certain manifestation, a certain actuality, a certain assonance to the Aristotelian EvTEλEXEα. Hegel intimates that an sich, with the accent not on sich, but on an, may be viewed as equivalent to an ihm. But an sich, on the whole, in the passage referred to, has taken on a shade of meaning quite peculiar to the place. In this latter case what is an ihm is to be regarded as Seyn-für-Anderes, and so outwardly an ihm (in it). Hegel illustrates the meaning here by the common expressions, there is nothing in him or in it, or there is something in that, and seems to see implied in these a certain parallelism or identity between what is latent in itself, and what is overt in it. The addition of the selbst or selber introduces another shade, and renders the task of a translation still more difficult; for in English an ihm selber is in itself quite as much as an sich. To separate the words, as in the first German phrase, and say in it self, would be hardly allowable. Perhaps the plan actually adopted is as good as any: that is, to italicise in itself when it stands for an sich, and to leave it without such distinction, or write it, as here, in its own self' (also without italics), when it represents an ihm selbst or selber. What is intended to be conveyed by the text Seyn an ihm selber, Being in its own self, is not hard to make out: it just means. Being as (when abstractly thought) it is there before us overtly in its own self, and without reference to another or any other. An sich, then, implies potential latency; An ihm selber, irrespective selfness, or irrespective, selfdependent overtness; and An ihm, such overtness connected with and equivalent to such latency. Again, these terms will occur in Hegel, not always in their technical senses, but sometimes with various shades, and very much as they occur in other writers. It must be confessed, indeed, that it is these little phrases which constitute the torment of everyone who attempts to translate Hegel. An, for example, in the phrase an ihm, is often best rendered by the preposition by. An, in fact, is not always coincident with the English in. An denotes proximity, and is often best translated by at or by nay, in all of the three phrases above, the substitution of at or by for in will help to illustrate the contained meaning. Consider the phrase 'Das Seyn scheint am Wesen,' which we may translate, the Phenomenon shows in the Noumenon; would not the sense seem to be more accurately conveyed by, the Phenomenon shows by the Noumenon, or even by, the Phenomenon shows at the Noumenon? When an refers to overtness or manifestation, then, we may translate it by. There-being or Here-being is the translation of Daseyn, and is an unfortunate necessity. Existence might have answered here; but Existence, being reserved by Hegel to name a much later finding, is taken out of our hands. What a German means by Daseyn is, this mortal sojourn, this sublunary life, this being here below; and what Hegel means by it, is the scientific abstract thought implied in such phrases. It is thus mortal state, or the quality of sublunariness; it is existential definiteness, or definite existentiality, and implies reference thus to another or others. It is determinate Being, Here-being, There-being, Nowbeing, or, best perhaps, So-being or That-being; it is the quasi-permament moment of Being that manifests itself between Coming to be and Ceasing to be; it is the to-be (Seyn) common to both phrases: and this constitutes the perfectly correct abstract description, or thought (the notion), of every single Daseyn or Here-being, or So-being, and consequently of Daseyn, Here-being, So-being, as such. Being-for-self is the literal rendering of Fürsichseyn; which, indeed, cannot be translated otherwise. It means the reference of all the constituents of an individuality, of a personality, of a self, to the punctual unity of that individuality, or personality, or self: it is the focus in the draught of the whole huge whirlpool, that whereby its Many are One. For, however, does not completely render Für. The German, when much intruded on, exclaims, One can never be Für sich here!' Vowels also are described as letters which für sich sound, consonants not so. Für sich, then, is the Latin per se and a little more: it expresses not only independence of others, but occupation for oneself. Were a Voter, when asked, Whom are you for?' to reply, For myself,' he would convey the German für mich. That is für sich which is on its own account. By Fürsichseyn, Beingfor-self, then, we are to understand a being by one's own self and for one's own self. Generally, in reading Hegel, let us bear both the current and the etymological meanings in mind. That finite is literally ended or limited, infinite unended or unlimited, must not be lost sight of, for example. Finally, I will just add this, that almost all the technical terms of Hegel appear in Kant also, especially in his Logic,' where much light is thrown upon them as used, not by the latter only, but by the former likewise. UNIVERSITY OF LIBRARY CHAPTER I. BEING. ALIFORNIA. A. Pure Being.-B. Nothing.-C. Becoming: 1. Unity of THE explanation of terms which we have just given All that they present has remained hitherto a universal stumbling-block, and a matter of hissing, we may say at once, to the whole world. Probably, indeed, no student has ever entered here without finding himself spell bound and bewildered, spell-bound and bewildered at once, spell-bound and bewildered-if he has had the pertinacity to keep at them and hold by them perhaps for years. When the bewilderment yields, however, he will find himself, it is most likely, we shall say, putting some such questions as the following: 1. What has led Hegel to begin thus? 2. What does he mean by these very strange, novel, and apparently senseless statements? 3. What can be intended by these seemingly silly and absurd transitions of Being into Nothing, and again of both into Becoming? 4. What does the whole thing amount to; or what is the value of the whole business? These questions being satisfactorily answered, perhaps Hegel will at last be found accessible. 1. What has led Hegel to begin thus?-To this question, the answer is brief and certain: Hegel was led to begin as he did in consequence of a profound consideration of all that was implied in the Categories, and other relative portions of the philosophy, of Kant. But in order to awaken intelligence and carry conviction here, it is obviously incumbent upon us to do what we can to reproduce the probable course of Hegel's thinking when engaged in the consideration alluded to. No doubt, for a full explanation, there is necessary such preliminary exposition of the industry of Kant as has been spoken of as likely to follow the present work; but, pending such exposition, we hope still to be able to describe at present Hegel's operations, so far as Kant is concerned, not unintelligibly. The speculations peculiar to Hume generally, and more especially those which bear on Causality, constitute the Grundlage, the fundamen, the mother-matter of the products of Kant. Now in this relation (of Causality) there are two terms or factors, the one antecedent and the other consequent; the former the cause, and the latter the effect. But if we take any cause by itself and examine it à priori, we shall not find any hint in it of its corresponding effect: let us consider it ever so long, it remains self-identical only, and any mean of transition to another to aught else is undiscoverable. But again, we are no wiser, should we investigate the matter à posteriori: that the effect follows the cause, we see; but why it followsthe reason of the following the precise mean of the |