REASON AND FAITH.

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I. THE SEPARATION BETWEEN REASON AND THE

FAITH IN REVELATION.

BACON AND TERTULLIAN.

THIS Dualism establishes a separation between religion and philosophy, that excludes all intercommunication and reciprocal influence. Philosophy within the sphere of religion is infidelity; religion within the sphere of philosophy is fantastic. From the Baconian point of view religious faith can neither be self-appropriated nor believed by human reason; it will not tolerate any rational criticism, but demands a blind acceptance of the divine decrees that have been revealed. To human reason, these revelations, divine in their origin, are impenetrable mysteries. The opposition of our own will does not weaken the stringency of the divine decrees; neither does the contradiction of our reason lessen the credibility of the divine revelations. Rather, indeed, does this very contradiction confirm the divinity of their origin. We are the more bound to accept the divine revelations the less they are comprehensible by our reason; the "more the divine mystery is contrary to reason, the more must it be believed for the honour of God."* Repugnance * Compare "De Augm." IX. 1.

to reason, far from being a "negative instance,' with respect to faith, is, on the contrary, a “positive instance"- a criterion of credibility. Α divine revelation must be believed, not although, but because it is, in opposition to human reason. Religious faith is not to stand behind, but beyond science, on a totally different basis; it must be unconditional, without rational ground, without logical aid, and therefore to all intents and purposes a blind faith. Thus, even in the sphere of theology, Bacon is thoroughly anti-scholastic. Scholasticism is a speculative theology, a construction of the articles of faith according to the laws of the understanding, a logical bulwark of the Church. This bulwark is destroyed by Bacon in the case both of philosophy and of religion. Philosophy must not raise it, theology must not seek to fortify itself by such expedients; and by separating the two Bacon destroys the scholastic spirit which had united them, or, if we prefer the expression, jumbled them together. Indeed, he seems to revert to the præscholastic faith, and to revive the maxim of Tertullian-"Credo quia absurdum." "Christ, the Son of God," said Tertullian, "died ; this I believe, because it is repugnant to reason: he was buried and rose from the dead; this is certain, for it is impossible." But between Tertullian and

BACON AND TERTULLIAN.

295

Bacon intervene the systems of Scholasticism, and they are as different from each other as the ages to which they belong. To the English philosopher human reason did not appear so impotent as to the Latin Father of the Church. The same expression bears one meaning in the mouth of a reformer of science, another in that of a teacher of the early Church. The declaration of Bacon in the last book, "De Dignitate et Augmentatione Scientiarum," has manifestly another sense from that of the same proposition when uttered by Tertullian in his treatise "De Carne Christi." Bacon has in the background the "Dignitas Scientiarum," which he has defended with so much zeal, and enriched with so many treasures. But this "Dignitas Scientiarum" is far from being acknowledged by Tertullian; or, we may rather he acknowledges the direct contrary—namely, the worthlessness of science and the impotence of human reason. Tertullian's proposition is simple; Bacon's conveys two meanings. They have one interest in common; they wish to have no rationalising faith, no intermixture of faith and reason, of religion and philosophy, of revelation and nature. For the sake of this interest both grasp the paradox which declares that, in religion, repugnance to reason increases credibility. In the relation between faith and reason only three cases

say,

are possible, and of these one alone belongs to the purists of faith. Either faith contradicts or does not contradict reason; and, in the event of contradiction, it contradicts with or without the consent of reason. The first case is expressed by the declaration, "I believe, because it is in accordance with reason." Here faith becomes a rational dogma, for it has the testimony of reason. The second case is expressed thus: "I believe, although it is repugnant to reason."

Here faith is a concession of the reason, by which it is granted, and, as it were, permitted. Here reason performs an act of self-denial for the sake of faith. It resolves to believe with a heavy heart, saying, "I believe, Lord, help thou my unbelief." From this point of view faith would greatly prefer its articles to be rational, as it would then deem them all the more credible. Lastly, the third case is expressed thus: "I believe, because it is impossible." Here faith not only renounces all subservience to reason, but all alliance with it, openly taking the opposite ground and allowing no objection. If, with Tertullian and Bacon, we oppose faith to reason, and make repugnance to reason a positive criterion of faith, this third case remains alone possible. No other formula can be applied by purism in faith to reason and philosophy. Nevertheless, even this formula

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297

is involuntarily allied with reason, and herein consists the contradiction that produces its intrinsic impossibility. It is an argument of the reason; it gives a ground for faith which, although the opposite of reason, is a ground notwithstanding; it cannot get rid of the "quia," but is itself logic, while it precludes all logic! However, we will be satisfied with the good intention, and merely inquire whether the "Credo quia absurdum" is as piously meant by Bacon as by Tertullian.

Tertullian, when he made his declaration, had only one purpose in view the purity of faith. He did not intend to confer a benefit on science, for to him science was valueless. His proposition was simple and had but one meaning. On the other hand, Bacon, by his separation of faith and reason, wished to secure the independence of both; he wished to preserve both from intermixture, intending the independence of science, no less than that of religion. Nay, we will go further. Bacon desired the independence of faith, because he preferred that of science; he acted more for the sake of science than for that of faith. His declaration carried with it a double meaning. It can be interpreted to the advantage of both faith and science, but it must be interpreted more to the advantage of the latter. Science was