THE FRENCH ENCYCLOPÆDISTS.

*

453

quent effusions; his materialism, on the other hand, allowed him to show the bon sens in conjunction with the esprit fort; and the commonplaces of scepticism, in the mouth of a Voltaire, sounded like critical acuteness. It was Condillac, however, who systematically carried out the principles of Locke, and in his analysis of human knowledge brought sensualism to perfection, deducing all human knowledge from sensation alone, and leaving only one result possible,-materialism in its most naked form. Condillac was followed by the Encyclopædists; and his materialism was further elaborated by the Holbachians, represented by Lamettrie and the "Système de la Nature." The tendency of the Baconian philosophy from the time of Locke is in England towards scepticism, which is finally attained in Hume; in France towards materialism—the light weight of which is suited to the capacity of light talents, whose extreme rearguard has come down to our own days, to end, it would seem, in Germany. The less the power of thought required by a philosophical theory, the further will it naturally extend.

* As contained in the "Essais sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines," 1746, and the "Traité des Sensations," 1754.

IV. THE SO-CALLED IDEALISM OF BERKELEY.

The appearance of Berkeley among the English philosophers is seldom understood. Most are so surprised to find in the midst of decided materialists a philosopher who looks like an ultra-idealist, that they are tempted to award the latter a totally different position than historically belongs to him. An error of this sort is committed by an eminent historian of modern philosophy*, who transfers Berkeley from the ranks of the English to the ranks of the German philosophers, and places him with Leibnitz, as if he were the perfection of the latter. Berkeley is not the consistent Leibnitz, but the consistent Locke. With Leibnitz he has no historical point of contact; he rests upon Locke, as Hume rests upon him. Berkeley takes an historical and philosophical position between Locke and Hume, as the link in the series that marks a transition. It has been said that both Berkeley and Leibnitz attack Locke; and, from the opposition thus common to both, an endeavour has been made to put them on the same logical level; but we cannot deduce the equality of two magnitudes from the fact that they are both unequal to a third. Are not Locke and Leibnitz both ad

* Erdmann, in his "Geschichte der neuern Philosophie," ii. 2.

ULTRA-SENSUALISM OF BERKELEY.

455

versaries of Descartes, and at the same time opposed to each other on the very point which they attack in Descartes, namely, the doctrine of the mind? Leibnitz is just as far removed from Berkeley as from Locke. He opposes the principles of Locke that are shared by Berkeley, who only disagrees with Locke as to consequences. It seems that this error has been occasioned by a word. The name "idealism," which has been given to Berkeley's philosophy, has misled many to assign this philosopher to a family very different from that to which he belongs. Some would make him akin to Kant*, others to Leibnitz. Both are wrong. If by "idealism" we understand a tendency opposed to the sensualistic, no expression is less suited to the philosophy of Berkeley; compared with that of Locke, it is not less, but more, sensualistic. Locke was not enough a sensualist in the eyes of Berkeley. He was so in his principles, but not in his consequences; and this is the contradiction that Berkeley points out and solves. Locke had laid down the principle, that all knowledge must consist in sensuous perception; and yet he spoke of things that could never be perceived, such as material substances or bodies in general, as objects of

* Garve, in his critical review of the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," published in the Göttingen "Gelehrte Anzeiger," 1782.

knowledge. He had laid down the nominalistic principle, that generalities are words and not things; and yet he allowed in bodies certain primary qualities, such as extension, mobility, solidity. Is not material substance or body an abstract "idea," an empty generality? Are not extension, mobility, solidity, general abstract "ideas," which, consistently with his own principles, Locke should have declared to be mere words, not things—not objective qualities—not real perceptible existences? But he said the very opposite. He was, tried by his own standard, too little of a sensualist, too little of a nominalist. still held that some insensible things were perceptible, that some generalities were real.

He

1. THINGS AS PERCEPTIONS.

To this point Berkeley directs all his acuteness, an attention thoroughly schooled by nominalism. There are no general things or bodies, but only individual things, perceptible by the senses. There are no more any general bodies than there are general triangles; the existing triangle is always definite, either rectangular, acute, or obtuse. Neither is there any general extension, motion, or solidity, but every conceivable extension is determined as large or small, every motion as swift or slow, all impenetrability in body, as hard or soft.

NO PRIMARY QUALITIES.

457

But all quantitative differences, whether of extension or motion, are manifestly relative. If I change my point of view, or sharpen my sight with an instrument, things will appear to me larger or smaller. Thus greatness and smallness are phenomena of the human vision, as well as light, figure, and colour; they only exist in my perception; and as every conceivable extension has a definite magnitude, without which it does not exist at all, so extension itself is not an objective quality of things in themselves, but merely belongs to my own perception. The same may be said of motion and solidity. The latter is either hard or soft; but hardness and softness are merely human sensations, and exist as little without our sense of feeling as sounds without our ears, colour without our eyes, sweetness or sourness without our taste. Therefore what Locke calls the primary qualities do not exist. Hence, to speak in Locke's language, there are only secondary qualities*, or, all the perceptible qualities of things are secondary; that is, they exist in us, not externally. But if everything perceptible is within ourselves, what is external to ourselves?

Things is the answer. But there are no general things; there are only individual sensible things. What are sensible things, if I deduct

* Compare the first dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.