a bur

woric, above our compressUL.
tains many things in pic, an
limited vier, apparenty strucu!
theless, make up a harmonious who may
the moral world Both of them may be
as to form One vast System, of auch
incompetent judges, both of their severd
the means made use of Frequent
incompatible with general

free agents; but if they are necessary agents, then there is nothing incredible in their being rewarded or punished, since we, ourselves, are thus dealt with.

Hence the analogy of nature shows us, that the opinion of necessity, considered as practical, is false; and if, therefore, it doth not destroy the proof of natural religion, it can make no alteration in the proof of revealed; and, if necessity be reconcileable with the present constitution of things, it must be also reconcileable with religion.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COM

SCHEME

PREHENDED.

ARGUMENT.-Analogy, though being applicable only

to facts, and, therefore, affording no direct answer to objections against the Wisdom and Goodness of God's moral government, is yet serviceable, by suggesting that the whole is a regular System; and, therefore, like the vast and complicated scheme of the natural world, above our comprehension. As the latter contains many things inexplicable; and some, to our limited view, apparently contradictory ; which, nevertheless; make up a harmonious whole: so may it be with the moral world. Both of them may be so connected, as to form One vast System, of which we are utterly incompetent judges, both of their several parts, and of the means made use of. Frequent interpositions are incompatible with general laws. The very things objected to, may be actual instances of wisdom and good

ness, could the whole be seen and comprehended. Our ignorance making us incompetent judges of the natural world, makes us, by Analogy, equally so of God's moral government, and, of itself, is an answer to all objections against the Wisdom and Goodness thereof.

THE credibility or truth of a fact does not necessarily prove any thing as to its goodness or wisdom; and, therefore, though the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to religion, and the several particulars thereof, as matters of fact, it affords no direct answer to objections against the wisdom and goodness of the Divine government. But if it renders it credible that this government must be a regular system, (and not a number of unconnected acts;) and one so imperfectly comprehended, and, in other respects, such, as to afford an answer to all objections of this kind; then, analogy is remotely of great service, as will be now shown.

I. Suppose, God exercises a moral government over the world; the analogy of His natural government shows it to be a scheme beyond our comprehension; and is, therefore, an answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it. In the great scheme of the natural world, individuals have special relations to individuals of their own species; and species to other species; and these relations may be indefinitely extended, so that no single natural event may be so

unconnected, as not to have some remote connection with others, remote beyond the compass of this world; and all events throughout nature may thus have relation to each other. The most insignificant things seem sometimes to be necessary conditions to most important ones; and any one thing (for what we know) may be a necessary condition to any other.

The natural world and its government, then, being plainly a scheme incomprehensible to us, this shows the credibility that the moral world and its government may be so too. Indeed, both appear so connected, as to make up but one system: the former being arranged in subserviency to the latter, even as the vegetable world is for animal creation, and animal creation again, for man. Hence, every act of divine justice and goodness may look far beyond its immediate object, being connected with other parts of a general moral plan of God, each particular of which is adjusted with reference to the whole. For instance, the periods and methods for discipline of virtue, permission of vice, distribution of rewards and punishments, and all other particular acts of divine administration, may all have such a general connection and relation, as to form One great System, such as the natural world is. And if so, from our limited views of it, we are not competent judges respecting its several parts.