pondered this to some effect], as all à priori distribution elsewhere through notions is necessarily a Dichotomy [Black or not-Black, &c.]. Moreover, that the third category in every case [Hegel is all here] arises from the union of the second with the first of its class.

Thus Allness (Totality) is nothing else than Plurality [a Many] considered as Unity; Limitation is nothing else than Reality united to Negation; Community is one Substance Causally determining another Reciprocally; lastly, Necessity is nothing else than Existence given by Possibility itself. Let it not be thought, however, that the third category is for this reason a merely derivative one, and not a root-notion of pure understanding. For the union of the first and second in order to produce the third notion demands a special act of understanding, which is not identical with that which is exerted in the case of the first and second. Thus the notion of a Number (which belongs to the category of Totality) is not always possible where there are the notions of Plurality and Unity (as, for example, in the conception of the Infinite); nor out of this, that I unite the notion of a cause and that of a substance, is Influence-that is, how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance-directly and without more ado to be understood. From this it is obvious

that a special act of understanding is necessary to this; and so as regards the rest.

3rd Remark. In the case of a single category, that, namely, of Community, which occurs under the third Title, is the agreement with the corresponding form in the Table of the Logical Functions (here the disjunctive judgment) not so self-evident as in that of the others.

In order to assure oneself of this agreement, it is to be observed that in all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the Many of all that is contained under the judgment) is conceived as a whole distributed into parts (the subordinate notions), and, as these parts cannot be contained the one under the other, they are thought as mutually co-ordinated, not subordinated, in such wise that they act on each other, not one-sidely as in a series, but reciprocally as in an aggregate (if one member of the distribution is established, all the rest are excluded, and vice versa).

Now what we have to think is a similar conjunction in a Whole of Things, where the one is not subordinated as effect to the other as cause, but co-ordinated as at the same time

and reciprocally cause in reference to the other (for example, the case of a body, the parts of which at once reciprocally attract and resist each other), which is quite another sort of conjunction than that met with in the simple relation of the cause to the effect (of reason to consequent), in which the consequent does not reciprocally in its turn determine the antecedent, and does not therefore constitute a whole with it (like the Creator with the world). The same process which understanding observes when it represents to itself the sphere of a distributed notion, it observes also when it thinks a thing as capable of distribution; and as the members of distribution in the former mutually exclude each other, and nevertheless are united together in a single sphere, so it conceives the parts of the latter as such that existence attaches to each of them as substances independently of the rest, and yet that they are united together in a single whole.

In these remarks the reader will readily observe many germs which it was the business of Hegel only to mature. That, under each class, the third category, for example, should be a concrete of the two formerthis an sich, virtually, is the dialectic of Hegel. Once, indeed, that Hegel had observed this peculiarity, and that he had also generalised the categories into the category, his system, we may say, and in all its possibilities, was fairly born. Kant observes,* 'that there are two stocks or stems of human knowledge, which arise perhaps from a single common root, as yet unknown to us, namely, Sense and Understanding, through the former of which objects are given, and through the latter thought.' Now, to see that this bringing together of sensation and intellect amounted to the percipient Understanding (intuitus originarius, intellectuelle Anschauung, anschauender Verstand) of Kant-to see moreover that Kant's own industry had no other tendency

K. of P. R., Introduction, sub finem.