what a false one. Again, we learn that it is the abstractions which are unreal, while their concrete union is fact. In truth, the general gist of the remark is, it is absurd to remain in abstract self-identity, and say movement, progress, is impossible to you; for synthesis must be possible, and is necessary just for this reason, that synthesis is—that is, there is this variegated empirical universe. The observations in regard to determinate nothings are very important, as well as those that bear on the necessity of our keeping strictly to the precise stage we have reached, without applying in its description or explanation characters which belong to later stages. The incidental notice of the Parmenides of Plato is exceedingly terse, full, and satisfactory.

6

Hegel remarks of Plato's critique of the Eleatic One: It is obvious that this path (method) has a presupposition, and is an external reflexion.' A cooperative reader, and every reader should be cooperative, ought to ask himself, where is the presupposition?' and where is the external reflexion?' Again, in the first Remark, the reader ought not to leave without understanding: Metaphysic might tautologically maintain, that were a dust-atom destroyed, the whole universe would collapse.' Let the reader go back here, and study both for himself. The presupposition is, that variety is incompatible with unity: the external reflexion is, that the two forms are just externally counted Hegel's universe is such, that the whole is not more each part than each part is the whole-to destroy a part and destroy the whole are thus tautological.

There is also expressed here such respect for the empirical world as helps us to see that the system of Hegel·

is no chimera of abstraction, no cobweb of the brain, but that what it endeavours is just to think this universe, as it manifests itself around us, into its ultimate and universal principles.

As regards terms, we may just remark that Beziehung implies more than mere reference; it implies, as it were, connective reference: it is used pretty much, in fact, in its strict etymological meaning. Synthesis, as alluded to in a previous note, will be found fully explained here: the unphilosophical synthesis thinks it enough just to put together full-formed individuals from elsewhere, as God, a germ-cell, and space (say); while philosophical synthesis is immanent, and points to a transition of necessity with concrete union of differents. The allusion to ursprüngliche Urtheilen' leads one to think of Kant as the source of all that Hegel seems peculiarly to teach as regards the Ur-theil; at all events-leaving Apperception and the Categories out of sight-Kant's transcendental doctrine of Urtheilskraft is wholly employed on the commediation of the inner unities with the outer multiples, and contains a great variety of matter which must have proved eminently suggestive in regard to the main positions assumed by Hegel.

6

REMARK 4.

This remark is still occupied with the Unity of Being and Nothing; but it is exceedingly terse, clear, and illustrative. The dialectic against the Beginning or Ending of the World is very happily shown to rest wholly on the separation of Being and Nothing; and the hit to ordinary understanding which believes — against this dialectic-a Beginning and Ending of the World, and yet accepts with this dialectic — the

dividedness of Being and Nothing, is a very sore one. The mode in which incomprehensibility is explained to be produced is excellent, and genuinely Hegelian, The illustration afforded by Infinitesimals is also exceedingly satisfactory, as are also the definitions of Sophistry and Dialectic.-Something that is in its disappearance was eminently adapted to attract a Hegel, whose own object is always something very similar; that is, it is, like Infinitesimals, very much of a ratio- the one of a double. In fact, reciprocity very well answers to the bottom thought of Hegel, the Notion itself is — in one way of looking — but a form of reciprocity. So we have neither Being nor Nothing, but a sort of outcome of their reciprocal reflexions, where the one is very much the other—and in consequence of the other. Hegel seems to contemplate the intussusception of the infinite Universe into a geometrical punctum : the world is the oscillating coloration of a partridge's eye; it is but a vibrating point. -an ideal throb. The method is infinite referential inferentiality, or relative illativity of object and subject; but the object is the subject's, and the subject itself is the veritable Absolute. There is a Chinese toy or puzzle which appears as a hollow sphere with innumerable contained successively smaller spheres, movable, and successively within one another: conceive this expanded into the infinitude of space, extended into the infinitude of time, and occupied by all the interests of the universe and man, sphere under sphere, but so that all, perfectly transparent, perfectly permeable, are mutually intussuscipient, and collapse punctually into a single eye-glance ;-conceive this, and you have the Vorstellung, the Figure, the Metaphor of the System of Hegel. But is not this a mere intellectual jeu d'esprit? Outside

effort and intentional production, in such a scheme, and with only human faculty to carry it out, must be expected; but this must also be said, that, in the progress of the work, there is no great interest of the world, which does not require to be touched; and this touch we find always to be that of the very master of thought, in such wise that, on the whole, at once the most penetrative and the most comprehensive wisdom is offered to us which has ever yet exhibited itself in time. Again, it is not only an objective system that is concerned; it is also a subjective organon: he, indeed, who has passed through such a Calender finds himself— always in the ratio of his original force, of course a power of rare elasticity and vigour, and with a range of the most gratifying compass a Hegel himself is keen to the last point, strong to the last weight, and wide as the universe. Lastly, if we bear in mind that Kant and Hegel have at length introduced objective principles into philosophy, and thus lifted it bodily to the platform of Science, e.g. the Categories, the Notion, &c.-one will see good reason to consider the system of Hegel (and the same may be said for that of Kant) an essential and indispensable element in the culture of all who would present themselves in the arena now-a-days, and work for the public-whether in Science or in Art, in Statecraft or the Professions, in Literature, or the mere business of the Schoolmaster.

2. Moments of Becoming.-3. Sublation of Becoming.

Remark.

We may spend a word, first of all, on the terms Zunächst, Unmittelbar, Daseyn, Moment, Ideel, and Grundlage. Zunächst remains for long something troublesome to the student of Hegel. It just means,

at nearest in the direction in which you are going. If you are generalising, then it will mean the next step towards the genus summum; and nearer (näher) will mean, nearer to universal extension. But if, like Hegel's, your process is one of Determination, and towards ultimate Comprehension or Singularisation, then you must look on the opposite side of the line, and nearer and nearer must mean, greater and greater comprehension, or more and more complex, more and more particularised, more and more individualised. Zunächst, then, may be translated just in the first instance, in the first place, at first hand, primâ facie, &c.; and sometimes also, at closest, or at strictest :-first of all is also a convenient phrase; shortly, properly, &c., will sometimes be found to render it. Das nähere just means the particulars, the details, and this manifests the process to be one towards increased precision and definiteness the nearness involved regards the particular object concerned, then.

Unmittelbar: Direct will be found best to translate this word in paragraph 2 of No. 2; so also at end of No. 3 as it is used in the Remark opposed to das Aufgehobene, one gets a vivid glance of the direct beingness which Immediacy amounts to.

:

Daseyn: an English equivalent for this word is dif ficult to find; but this is no reason why we should make any difficulty of the Notion. Being, Seyn, is easily understood to be Being in general, just the universal or general fact of existence, of Being at all: but Daseyn refers to a definitely-recognised Being; it is that which constitutes the recognisableness of every and any member of this actual existence. Seyn applies to the whole; it is the universal indistinguishable mush: but Daseyn has thrown the checker down, and