CHAPTER VI.

Battery ordered to James island. Affair of the 16th of July, with the Pawnee. Operations on Morris island resulting in the reduction of Batteries Wagner and Gregg, and the silencing of the barbette fire of Fort Sumter.

The movements of the Federals upon the coast of South Carolina indicating very plainly the inauguration of a new and serious effort to possess themselves of the outposts, and ultimately of the city of Charleston itself, a concentration of troops was ordered by Gen. Beauregard for the protection of the approaches to that city, and the stronger occupation of its harbor defenses. The Chatham Artillery, in obedience to orders received late in the afternoon of that day, on the night of the 9th of July, 1863, marched from Camp Ashby at White Bluff to Savannah, and thence proceeded the next day by the Charleston and Savannah rail road to Charleston, arriving in that city about ten o'clock P. M. Upon reporting at head quarters of the department for further orders, the Battery was directed to proceed with all haste the same night to James island, and report for duty to Col. Simonton commanding the advanced lines. The march-although along strange roads, sadly out of repair and during a very dark night-was accomplished without accident. At day-break on the morning of the 11th the battery reported at Secessionville to Col. Simonton, ready for immediate duty and in perfect order. At this time the enemy was present in considerable force

on the lower end of James island, and a formidable advance was daily expected. For four consecutive nights after its arrival the Battery was kept in position on the advanced lines - horses harnessed and hitched to the pieces, and detachments at their posts-in momentary anticipation of an attack.

The Federals failing to advance, it was deemed best to make an effort to drive them from the island. Accordingly, all the available Confederate forces were put in motion early on the morning of the 16th. The effect of this demonstration was seen in the hasty withdrawal of the enemy, and their abandonment of the effort to secure a lodgment upon James island.

The part borne by the Chatham Artillery in this affair of the 16th, is truthfully detailed in the following letter written a few days after, by Captain Wheaton, who was present, directing the movements of his command with that energy, ability and patriotism, which, during the long and tedious hours of this protracted struggle, characterized him as an officer:

HEAD QUARTERS, CHATHAM ARTILLERY, Advanced Lines, James Island, July 20th, 1863.

Colonel Charles C. Jones, Jr.,

Savannah, Geo.

Colonel: Your note of the 14th inst. did not reach me until yesterday. I had forwarded my ordnance returns for the last quarter, previous to its receipt. The telegraph keeps you so fully informed of what transpires here, that any news which I might give of a general character would be old before it reached you. I will therefore confine myself to the part taken by my company in the engagement of the 16th inst. At ten o'clock on the night of the 15th, I received orders to have my section of howitzers, fully equipped, each piece and caisson supplied with eight horses, at Secessionville, by 12 P. M., there to await further orders from Col. Way. While placing that section in

marching order, a second courier arrived with instructions for me to prepare my Napoleon section for action, and to report with it at a certain cross roads to Col. Ratcliff of the 61st North Carolina. Both sections reported promptly, according to their respective orders. Arriving with the Napoleon section at the point designated, Col. Ratcliff informed me that he had been ordered with his own regiment, my section, a Napoleon section of Capt. Blake's South Carolina battery, and a siege train, to proceed to Grimball's point on the Stono river and there attack the United States gun-boat Pawnee, and another gun-boat, the name of which was then unknown, both lying in the river abreast the position designated. Capt. Blake's section reported promptly. We awaited patiently for three hours the arrival of the siege train, but it failed to make its appearance. Col. Ratcliff then, with the advice of Lieut. Col. Del Kemper, who had intermediately reported for duty, decided to move forward with the force under his command, as it was all important that we should reach the point specified before daylight. We accordingly took up the line of march and reached our pickets just as the first indications of approaching day were visible in the east. Our picket lines rested in the edge of a thick wood, which they skirted for a distance of a mile and a half. Beyond, were old fields a quarter of a mile in width, which had to be crossed in full view of the gun-boats of the enemy before we could reach the position assigned to us for offensive operations. The neces sary arrangements having been made, the infantry deployed to the right and left of the road, and soon came up with and drove in the Federal pickets. As soon as the infantry had deployed and were moving well to the front, we started at a round trot, which was very shortly afterwards increased to a gallop, and came into battery in handsome style within five hundred yards of the gun-boats. Both sections, my own and Capt. Blake's, opened fire simultanously, and with a will. Crash, went shot after shot into the monster sides of the vessels, nearly every shot taking effect.

After having fired some ten rounds, we observed great confusion on board both vessels, which soon opened upon us with

their heavy guns. A moment afterwards two other gun-boats, about a mile lower down the river, also opened upon us. Nothing dismayed, we continued our firing with great spirit. Both of the advanced vessels slipped their cables and commenced moving down the river, making all haste to get out of the range of our guns. We continued firing from our first position for some minutes longer, when we limbered to the front, and advancing at a gallop to the bank of the river, again. opened fire with shells which exploded beautifully right over and on the Pawnee's deck. At one time her pilot house was set on fire. Screaming and great confusion on board could be distinctly heard and seen by our advanced pickets who enjoyed a fine view of the engagement.

She soon, however, got beyond the range of our guns, and it being impracticable, on account of the soft and marshy character of the river bank, for us to pursue her farther, we limbered up and took a position to the left of our first position, expecting an attack from the land forces of the enemy. They were, however, so actively engaged by our troops on the left, that they had no opportunity to pay any attention to us. Not so the gunboats however. They rained upon us a perfect torrent of shells which fell in front, and rear, and all around us, sometimes falling and exploding so near as to cover the men with dirt, and yet, strange to say, wounding neither man nor horse of either battery. Our infantry support lost one man killed. One was seriously, and several were slightly wounded.

After remaining for about an hour under this fire we received. orders to retire, the gun-boats continuing their shelling until we reached our camp.

An incident occurred while we were changing our position from the one first taken to that nearer the river bank, which will give you an idea of the spirit with which my men went into the fight, and of their conduct under fire. As we were advancing at a round gallop (a very thick growth of weeds completely obscuring the ground), my right piece ran into a pit at least six feet deep, leaders first, then the centre team, ther the wheel-horses, and finally the limber, piled on the top of all.

No one could view the situation and think it possible that either horses or drivers could escape without serious injury. The piece had to be unlimbered before they could be extricated, and they lay in such a position that this could not be done until the right wheel of the limber was raised to a level. I saw the situation at a glance, and ordered the prolonge to be uncoiled and made fast to the lower part of the wheel, and then passed over the limber. The men executed the order so system-. atically and promptly, that in less than five minutes we had limber, horses and drivers all out, without having sustained any serious injury. Even the harness encountered no material damage. During the time that we were thus employed, shells were exploding all around us, but my men paid no more attention to them than they would have done to so many puff balls.

Our Napoleon section fired one hundred and four rounds during the engagement. The expenditure of ammunition by Capt. Blake's section was about the same. A great number of our shots took effect, but we did not accomplish what we hoped, to wit, the capture of at least one of the vessels. That they were seriously endamaged by our fire, there can be no doubt. There is also every reason to believe that a goodly number of lives was lost on board, as the flags of the Federal vessels lower down the Stono were at half mast all day Friday.

The howitzer section did not fire a shot. As it was about to open upon the enemy, it was ordered to hold itself as a reserve; which order was reluctantly obeyed.

The object of the reconnoissance was announced as accomplished, and our forces were ordered to retire. Subsequent events conclusively demonstrated the fact that if we had vigorously prosecuted the attack, we would have captured the entire Federal force on the island. The enemy evacuated James island the same night; in their haste abandoning a considerable amount of stores. They are now supposed to be on one of the smaller islands below.

Since leaving home (Camp Ashby) we have been constantly on duty, last night being the first that our horses have passed with the harness off. My men have borne it well, when it is