two parts of which the Major consists here are called the antecedent and the consequent, and in the modus ponens the former ponit, setzt, sets, posits, or infers the latter. In the example before us, the existence. of perfect justice is the antecedent, and it posits the punishment of the hardened sinner, which is the consequent. If the word posit were a vernacular English word parallel to the German setzen both in its logical and in its ordinary senses, we should have no difficulty in the respective translation; but it is not so, and we are constantly in perplexity in consequence of being unable properly to render the various shades and secondary meanings which setzen and its derivatives acquire in the hands of Hegel. For instance, an antecedent may be considered as only in itself or potential, until the consequent is assigned, and then it is the antecedent which seems posited. Posited in this case seems to refer to statement or explication; and this sense is very common in Hegel. Here, then, it is gesetzt means, it is developed into its proper explication, statement, expression, enunciation, exhibition, &c. Again, a Gesetztes, as not self-referent, is but lunar, satellitic, parasitic, secondary, derivative, dependent, reflexional, posititious, &c. Then on the part of that which posits, something of arbitrary attribution may enter. Altogether, Gesetztseyn alludes to reflexion, relativity, mutual illativity, &c. Setzen has the senses, to put in the place of, to depute, and also duly to set out the members of a whole or set; and allusions to these senses also are to be found in Hegel. In short, such senses as the following will sometimes be found in place in this connexion: vicarious, representative, attributive, adjectitious, &c. &c. To eximply or eximplicate often conveys the meaning of setzen, as also the simple assign. See further Hegel himself on the

word at pp. 376, 377, vol. i.; see also pp. 109, 110, vol. ii. In Kant and Fichte, setzen means, to lay down as granted, to take for granted, to establish, to affirm, to assert, to assume, &c.; and this meaning is, at bottom, identical with the Hegelian.

Inhalt means here, Logical comprehension, or the complement of significates which attach to a notion : Inhalt is to Hegel the Import of something, and the import is not always mere contained matter, but implies that matter as formed or assimilated.

Opined, Gemeint. - Meinung is the dia of the Greeks; it implies crude, instinctive, uninvestigated, unreasoned, subjective, or personal opinion,-mein-ung, as if it were a mine-ing, or my-ing-something purely mine- something purely subjective and instinctive.

The Remark itself is sufficiently miscellaneous; its general object, however, is to illustrate what has just been said, and repel the most usual objection. This objection concerns the identification of Being with Nothing, and probably requires now but small notice at our hands, seeing that so much has been already done to insure a correct understanding of what is meant by each of the terms, and of how they are to be identified. The whole error of the objection lies in opposing to Nothing, not abstract, but concrete Being; in which case, the Nothing itself ceases to be abstract. As Nothing and Being are the same, it seems to be inferred that we say it is the same thing whether we have food or not, whether we have clothes or not, whether we have money or not, &c.: but this reasoning is very bad. Nothing when it is concreted into no-food is hunger; in the same way, as no-clothes, it is cold, and as no-money, it is poverty. Now we have been speaking of Nothing as Nothing, and not of hunger,

cold, and poverty. Again, we have been speaking of Being as Being, and not of corporeal or animal Being. When you oppose, then, these definite Nothings to this definite Being, it is absurd to suppose that the results will be identical with those which issue from the opposition of abstract Being and abstract Nothing. Nothing, when abstract Being is concerned, is the abstraction from everything definite and particular, and abstract Being itself is the same abstraction; but the nothing of light is darkness, and it cannot be said that the eye is indifferent whether it be the one or the other definite Being is a complex of infinite rapports. But where is the use of your abstraction, then, may be urged in reply? Why, this ultimate generalisation Being-we are bound to make it, and it has always been considered a determination of the greatest consequence surely, then, it is worth while pointing out that this Being is identical with the abstract Nothing, that they are both abstractions, and that their truth is Werden. These are great poles of thought, subjective and objective; and it is important to know them, as they are, and in their relations. The incidental references illustrate this: the philosophy of Parmenides, for example, was centred in the thought abstract Being, while that of Heraclitus related simply to Becoming, and we see what vast effects may be produced by the contemplation of abstract Nothing in the case of Buddhism. Being is the first abstract thought, indeed, and, with the Eleatics, we find it as such in History; for the material principles and the numbers which preceded it are not pure thoughts.

The importance of our findings, too, is well shown in the impossibility of a creation and in the Pantheism, which result from the absolute separation of Being

and Nothing exhibited in the common dictum Ex nihilo nihil fit. A creation is impossible without the community of Nothing and Being; and if all that is, is just Being, or if all that is, is just Substance, then there results only the abstract Pantheism of Parmenides or of Spinoza. We may remark, however, that - as used the dictum is safe from the attack of Hegel; for it is nothing else but the law of causality in another form; what it means is simply the à priori synthetic judgment of Kant-there is no change without a cause. It is this sense which prevents the reader from agreeing with Hegel in his attack. What Hegel wishes to hold up, however, is the essential importance in this universe of the distinction, Nothing: in effect, negativity, in the sense of distinctivity, is the creative power; and there is nowhere anything which does

not confess its influence.

The errors of Kant, too, in reference to the Ontological argument spring from bluntness to the distinctions we signalise, and thus demonstrate the value of the latter: Kant, in fact, exhibits a similar confusion of the finite and the infinite, as well as a very imperfect perception of the nature and relations of Being, Non-being, and So-being (Daseyn).

The objections to the relative teaching of Hegel, then, arise from the untutored attitude of common sense, which means ever the blind instinctive employment of stereotyped abstractions of one's own, whence or how derived one knows not, asks not, cares not: in the case before us, for example, common-sense insists that its abstraction, a differentiated Nothing, is our abstraction, reference-less Nothing. We may add, that the practical lesson is to perceive that it is our duty, in view of the infinite affirmation in which we participate,

to entertain complete tranquillity in the presence of finite Particular that may emerge.

any

REMARK 2.

There seems nothing very hard here; the chief object is to point out the difficulty of giving a true expression to speculative propositions, which are always dialectic. The form of the judgment is shown to be inadequate. Identity, unity, inseparability, are all imperfect expressions of the relation that subsists between Being and Nothing. The concluding illustration in regard to light and darkness speaks for itself.

Of terms, we may notice two-Abstract and Unterschied.

Abstract is one of the commonest words in Hegel, and is often used in such a manner as perplexes: it always implies that something is viewed in its absolute self-identity, and absolutely apart from all its concrete references. As regards Unterschied, it is worth while observing that it means inter-shed, or inter-part: the Unterschied of Seyn and Nichts may be profitably regarded as just a sort of abstract water-shed.

REMARK 3.

This is the most important of all the Remarks in this place, and the reader ought to make a point of dwelling by it long and studying it thoroughly. The rigour of thought in regard to a First, a Second, the transition between them, and the principles of progress in general, ought to improve the powers of every faculty which has been privileged to experience it. What is said in regard to crude Reflexion and the means of helping it, is also striking and suggestive. Then we are taught what a true synthesis is, and