is that it involves UNIVERSAL MIND, that it binds the Supreme intellect in the same fetters of necessity. Necessity cannot attend one step in the series and be separated from any other step. The theory maintains that volition, from its very nature, without a motive cause, would be an absurdity. If then the demand arises out of the nature of volition, it must apply to mind without distinction, to God's as to man's. There can be no exemption for the Infinite mind! Whatever other differences exist between the created mind and the Infinite mind, there is none here.

God's volitions being the source of ours the theory compels us to reason of them as we do of our own. We have then reached that mysterious point where the motive and the efficient cause are identical. But the sequel will show us that this sameness of the two is the exclusion of one. Whatever locates causal power in mere motive divests all mind of such energy.

This awful question arises then, involving an affirmative answer, are not the worst deeds in the universe as guiltless as they are necessitated? The conviction sways all minds, by their very structure, that the guilt of an evil deed is grounded on the power to refrain from it. But what power can grapple with an opposing eternal necessity? How utterly astounding the position, that the character of an act lies in the will, and yet the cause of the act lies as far out of the will as is the Infinite arranger of all motives. The very attempt to do otherwise involves the same impossibility as to achieve the opposite. For what part of the theory has ever been taught with deeper emphasis, than that the mind must have a different motive in order to vary its volition? how can the mind command a different volition until the needed motive has been present and operated?

Thus, the motive indispensable to the attempt lies forever out of the reach of the agent. An opposite state of mind, or an attempt to procure one, lies as far beyond the man's control as is that creative energy which framed the universe. Thus, to curb appetite, to restrain passion, or to practice self-denial, are words without ideas; they can never, in human experience, be a realization. All guilt, self-reproach, fear of penalty, must be the delusions of superstition, and can be readily vanquished by the potency of this theory. It is also fully adequate to dissipate the errors, that blameworthiness attaches to crime and praiseworthiness to virtue. Though this has ever been the judgment of the race, it having been based on the error that the opposites were possible, their impossibility having now been proved, this fallacious judgment must be reversed.

If motives, and not mind, produce volitions, then, as to being causal, mind and matter are on common ground; they are links in the

great chain of antecedents and sequences, all their operations being from a power without themselves. They are nature, under the law of necessity, a necessary chain, one link of which can no more be wanting than can an infinite attribute. As we cannot command the motives which produce our volitions, why are we not equally respon. sible for our incipient feelings and intellections as for our volitions? As the cause of each of these lies out of the mind, and as they can have no character out of their cause, there can be no human vice or human virtue. The theory finds the cause in God; these effects of his will, then, can have no character which he has not. As nothing not good can flow from God, vice is not different from virtue. Their names are inexpressive of ideas.

Whatever makes the distinction between vice and virtue impossible makes them impossible. The motive cause of volitions, therefore, inaugurates the most absolute OPTIMISM. The so-called crimes that have desolated society, blighted the hopes of ages, and buried nations in a premature grave, differ only in name from the brightest virtues. The two things flow from a common fountain and have a common purpose, and therefore cannot be of opposite natures. Their oneness of character has all the certainty of first principles. The infinity of their source is everlasting security for the identity of their nature.

This makes everything really what it may merely appear to be. Wisdom, folly, truth, falsehood, sincerity, hypocrisy, all opposites, are true if they so appear. As our conceptions of qualities, no less than of things, are from God, how can those be wrong if these be right? Why are they not equally true at all times? How can any error occur while in the entire universe only infinite perfection operates? What appeared true yesterday and appears false to-day must be equally true and false. God having originated both opposing conceptions, it is impossible the contradiction should not be true. But though the theory precludes all liberty in the production of volition, it locates freedom in the workings of volition. But if this element resides in the connection between volition and its effects, must it not be equally found between every effect and its antecedent, through the entire series up to the first cause? The theory, therefore, identifies the highest form of liberty with the most stern absolute necessity.

Now the very ground on which liberty is denied to human volition requires that it should also be denied to Divine volition. How is it possible to doubt, that if motives can be the only possible cause of volition in some minds they only can be such in all minds? This motive-control making all movements of mind necessary, it

must make all beings and events equally so. The will of God, no less than that of man, must be passive. The terrific tyranny of fate must rule the one no less than the other.

The name we may choose to give to this necessity can alter no feature of its character.

Its stern resistless power sweeps onward, regardless of character and consequences, crushing beneath its iron heel the moral dictates of all minds.

Were the known events of the universe of a benignant character, we might regard this a distinctive of their necessitating cause; were they only diffusive of bliss their cause might be contemplated without horror. But finding deformity, crime, agony, forming the vast range of events in man's history, how can we view the necessitating cause apart from the most odious tyranny?

If falsehood, treachery, murder, and blasphemy be the appropriate expression of the Infinite character, what fate can be too dreadful for the universe to apprehend? What indemnity can it have against howling away in ever augmenting agony the fiery ages of a wasteless future?

This doctrine of the causality of motives forces upon us PANTHEISM. The doctrine makes God the author of all motives as he is of all beings, of all volitions as of all motives, of all sequences as of all volitions. It places the Divine mind under this same law which controls all other minds. Extend this chain of antecedents and sequents to any conceivable length, and you change not the relation between the last effect and the first moving cause. Does not this exclude all life, all thought, all efficiency, all kinds of causation, from every being, but eternal necessity? Does it not place the seal of truth on the atheistic argument of Spinoza? God, says he, is the author of all things, acting not from choice, but from necessity; is the author of all vice, of all virtue exhibited in human history. Cause and effect, then, must be substituted by substance and qualities, the same reasoning being adapted to all will which is applied to human will. If our will cannot be causal God's cannot be. His volitions like ours must flow from unbeginning antecedents. The tendencies and energies that now belong to the Eternal always belonged to him. The nature of eternal necessity admits of no variation or beginning. God's volitions are commensurate with his being; this must also be true of all their sequences. Beginning is shut out by necessity alike from both. All we call finite are not God's creatures, but his attributes. They are not creations but developments. The eternity of all volitions is the annihilation of all causation, and by striking cause from the universe the possiFOURTH SERIES, VOL. XI.-17

bility of effect is precluded. Where there is no creature there can be no creator. Phenomena take the place of creatures, and substance that of Creator. Now as phenomena could not exist without substance, so substance could not be without phenomena. Neither could therefore be before the other. Both alike must be without a beginning. All parts of the mundane system are portions of the always ancient one. What can be more true than the Pantheistic answer to the question, What is God? He is substance and attributes, being and its phenomena. The universe, comprising mind and matter, the clod, the animal, the man, the Deity, all, all are God. This is the crushing conclusion triumphantly forced upon us by this iron agency of fate. If God consists of everything he cannot be a person; so this great distinction of theism is lost amid the common ruins of creative agency.

These are among the shuddering conclusions drawn from the same premises by modern atheists, and they are indubitably true conclusions. Christian necessitarians have failed to reach them, not because logic would lead to any others, not because the laws of thought permitted them to stop short, but because so terrific a result has driven them back for refuge in opposite truths. Had they fearlessly resigned themselves to the eternal laws of evidence; had they, like Spinoza, Hobbes, and Shelley, advanced with an unfaltering step from the premises to the conclusion, from necessitated volitions to the denial of creation, atheism must have been their only possible terminus.

ART. VII-OLSHAUSEN'S NEW TESTAMENT PSYCHOLOGY: Being a translation of a part of Olshausen's De Naturæ Humanæ Trichotomia, N. T. Scriptoribus Recepta, among his Opuscula Theologica.

THE wisest among the ancient philosophers held man to be the head of the system of nature, embracing in himself the diverse forms of created things, and cognate not less to earth than to heaven. So far as regards the body, the external and visible part of man, they acknowledged the proximity which connects it with inferior animated nature. It obeys the same laws in developing and nourishing individual parts and members. The movements of the body, of the blood, lungs, and heart, the appetites of food and drink, all these are common to him with the lowest orders of animals, although they are found of a much subtler character in

man. Then, so far as relates to the internal and invisible nature of man, they recognized as existent in this animated body a power of knowing, choosing, imagining, and recalling to memory, which faculties the superior races of animals do not altogether lack. Then also they recognized, as peculiar to man alone, a faculty of discoursing, cogitating, and of understanding, and a will, which enables it to use, at its own choice, those superior and inferior powers; to which also self-consciousness is to be added. These single faculties they decided to be so combined in human nature as to render man a single organism, (õpyavov,) artistically constructed, a monument of the wisdom of Divinity; created, indeed, for this end, that being released by his own will gradually from the dominion of the inferior forces, he might commit his whole nature to the government of those superior forces which should secure to him an eternal existence. So those two chiefs of the Greek philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato, had taught concerning human nature; of whom the former distinguished between vous, the intelligence, or the reason, (pony,) mind, and dúμos, affections; and the latter between νοῦς oι λόγος, θύμος and επιθυμία, or adjectively, between λογικός, θυμικός, and επιθυμητικός. And Zoroaster also (or, at any rate, the disciples of Zoroaster, if you reject the genuine origin of the book Bundehesch,) seems to have held the same opinion concerning the partition of human nature. The Jews, also, especially in later times, used the same trichotomy, (or threefold division,) in distributing the faculties of human nature. The Septuagint translators palpably set forth this opinion in their version of the memorable passage of Job vii, 15 : ἀπαλλάξεις ἀπὸ πνεύματός μου τὴν ψυχήν μου ἀπὸ δὲ θανάτου τὰ ὀςτᾶ μου; literally, thou releasest my soul from my spirit and my bones from death.* Josephus, also, uses the same partition, following the doctrine of the Pharisees, which the Rabbins of the more recent age have preserved.† The doctors among the Alexandrian Jews, being skilled in Greek philosophy, followed Plato, as is plentifully evident from the pages of Philo. For this celebrated man distinguishes between the λoyikóv evμukóν and εtivμETIKóv, or the rational, the passional, and the ani

מָחֲנָק Since .תִּבְחַר מַחֲנָק נַפְשִׁי The Hebrew words have a different ring •

signifies suffocation, Doderlein conjectures αποπνευματισμού; Bahrdt, απο πνίγε paros. There is scarce need of conjectural emendation, for the LXX as often translated the sense rather than single words. The phrase ȧrahλáttei þvxýv ἀπὸ πνεύματος with them simply expressed to kill, as in Hebrews v, 12, μερισμός ψυχῆς τε καὶ πνεύματος. Romans vi, 6.

Josephus, Arch. i, 1, 2, edit. Haverc., on the creation of man, says: "ExλaσɛV ὁ Θεος τον άνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς λαβών καὶ πνεύμα ἑνῆκεν αὐτῷ καὶ ψυχήν.

נָפֶשׁ הָיָה and חַיִּים נִשְׁמַת The Rabbins also distinguish between