ness of Quantity as such. Extensive and intensive magnitudes are, in like manner, not two sorts of which the one should possess a distinction which the other wanted; what is extensive is equally intensive, and vice versa.

In degree the notion of Quantum is in explicit position. It is magnitude as indifferently independent and simple, but so that it has the determinateness by which it is Quantum directly out of it in other magnitudes. In this contradiction, viz. that the beënt-for-self indifferent limit is absolute Externality, the infinite quantitative Progress is expressly explicit,-an immediacy which immediately strikes round into its counterpart, mediatedness (a going over and beyond the Quantum that has just been posited), and vice versa.

A Number is thought, but thought as a Beingness completely external to its own self. It belongs not to perception because it is thought, but it is the thought which has for its characterisation the externality of perception. The Quantum not only may therefore be increased or diminished ad infinitum; it itself is through its Notion this dispatch of itself beyond itself. The infinite quantitative Progress is just the thoughtless repetition of one and the same contradiction which the Quantum in general is, and Quantum as Degree, or expressly set in its determinateness. As regards the superfluousness of enunciating this contradiction in the form of the infinite Progress, Zeno in Aristotle says justly it is the same thing to say something once, and to say it always.

This outerliness of Quantum to its own self in its beënt-for-self determinateness constitutes its Quality; in it it is just itself and referred to itself. In it are united, Externality, i.e. Quantitativeness, and Being

for-self, i. e. Qualitativeness. Quantum thus put is in itself the Quantitative Relation,-determinateness which is no less immediate Quantum, the Exponent, than mediatedness, namely, the reference of some one Quantum to another, the two sides of. the relation, which at the same time are not valid in their immediate value, but have their value only in this reference.

The sides of the relation are still immediate Quanta, the qualitative and the quantitative moments still external to each other. Their truth, however, viz. that the Quantitativeness itself is in its externality reference to itself, or that the Being-for-self and the indifference of the determinateness are united, is Measure.

VI.

THE COMMENTATORS OF HEGEL: SCHWEGLER,
ROSENKRANZ, HAYM.

In the interest of one's own self-seeking to demonstrate the shortcomings of one's predecessors, is a procedure now so vulgar that it would, perhaps, have been better taste to have left to others the task which is here begun. Any plea in excuse can found only on the important aid which may be so afforded to a general understanding of the single theme, and is only to be made good by the result.

There are many other Commentators of Hegel, but we have selected these examples, too, of feelings impartial, partial, and hostile-as the latest and most generally-acknowledged best. Now, each of the three has devoted a vast amount of labour and time to the study of Hegel, and all of them have, more or less, attained to a very considerable relative knowledge. It is not, then, what is in general meant by ignorance that we would object here, but only a peculiar and insufficient state of knowledge in this way, that the path of this knowledge has been ever on the outside, from particular to particular, with darkness and incoherences between, and without perception of the single light in which the whole should show-without attainment of the single Rück, of the single turn, stir, touch

by which the painful and unreachable Many should kaleidoscopically collapse into the held and intelligible One. In a word, whatever general connexion they may have perceived between Hegel and Kant, and however often they may have used, each of them, the word Begriff, they have all failed to detect that literal one connexion and that literal one signification which have been accentuated in the preceding pages. Hegel was literal with Idealism; the whole is Thought, and the whole life of it is Thought; and, therefore, what is called the History of Philosophy will be in externality and contingency, but a Gesetztseyn of Thought, but an explicitment, a setting of one thought the other. So it was that Spinoza was Substance, Hume Causality, Kant Reciprocity, and Hegel the Notion-the Notion as set by Kant, and as now to be developed subjectively by Hegel into the Subjective Logic which ends in the Idea. So it was that he, as it were, anallegorised actual history, even contemporary history, even his own position, into the plastic dialectic of his abstract Logic. Hegel was literal with Idealism up to the last invisible negation of the negation-up to the ultimate pure Negativity within which even the triple muscle of the Notion lay a hidden Nisus, retracted into transparency. To Hegel even the very way which had led to this was, so far, false; it was but the chain of the finite categories; and their whole truth was this negative One. Thus it was that Hegel completed the whole movement of which Kant, Fichte, and Schelling had been successive vital knots; but still this completion he reached only by making good his attachment directly to the first of them. This was effected by the entire realisation and vitalisation of Logic, even scholastic Logic (which Kant had begun), by reduction simply of the All into the simply

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technical moments of Logic as named Simple Apprehension, &c., through substitution of his own conscious concrete Notion (which, in a word, is but the one existent, and the only existent, Entelechie of Difference and Identity), for the unconscious abstract Notion of Kant that lay in the question: How are à priori Synthetic Judgments possible?' It is this literality which we assert to have been universally missed, and we claim to have discovered the Notion which Hegel meant, what we call the concrete Universal, as well as the precise nature of the genesis of this notion with special reference to Kant.

It often happens that, when particular announcements of this nature are made, many previous general expressions come to be collected which seem very fairly to convey the particularity announced. Now these ex post facto coincidences, as they may be termed, while they belong to the peculiar industry of the mere rats of literature, are themselves particularly delusive and deceptive. In these very volumes we have many instances in point. Some of these instances we shall adduce by way of illustration just as they occur.

'Hegel is quite in earnest when he maintains the co-incidence of History and of Logic:' this (vol. i. p. 38) is a very explicit and perfectly categorical statement; nevertheless, it was probably written years before the true thought, or anything like the true thought, of the fact which it seems to convey, had dawned on the mind of the writer. Plato's Tauroy and Jáτepov, as well as a triad of an sich, ausser sich, and für sich, are spoken of, not far from the same neighbourhood, but quite blindly as to the true issues involved. Thus Hegel, horsed on his idea, penetrates and permeates the whole universe both of mind and matter, and