for injuries caused by the fall of rock from such dangerous place, as under the statute negligence by the injured miner is no defense to an action based upon the mine owner's wilful failure to carry out the provisions of the statute. Peebles v. O'Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370, p. 373; Brunnworth v. Kerens-Donnewald Coal Co., 260 Ill. 202, p. 212. The fact that a miner was attempting to ride in a car against the rules of a mine operator cannot be considered as a defense in an action for damages for the death of the miner caused by an alleged violation of the statute, on the theory that his contributory negligence is no defense in such actions, Wilkerson v. Willis Coal & Min. Co., 158 Ill. App. 620, p. 626. In an action by a miner for injuries received while descending into the mine in a cage on the ground of the alleged violation of the statute by the mine operator in failing to have the cage properly covered, the mine operator cannot prevent a recovery on the ground that the injured miner violated the statute in putting in an empty car on the cage and taking picks with him, as this amounts only to contributory negligence on his part. Darling v. Wood, 168 Ill. App. 272, p. 275. See Illinois Collieries Coal Co. v. Davis, 137 Ill. App. 15; Merlo v. Johnston City & Big Muddy Coal & Min. Co., 173 Ill. App. 425, p. 430; Swengel v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 182 Ill. App. 623, p. 630. The fact that a miner went to a dangerous place in the mine after being permitted to enter the mine with full knowledge of its dangers, against the direction of the superintendent and that in so doing he was guilty of contributory negligence, is no defense against a wilful violation of the statute by the mine operator in permitting the miner to enter the mine knowing that it was in a dangerous condition and without making such dangerous conditions safe. Merlo v. Johnston City & Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co., 173 Ill. App. 414, p. 430; Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516; Peebles v. O'Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370. Where a miner discovered an overhanging piece of slate in the roof of his room and attempted to pull it down and finally stuck his pick into it with that intention and immediately a large piece of slate fell from the roof and injured him, it can not be said that this was the proximate cause of the injury sufficient to defeat the miner's action, as this would be permitting the contributory negligence of the miner to defeat the provisions of the statute, and is not sufficient to defeat a recovery in an action based upon the mine owner's wilful failure to obey the statute. Peebles v. O'Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370, p. 373. See Brunnworth v. Kerens-Donnewald Coal Co., 260 Ill. 202, p. 212. The obligation resting upon a miner to exercise due care for his own safety and to obey the statute and not to disobey any order or rule of the mine operator made in pursuance of the statute, does not require him to act with the same deliberation and foresight which might be required of him under ordinary cir cumstances, where by reason of sickness he was compelled to leave his working place and while passing through an entry was, without his own fault and through the negligence of the operator, put in such apparent danger as to cause him terror, loss of self-possession and bewilderment and as a natural consequence in attempting to escape put himself in a more dangerous position. Under such circumstances he is not, as a matter of law, charged with contributory negligence that will prevent him from recovering damages for injuries sustained. Junction Min. Co. v. Ench, 111 Ill. App. 346, p. 349. A miner or employee of a mine operator is not as a matter of law to be held guilty of contributory negligence where the conditions which occasioned his fright and caused him to jump were made by the negligent conduct or the wilful violation of the statute by the mine operator. Loescher v. Consolidated Coal Co., 173 Ill. App. 526, p. 532. In an action for damages by a miner for injuries caused by a fall from the roof of his room due to the alleged failure of the mine operator to have the mine examined and to have the dangerous condition properly marked, the fact that the miner had actual notice and knowledge of the dangerous condition can not be interposed as a defense to prevent a recovery. Davis v. Missouri & Illinois Coal Co., 186 Ill. App. 478, p. 485. See Huchett v. Wiliamson County Coal Co., 188 Ill. App. 321, p. 323. The miner who with knowledge of the dangerous condition of the roof of his working place continued to work for two days after a proper demand for props is not sufficient to charge him with contributory negligence or with assuming the risk. Russell v. O'Gara Coal Co., 188 Ill. App. 328, p. 329. See Huchett v. Wiliamson County Coal Co., 188 Ill. App. 321, p. 323. In an action for the death of a driver caused by an alleged wilful violation of the statute it is not necessary or proper for a court in its instructions to give directions or make allusions to any want of care on the part of the deceased miner and to the hazard of the mining business, as these matters are not material in an action for a wilful violation of the statute. Hamilton v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 149 Ill. App. 10, p. 20. See Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 576; Adams v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co., 85 Mo. App. 45. In an action by a miner for damages caused by a wilful violation of the statute on the part of the mine operator it is not necessary for the complainant to aver or prove that he was in the exercise of due care. Davis v. Missouri & Illinois Coal Co., 186 Ill. App. 478, p. 485. In an action by a miner for damages for injuries under a common law count caused by the negligence of the mine operator, the complainant must aver and prove that he was in the exercise of due care and caution. Davis v. Missouri & Illinois Coal Co., 186 Ill. App. 478, p. 485. The cases where contributory negligence has been held not to bar a recovery are cases of assumed risk, Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Stroff, 100 Ill. App. 576, p. 581. See Carterville Coal Co. v. Abbott, 181 Ill. 495. Pawnee Coal Co. v. Royce, 184 Ill. 402; Cain Coal Co. v. Denman, 185 Ill. 413. The liability of a mine operator for injuries caused by the employing and retaining an incompetent engineer in violation of this act can not be affected or nullified on the ground of the contributory negligence of such incompetent engineer under the fellow servant doctrine. Niantic Coal Min. Co. v. Leonard, 126 Ill. 216, p. 217; See Franci v. Tazewell, 157 Ill. App. 477, p. 482. 77. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-MINER'S VIOLATION OF duty, The violation of a duty imposed by statute upon a miner is recognized as supporting the defense of contributory negligence if it in fact contributed to the injury complained of. Seghetti v. Berry Coal Co., 186 Ill. App. 263, p. 268. A mine examiner injured by an explosion of gas while in a mine looking for an accumulation of gas, lack of air, loose roof, or other dangers that may exist, must know that he is likely to encounter an accumulation of gas at any time, and for him to proceed in such an examination with an open lamp is inexcusable carelessness, and the statute was not enacted for his protection. Haveron v. Schoal Creek Coal Co., 184 Ill. App. 117, p. 122. 78. ASSUMPTION OF RISK-RISKS ASSUMED BY MINER. A miner assumes the risks of danger and injuries from falling coal where in mining the coal he cuts under the seam and pulls the dirt and rock from under the coal, thereby permitting it to be squeezed down, causing the coal to fall and come down so it can be shoveled up and hauled out, and in such case the statute has no application. Gliebas v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 159 Ill. App. SS, p. 89. Mygatt v. Southern Coal & Min. Co., 180 Ill. App. 150, p. 161; In mining generally the miner cuts in under the seam of coal, pulling the dirt and rock from under the coal, so that it is "squeezed" down by the weight above, which causes it to fall, sometimes catching the miner. After the coal is removed the miner then removes from one-half foot to one foot of loose rock from the roof. As the work progresses the miner supports the roof as he goes along with props provided for that purpose. The vein at the working place is referred to as the face of the coal. A miner injured by a fall of coal under such circumstances can not recover in an action against the operator on the ground of an alleged violation of the statute in the failure of the operator to furnish props, as in such case the props would not only be useless to prevent the fall, but the purpose of the cutting under is to cause the coal to fall so that it can be taken out. Such an accident is one of the assumed risks and is not within the scope of the statute. Gliebas v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 159 Ill. App. 88, p. 90. Mygatt v. Southern Coal & Min. Co., 180 Ill. App. 150, p. 159; The conditions under which a miner may work at a dangerous place at his own risk are those where the mine operator has complied with the law by having the miner's working place examined, the dangerous place marked by the mine examiner, and the miner sent to such place by the direction of the mine manager to make safe the particular dangerous conditions there existing. Arkley v. Niblack, 272 Ill. 356, p. 362. Under the statute of Illinois requiring a mine operator to cause his mine to be inspected each evening at the close of the day's work it is the duty of the miner, where the roof of his working place becomes dangerous after such inspection, to discover the danger and to protect himself from accident thereby; and a miner of 32 years' standing must be presumed to have appreciated the danger of a place in the roof which on testing sounded loose. Madison Coal Corporation v. Stullken, 228 Federal 308, p. 311. 79. ASSUMPTION OF RISK-RISKS NOT ASSUMED BY MINERS. The doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply and is no defense to an action against a mine owner where an injury results to a miner by reason of a willful violation of the statute. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Patting, 210 Ill. 342, p. 353; Franci v. Tazewell, 157 Ill. App. 477, p. 482. In an action by a miner for damages for injuries occasioned by the willful violation of the statute on the part of the mine operator, the defense that the miner assumed the risk can not be interposed by the mine operator to defeat the action. Peebles v. O'Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 270, p. 373; The violation of the statute on the part of a mine operator by a failure to employ a licensed mine manager or pit boss renders the mine operator liable for an injury to a boss driver where such injury was the result of the failure to employ such mine manager. The boss driver by continuing in the employ of the mine operator after his knowledge of the failure of the mine operator to employ a mine manager did not thereby assume the risks of the violation of the statute. Jupiter Coal Min. Co. v. Mercer, 84 Ill. App. 96, p. 102. Where it is established that the proximate cause of an injury complained of was the failure of the mine operator to obey the statute, the policy of the police regulations contain in the miners' act does not require that either court or jury should indulge in refined distinctions as to assumed risks or contributory negligence on the part of the person injured. Jupiter Coal Min. Co. v. Mercer, 84 Ill. App. 96, p. 102; Bartlett Coal Co. v. Roach, 68 Ill. 174; Litchfield Coal etc. Co. v. Taylor, 81 Ill. 590; Catlett v. Young, 143 Ill. 74; Illinois Fuel Company v. Parsons, 38 Ill. App. 182. The common law doctrine that when an employee is warned or knows of the danger he assumes the risk or if he is guilty of contributory negligence he can not recover, can not be invoked as a defense under the statute. The fact that the deceased miner undertook to stop the cars by putting the dog into action after he had gained a place of safety is no defense in the case if a case is made under the statute. Pate v. Gus Blair-Big Muddy Coal Co., 158 Ill. App. 578, p. 584. A miner does not assume the risk of the negligence of employees of the same master who are not fellow-servants with him. Illinois Third Vein Coal Co. v. Cioni, 215 Ill. 583, p. 589. 80. PROOF OF SIMILAR ACTS-ADMISSIBILITY. Where it is necessary to prove the purpose intended, guilty knowledge, or any other state of mind to give to the mere act an actionable character, then proof of other similar acts are admissible for the purpose of proving the state of mind necessary to give the particular act involved an actionable character. Taylor Coal Co. v. Dawes, 220 Ill. 145; Taylor Coal Co. v. Dawes, 122 Ill. App. 389, p. 396. 81. EXPERT EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-INSTANCES. Expert testimony is not permissible ordinarily for the purpose of showing whether a condition was safe or dangerous, as that is the ultimate question to be determined by a jury; but where the character of the work or the conditions are such that it requires explanation of the means and methods of conducting the business or the exercise of precautions therefor, for the purpose of enlightening the jury upon questions pertaining to the operation of a mine, it is proper to permit the use of expert testimony to explain the conditions and circumstances. Schultz v. Burnwell Coal Co., 180 Ill. App. 693, p. 697. In an action for damages for the death of a miner it is competent to show by qualified experts in mining matters that the conditions and surroundings existing at the particular place and in reference to the alleged dangerous conditions were safe. Hamilton v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 149 Ill. App. 10, p. 19. Henrietta Coal Co. v. Campbell, 211 Ill. 216, p. 227; Jacobs v. Madison Coal Corp., 165 Ill. App. 444, p. 448. The opinion of an expert miner as to the effect of the firing of shots upon props and the conditions surrounding them is admissible in evidence in an action for damages by a miner where it was shown that shots were fired near the props. Schultz v. Burnwell Coal Co., 180 Ill. App. 693, p. 697. See Hamilton v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 149 Ill. App. 10; Where a miner was injured while operating a new cutting machine in a mine and the equipment and character of the machine were in controversy it is proper to show by machine experts what constitutes a full equipment of such machine. Morris v. O'Gara Coal Co., 181 Ill. App. 309, p. 317. Expert witnesses may testify as to whether the use of bent and broken cross bars was a proper method of propping the roof of a mine or the proper method of cutting cross-cuts from one room to another; but it is not competent to ask expert witnesses whether or not a particular room in which a miner was at work was rendered a dangerous place in which to work because of the opening of a cross-cut. The question as to whether or not a room was rendered dangerous and unsafe in an action by a miner for damages for an injury, is a conclusion to be drawn by the jury from all the facts and circumstances proved in the case. Hart v. Penwell Coal Min. Co., 146 Ill. App. 155, p. 158. See Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 531; LeGru v. Penwell Coal Co., 149 Ill. App. 555, p. 558; Aetitus v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 150 Ill. App. 497, p. 502. Where in an action by a driver against a mine operator for damages for injuries occasioned by reason of a dangerous condition in the mine, and where witnesses with knowledge have testified as to the actual conditions in the mine at the place where the accident happened, it is not proper to prove by expert witnesses who have no knowledge of the actual conditions at the place of the |