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contending forces; with Rousseau it is a paradise of happy and peaceful creatures; with the former it is barbarous, with the latter it is idyllic. Rousseau's state bears to that of Hobbes the same relation that material nature bears to the terrible Leviathan. We do not stop to inquire how far the ideas of both are remote from the truth.

This point of difference between Hobbes and Rousseau is important, and opens a further view into the age of Anglo-Gallic" enlightenment." By his difference from Hobbes, Rousseau is opposed to the French philosophes, who are the intellectual progeny of Hobbes and Locke. Herein consists the strong contrast between Rousseau, on the one side, and Voltaire, Helvetius, Condillac, Diderot, and, above all, the Holbachians (as Rousseau loves to call them), in whom materialism reaches its culminating point, on the other. Here, in the very midst of the AngloGallic" enlightenment," arises a mighty reaction. Consistently with his own notions of nature and the natural condition of man, Rousseau finds in nature the source of morality and religion; he does not, like Hobbes and Helvetius, find the source of morality in selfishness, but in love; he does not, like Hobbes and Voltaire, find the source of religion in blind fear, but in pious admiration. To his eyes nature appears, not as a

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blind mechanism of forces, but as a moral, loving being, which unites men in brotherhood, instead of setting them against each other as enemies. His view of nature was intended to be of a moral-religious character, and was therefore to restore natural morality and religion in opposition to the prevailing "enlightenment." Here Rousseau, to a certain extent, unites himself with the German “enlightenment," which tends towards Kant; or, rather, German "enlightenment" unites itself with him.

Nearest akin to Hobbes is Spinoza, on whose political theory the English philosopher probably exercised an immediate influence. The "Leviathan" of Hobbes and the Political Treatise of Spinoza agree completely in their fundamental principles; but, in results, Spinoza's reason inclines him to the democratic, his wishes to the aristocratic form of government, whereas Hobbes, both from theory and inclination, chooses absolute monarchy. In politics Spinoza holds the middle position between Hobbes and Rousseau; in his view of the natural condition of man he is entirely on the side of Hobbes. Spinoza does not, any more than Hobbes, discover a source of religion and morality in nature; like Hobbes, he denies both on natural grounds, while, by Rousseau, both, on natural grounds, are affirmed. Hobbes's conception of the nature of the Deity was likewise similar to Spinoza's. The Deity was to

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be conceived utterly without human analogy, determined by no limit, humanised by no passion; all anthropomorphism, in short, was to be avoided. The Divine will is power; and this power is unlimited action. "Of God we can only say, in truth, that He is."* If we place Bacon by the side of Descartes, we may aptly compare Hobbes with Spinoza. Whatever there is of Spinozism in the Baconian philosophy is most clearly expressed by Hobbes.†

If we consider Hobbes in reference to Bacon, we must say that he has solved a problem, proposed by the latter in his Organum as entirely new, uncommon, and necessary: he has laid a physical foundation of morality and politics. And, indeed, Hobbes solved the problem in such a manner as to make morality and religion subservient to politics, and to reduce them to the laws of nature.

II. THE SENSUALISM OF LOCKE.

BACON had insisted that the laws of nature could only be discovered by experience, and that

* The words of Hobbes are, "For there is but one name to signify our conception of His nature, and that is, I AM."Leviathan, II. 31.—J. O.

On the subject of Spinoza's politics, and its relation to Hobbes, compare my "Geschichte der neuern Philosophie," vol. i.-Author's Note.

experience could only be attained by the natural understanding. Thus the question remained, What is the natural understanding? Bacon himself was chiefly interested in the question, How does experience arrive at invention? This inquiry stands in the foreground of his philosophy; the "Novum Organum" is devoted to it. In the background arises the question, How do we arrive at experience? how does experience result from the human mind? Or what is the human mind, if its knowledge, as Bacon has explained, only consists in experience? This is the problem solved by John Locke in his "Essay concerning Human Understanding." Locke takes root in Bacon; but, as far as I have seen, those who treat of Locke have not sufficiently recognised his dependent position with regard to Bacon the historical root of his philosophy. With respect to Bacon, he is, indeed, far less independent than Hobbes. Hobbes has complied with Bacon's boldest requisitions, and, among all the philosophers of the Baconian race, is unquestionably the most original. Locke has merely carried out what Bacon has already explained and promulgated throughout his works. Hobbes found in the Baconian philosophy a mere cursory hint for the establishment of his views, whereas Locke for his views found a frequently repeated pattern.

BACON AND LOCKE.

1. THE MIND AS A TABULA RASA.

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Bacon had often and expressly declared that the human understanding, to think correctly, must completely get rid of all preconceived notions. From these he had not made a single exception. Thus, according to him, there was not a single notion of which the understanding was unable to get rid, not one that was firmly rooted or innate in the mind. All notions must be first acquired by experience; therefore we have not, or ought not to have, a single notion prior to experience. Thus the mind without experience is destitute of all notions, is perfectly void, like a tabula rasa. This, I think, follows by very simple and evident reasoning, from the propositions of Bacon; and the conclusion thus drawn forms the startingpoint of Locke.

To the question, What is the human mind prior to experience? Locke replies, It is a tabula rasa; for there are no "innate ideas." Bacon, in strictness, must have given the same answer to the same question; or, rather, he actually gave it. It is scarcely necessary to deduce Locke's principle from Bacon by a course of reasoning; we can find the principle, even verbally expressed, in Bacon himself. The understanding must lay aside all preconceived notions - must, according to the very words of Bacon, clear itself