CHAP. VI. THE PHILOSOPHY OF BACON IN ITS RELATION TO THE THE result of the Baconian philosophy, and the logical order of its ideas, may be thus stated in its principal features: 1. Science should serve man by being useful to him. Its use consists in inventions; the object of which is the dominion of the human race. 2. Science can only become inventive through an exact knowledge of things, and this is only to be obtained by an interpretation of nature. 3. A correct interpretation of nature is only possible through pure and methodical experience. Experience is pure when it does not judge according to "idols" and human analogies, when it does not anthropomorphise things, when it is mere experimentalising perception. Experience is methodical as true induction. Induction is true when, by an accurate and critical comparison, it infers laws from a number of particular instances. Comparison is critical when it opposes OPPOSITION TO ANTIQUITY. 141 negative to positive instances. Moreover, the process of inductive reasoning is accelerated by the investigation of prerogative instances. Experience, thus disciplined, avoids from first to last all uncertain and premature hypotheses. Thus Bacon sets up his principle and himself in opposition to the past. He sees that his own principles comprise all the conditions requisite for a thorough renovation of science, such as no one before him had the courage or the vigour to effect; he feels that he is himself the bearer of the renovating spirit, the scientific reformer. "No one," he says, "has as yet been found endowed with sufficient firmness and vigour to resolve upon and undertake the thorough abolition of common theories and notions, and the fresh application of the intellect, thus cleared and rendered impartial, to the study of particulars. Hence human reason, such as we have it now, is a mere farrago and crude mass made up of much credulity, much accident, and, withal, of those puerile notions which are imbibed early in life. But if some one of mature age, sound senses, and a disabused mind, should apply himself anew to experience and the study of particulars, we might have better hope of him."* "Some hope might, * "Nemo adhuc tanta mentis constantia et rigore inventus est, ut dicaverit et sibi imposuerit theorias et notiones communes we think, be afforded by my own example; and we do not say this for the sake of boasting, but because it may be useful. If any feel a want of confidence, let them look at me,- a man who, among his contemporaries, has been most engaged in public affairs, who is of somewhat infirm health (which of itself occasions great loss of time), and who, in this matter, is assuredly the first explorer, neither following in the steps of another, nor communicating his own thoughts to a single individual; but who, nevertheless, having once firmly entered upon the right way, and submitted his mind to things, has (I think) made some advance." If we now compare Bacon's philosophy with penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia de integro applicare. Itaque ratio illa humana quam habemus, ex multa fide et multo etiam casu, nec non ex puerilibus quas primo hausimus notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries. Quod si quis ætate matura et sensibus integris et mente repurgata se ad experientiam et ad particularia de integro applicet, de eo melius sperandum est."-Nov. Org. I. 97. * "Etiam nonnihil hominibus spei fieri posse putamus ab exemplo nostro proprio; neque jactantiæ causa hoc dicimus sed quod utile dictu sit. Si qui diffidant, me videant, hominem inter homines ætatis meæ civilibus negotiis occupatissimum, nec firma admodum valetudine (quod magnum habet temporis dispendium), atque in hac re plane protopirum, et vestigia nullius secutum, neque hæc ipsa cum ullo mortalium communicantem, et tamen veram viam constanter ingressum et ingenium rebus submittentem, hæc ipsa aliquatenus (ut existimamus) provexisse." Nov. Org. I. 113. BACON AND KANT. 143 that which preceded it, we find, in all those points that bear upon the reformation of science, a decided antagonism. Bacon gives science another purpose, another foundation, another tendency. I. THE PRACTICAL END. DOGMATISM AND SCEPTICISM. Bacon immediately directs science to the use of mankind, and to invention as the agent for promoting it; he would make science practical and generally useful, and from this point of view opposes the scientific character previously recognised, which was theoretic and only accessible to the few. From an affair of the schools, which it had hitherto been, Bacon would make of science an affair of life, not merely because it suited his inclination so to do, but as a necessary consequence of his principles. Bacon's plan of renovation stands in an opposition to the antique, similar to that of the Kantian philosophy. Kant would make philosophy critical; Bacon would make it practical. Preceding systems appear uncritical to Kant, unpractical to Bacon. In the summary judgment which both, from opposite points of view, pronounce upon their predecessors, both are alike incapable of doing justice in any particular to the philosophical culture of the past. They both agree that all preceding philosophy has been mere fruitless speculation, that the systems of the past fall into the opposite extremes of dogmatism and scepticism, and thus reciprocally annul each other's results. To Kant the representatives of dogmatic and sceptical philosophy were Wolf and Hume; to Bacon they were the dogmatic Aristotelians and the academical sceptics, of whom he said that the former came to false and rash conclusions, the latter to none at all. * To embrace both these epochs of modern philosophy in one common expression, we may assert that Bacon and Kant, convinced of the fruitlessness of all preceding speculation, both desired to render philosophy fruitful, and therefore practical. Bacon directed it to a practical knowledge of nature, Kant to a practical knowledge of self. The ripest fruit of the Baconian philosophy is invention, so far as it conduces to the dominion of man; that of the Kantian is morality as based upon human freedom and autonomy. Bacon is never weary of reproaching the past with unfruitfulness, as a necessary consequence of theoretical philosophy. People fancy that they know a great deal, through this traditional system; * Compare Nov. Org. 1. 67. |