Here-being, or So-being, and consequently of Daseyn, Here-being, So-being, as such.

Being-for-self is the literal rendering of Fürsichseyn; which, indeed, cannot be translated otherwise. It means the reference of all the constituents of an individuality, of a personality, of a self, to the punctual unity of that individuality, or personality, or self: it is the focus in the draught of the whole huge whirlpool, that whereby its Many are One. For, however, does not completely render Für. The German, when much intruded on, exclaims, One can never be Für sich here!' Vowels also are described as letters which für sich sound, consonants not so. Für sich, then, is the Latin per se and a little more: it expresses not only independence of others, but occupation for oneself. Were a Voter, when asked, 'Whom are you for?' to reply, For myself,' he would convey the German für mich. That is für sich which is on its own account. By Fürsichseyn, Beingfor-self, then, we are to understand a being by one's own self and for one's own self.

Generally, in reading Hegel, let us bear both the current and the etymological meanings in mind. That finite is literally ended or limited, infinite unended or unlimited, must not be lost sight of, for example. Finally, I will just add this, that almost all the technical terms of Hegel appear in Kant also, especially in his Logic,' where much light is thrown upon them as used, not by the latter only, but by the former likewise.

CHAPTER I.

BEING.

A. Pure Being.-B. Nothing.-C. Becoming: 1. Unity of Being and Nothing.

THE explanation of terms which we have just given seems sufficient for the above sections also; and we may now apply ourselves to some interpretation of the particular matter, confining our attention for the present to what of text precedes Remark 1. We shall rely upon the reader perusing and re-perusing, and making himself thoroughly familiar with all he finds written in the paragraphs indicated.

All that they present has remained hitherto a universal stumbling-block, and a matter of hissing, we may say at once, to the whole world. Probably, indeed, no student has ever entered here without finding himself spell bound and bewildered, spell-bound and bewildered at once, spell-bound and bewildered if he has had the pertinacity to keep at them and hold by them perhaps for years. When the bewilderment yields, however, he will find himself, it is most likely, we shall say, putting some such questions as the following:- 1. What has led Hegel to begin thus? 2. What does he mean by these very strange, novel, and apparently senseless statements? 3. What can be intended by these seemingly silly and absurd transitions of Being into Nothing, and again of both into Becoming? 4. What does the whole thing amount

to; or what is the value of the whole business? These questions being satisfactorily answered, perhaps Hegel will at last be found accessible.

1. What has led Hegel to begin thus?-To this question, the answer is brief and certain: Hegel was led to begin as he did in consequence of a profound consideration of all that was implied in the Categories, and other relative portions of the philosophy, of Kant. But in order to awaken intelligence and carry conviction here, it is obviously incumbent upon us to do what we can to reproduce the probable course of Hegel's thinking when engaged in the consideration alluded to. No doubt, for a full explanation, there is necessary such preliminary exposition of the industry of Kant as has been spoken of as likely to follow the present work; but, pending such exposition, we hope still to be able to describe at present Hegel's operations, so far as Kant is concerned, not unintelligibly.

The speculations peculiar to Hume generally, and more especially those which bear on Causality, constitute the Grundlage, the fundamen, the mother-matter of the products of Kant. Now in this relation (of Causality) there are two terms or factors, the one antecedent and the other consequent; the former the cause, and the latter the effect. But if we take any cause by itself and examine it à priori, we shall not find any hint in it of its corresponding effect: let us consider it ever so long, it remains self-identical only, and any mean of transition to another-to aught else is undiscoverable. But again, we are no wiser, should we investigate the matter à posteriori: that the effect follows the cause, we see; but why it followsthe reason of the following the precise mean of the

nexus

can amount

-the exact and single copula-this we see not at all. The source of the nexus being thus undiscoverable, then, whether à priori or à posteriori, it is evident that causality is on the same level as what are called Matters of Fact, and that it cannot pretend to the same authority as what again are called Relations of Ideas. Did it belong to these latter - examples of which are the axioms and other determinations of Mathematic-it would be both necessary and intelligibly necessary; but as it belongs only to the former class, the weight of its testimony-its validityto probability only. That a straight line is the shortest possible from any here to any there, I see to be universally and necessarily true-from Relations of Ideas; but that wood burns and ice melts, I see to be true. only as Matters of Fact, which are so, but might, so far as any reason for the state of the fact is concerned, be otherwise: they are, in truth, just matters of fact, and relations of ideas do not exist in them. Matters of Fact, then, are probable; but Relations of Ideas are apodictic, at once necessary and universal. Causality now belonging to the former, it is evident that the nexus between the fire and the burning of wood (say) is but of a probable nature. The fire burns the wood, I perceive; but it might not the affair concerns contingent matter only, and no examination of the relation, either à priori or à posteriori, can detect any reason of necessity. Causality, then, as presenting itself always in matters of fact, and as exhibiting neither à priori nor à posteriori any relation of ideas, cannot claim any authority of necessity. Why, then, when I see a cause, do I always anticipate the ef fect; and why, when I see an effect, do I always refer to a cause? Shut out, for an answer here, from

the relations of ideas, and restricted to matters of fact, I can find, after the longest and best consideration, no ground for my anticipation but custom, habit, or the association (on what is called the law of the Association of Ideas) of things in expectation which I have found once or oftener associated in fact; for so habitual becomes the association, that even once may be found at times to suffice.-Thus far Hume.

But now Kant-who has been much struck by the curious new truths so ingeniously signalised by Hume, and who will look into the matter and not shut his eyes, nor exclaim (as simply Reid did, in the panic of an alarmed, though very worthy and intelligent, divine), God has just put all that in our souls, so be off with your sceptical perplexings and perplexities '-(Neither will he pragmatically assert, like Brown, Causality is a relation of an invariable antecedent and an invariable consequent, and absurdly think that by the use and not the explanation of this term invariable (which is the whole problem) he has satisfactorily settled all!)—now Kant, who is neither a Reid nor a Brown, but a man as able as Hume himself, steps in and says, this nexus suggested by you (Hume) between a cause and its effect, is of a subjective nature only; that is, it is a nexus in me, and not in them (the cause and the effect); but such nexus is inadequate to the facts. That this unsupported paper falls to the ground-the reason of that is not in me surely, but in the objects themselves; and the reason of my expectation to find the same connexion of events (as between unsupported paper and the ground) is not due to something I find in myself, but to something I find in them. I cannot intercalate any custom or habit of my own as the reason of that connexion. True, as you say, neither à priori