possible (as in the ordinary "enlightenment" of the school of Wolf), historical religion could only be regarded as an outward show, to be explained, on closer investigation, by a reference to worldly motives; so long was it impossible to get beyond a stubborn and exclusive opposition. To terminate this it was necessary to discover the affinity and connection between natural and historical religion, to comprehend the latter in its religious nature. historical faith is never to be discovered by a merely logical understanding, but requires an historical understanding that is able to apprehend its peculiarities, to appreciate notions and emotions different from its own, and to explain them from their historical antecedents. An explanation of historical facts from historical antecedents, is a recognition of a necessity in history, and is what we call "historical thinking;" which is, in fact, natural thinking with respect to history. The historical, as distinguished from the abstract logical understanding, comprehends that human

Now the religious nature of an

enlightenment" does not date from the present moment, but consists of a gradually progressive process of culture, and is of a universally historical nature; so that the actual state of “ lightenment" only represents a state of elevation corresponding to its period. Thus all religion,

en

HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING.

369

indeed human culture generally, is to be comprehended and vindicated not from the present point of view, but from the peculiar conditions

of its own age. Compared with the state of

thought in its own age, historical religion appears not as the opposite of that thought, but as its element and basis. From its very foundation, German " enlightenment" was compelled to think historically; the foundation was already established in Leibnitz, it was developed in Winckelmann, Lessing, and Herder, while no advance could be made during the age that was governed by Christian Wolf and his school. Lessing, above all, liberated the historical understanding, and in his "Education of the Human Race" (Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts) comprehended and vindicated positive religion in a corresponding spirit. The relation of Leibnitz to his contemporary Bayle is the same as that of Lessing to his contemporary Voltaire. Indeed, Leibnitz is distinguished from Locke and Bayle, and Lessing from Voltaire, just as the German "enlightenment" is distinguished from the Anglo-Gallic. The two bases are as different from each other as the two nations. The philosophy founded by Bacon liberated the natural understanding, investigating, developing, and establishing it in a sphere from which the histo

B B

rical understanding was excluded.

The philoso

phy founded by Leibnitz produced from its own resources the historical understanding, which did not exclude the natural understanding; but subordinated it to itself. In opposition to Bacon and Descartes, it considered nature, according to our human analogy, as a progressive series that rose up to man as its unconscious goal. Thus nature, as it were, "præforms" history, while it organises

man.

Thus, from its very origin, the philosophy of nature is destined to become a philosophy of history, and from this point of view the historical philosophy of a Herder, and the subsequent natural philosophy of a Schelling, are to be judged. Herder, in his "Ideas towards the History of Man," speculates on the hypotheses of natural history; Schelling, in his "Ideas towards the Philosophy of Nature," speculates on the results of historical philosophy. And perhaps Schelling has not advanced natural science so much as philosophical history; perhaps he has not so much explained nature itself, as the religion of nature.

While the Anglo-Gallic "enlightenment" was only naturalistic from its very foundation, and therefore remained uncongenial to the historical process of human culture, the German "enlightenment" was, in its very purpose, humanistic. It attained its end in Kant. But the Kantian epoch

is also of import for the Anglo-Gallic philosophy, which, as it progressed, had been impelled to a point where it had found itself compelled to call in question the natural understanding and its knowledge. Here it occupied the mind of Kant, and gave this mind the last and most effectual impulse towards a thoroughly new inquiry respecting the nature of human knowledge. It was then itself carried out further by Kant, and resulted in the German philosophy.

CHAP. XII.

THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO HISTORY AND THE PRESENT.

If we compare the Baconian philosophy with history, its limit, as well as its contradiction, becomes clear beyond the possibility of mistake. The interpretation of history is manifestly a necessary problem of a real exact science, inasmuch as history itself belongs to reality. Now the Baconian philosophy is incapable of interpreting history. This incapacity is its limit. Nay, it is even aware of this limit, and by clearly-expressed judgments, that show self-knowledge, has excluded from its precincts the elementary ideas requisite for the interpretation of history. These elementary ideas are the human mind and religion. The mind is the subject and supporter of all history; religion is the basis of all human culture. If we cannot explain the mind, how can we explain the development of the mind, which is, in fact, history itself? Bacon has defined the essence of the human mind as the unknown and unperceivable magnitude, that does not enter his philosophical