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but also of her laws; that is to say, a real interpretation. Here is the decisive point at which theory becomes practical, contemplative science becomes operative, knowledge becomes productive, experience becomes inventive. And invention itself forms the transition from the interpretation of nature to the dominion of man. Through science experience becomes invention, through invention science becomes human dominion. Our power rests upon our invention, and this upon our knowledge of things. In Bacon's mind, power and knowledge, the dominion of man, and the scientific interpretation of nature, belong so essentially to each other, that he treats them as synonymous, and connects them with an or (sive). His "Novum Organum" treats "De Interpretatione Naturæ sive de Regno Hominis."

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Our power consists in knowledge: in this truly philosophical proposition Bacon and Spinoza are agreed. According to Bacon, knowledge makes us inventive, and therefore powerful. According to Spinoza, knowledge makes us free by destroying the dominion of the passions, and the power of external things over ourselves. Here appears the difference of the directions taken by the two minds. With Spinoza, our power consists in free thought, which remains calmly contemplating the world, and is satisfied

KNOWLEDGE AND POWER.

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with that condition. With Bacon, our power consists in inventive thought, which exerts a practical influence over the state of the world, cultivating it and modifying it. The aim of Spinoza is attained when things cease to govern us; that of Bacon, when we govern the things. Bacon uses the power of knowledge practically, Spinoza theoretically; both in the widest sense of the term. Spinoza's aim is contemplation; culture is the aim of Bacon.

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CHAP. III.

EXPERIENCE AS THE MEANS OF INVENTION.

THE leading points in the Baconian philosophy stand thus:-Its ultimate purpose is the foundation and augmentation of human dominion; the nearest means to that end are supplied by culture, which converts physical forces into instruments fitted for man. Now there is no culture without invention, which produces the means of culture; no invention without science, which makes us acquainted with the laws of things; no science without natural philosophy; no natural philosophy without an interpretation of nature that perfects itself according to the standard of experience. From every one of these as so many points of view Bacon may be characterised, for each gives an essential characteristic of his philosophy. He aims at the culture of humanity by a skilful application of natural science; he seeks to attain natural science by a right use of experience. By a correct method he would convert experience into science; by application in the form of invention,

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he would convert science into art; and this he would convert into a practical and general civilisation, designed for the whole race of man. What single name will suffice adequately to denote such a mind? By connecting his points of view in such logical order, Bacon becomes a great thinker. By opening the widest prospects into the realm of science, and into the whole sphere of human civilisation, from these points of view, by indicating goals and setting up problems in every direction, so that his system is nowhere brought to a conclusion and dogmatically hedged round, the great thinker becomes an epoch-making thinker. For it is the peculiarity of epoch-making minds that they are open to the future. Bacon designed no finished system, but a living work, that should be continued in the progress of time. He sowed the seed for a future crop, which was to ripen slowly, and not to attain its perfection till centuries had elapsed. Bacon was well aware of this; he was satisfied to be the sower, and to begin a work which time alone could complete. This feeling with regard to himself was neither more nor less than a correct consciousness of his cause. At the conclusion of his preface to the "Novum Organum "* he says thus:-" Of our

* More correctly, the general preface to the "Instauratio Magna."-J. O.

selves we say nothing; but for the matter which is treated, we desire that men should regard it not as an opinion, but as a work, and should be assured that we are laying the foundation not of any sect or theory, but of that which conduces to the use and dignity of man. Next, we desire that, laying aside their jealousies and prejudices, they may fairly consult their own common advantage, and having been rescued by us from the errors and obstacles of their road and furnished with our defence and assistance, they may themselves participate in the labours that yet remain. Moreover, that they may be strong in hope, and not imagine that our Instauratio is something infinite and beyond the reach of man, when it is really an end and legitimate termination to infinite error, and is so far mindful of the mortal lot of man that it does not hope to accomplish its work within the period of a single life, but leaves this to succeeding times; when, moreover, it does not arrogantly search for science in the narrow cells of human wit, but humbly in the greater world.”* In the

"De nobis ipsis silemus: de re autem quæ agitur petimus, ut homines eam non opinionem, sed opus esse cogitent, ac pro certo habeant, non sectæ nos alicujus aut placiti sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanæ fundamenta moliri. Deinde ut suis commodis æqui, exutis opinionum zelis et prejudiciis, in commune consulant, ac ab erroribus viarum atque impedimentis, nostris præsidiis et auxiliis, liberati et muniti laborum qui restant et

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