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menace threatened the army more and more as the days went on. For a fortnight past the “ Race to the Sea ” had been in progress in France. Each side, hoping to envelop the outer flank of the other or seeking to protect its own flank from the same fate, was being led by a series of parallel and practically synchronous efforts to displace the centre of gravity and the decisive point of the campaign towards the sea. Thus by the end of Sept. the battle-front had been extended from the Oise to Arras and Béthune, and fresh German masses were traversing Belgium in a westerly direction.

The real peril to which the Belgian army was exposed lay in the possible failure of the Allied left to gain on the enemy’s right and join up with the Belgians on the Scheldt. Yet this junction must be effected at all costs, even if the fortress had to be abandoned in order to get into contact with the Allies.

The King was strongly in favour, however, of holding the fortress until the last extremity, in order to bind the troops and material now concentrated before it, and also to gain the maximum of time for the formation of a Franco-British-Belgian front on the Scheldt and the Dendrc—the natural rampart of the coast, the Straits and England. To prevent the Germans from reaching the coast would be an inestimable service rendered to the Allies, and the King was determined not to relinquish the idea save in the last resort. Every day gained at Antwerp meant a French port saved—to-day Boulogne, the next day Calais, the next Dunkirk—and the withholding from the Germans of the Straits of Dover, the most important maritime artery in the world.

Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, fully realized the capital role which the fortress might play in the war. With great foresight and initiative he had drawn the attention of the British War Office to the strategic importance of Antwerp in the beginning of September. In the first days of Oct. he came in person to the besieged fortress to take stock of the situation. The Belgian Command gave him a frank statement of its intentions, and King Albert informed him personally of the role he proposed for the Belgian army on the extreme left wing of the Allied front. Being entirely in agreement, Mr. Churchill returned in all haste to London to push forward the immediate dispatch of all the troops the French and English Governments could spare to Antwerp and Ghent. It was urgently necessary (1) to guarantee the effective union of the Belgian army with the general Allied front and (2) to bring about this union on a level with Antwerp, or, failing this, on a line as far east as possible with its left resting on the Dutch frontier or the coast, so that the enemy could in no case seize and envelop the Allies’ extreme left wing. '

Given the double aim which the King had in view, that of holding Antwerp as long as possible and not allowing himself under any circumstances to be cut ofi from the Allies, there was no time to be lost in transferring the main base of supplies from Antwerp to Ostend, whence vthe army could carry out its subsequent operations in concert with the Allies. The transport of materials and supplies and the evacuation of the manufacture and storage establishments, of the wounded, the prisoners and the recruits therefore commenced on Oct. 1. Although the only through railway connexion between the E. and W. banks of the Scheldt was that by way of Willebroeck, Puers and Tamise railway bridge, within range of the enemy’s guns, the trains followed one another night after night, with all lights out, until Oct. 7 without attracting attention. West of the Scheldt the evacuation transports and convoys were protected by the 4th Div. round Termonde, and the Cavalry Div. round Wetteren.l

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British AssisIance.—The immediate result of Mr. Churchill's personal intervention was the arrival at Antwerp, on the evening of Oct. 3, of a brigade of 2,000 men of the British Royal Naval Division. The apparition, at dawn on the 4th, of these the first Allies the Belgian soldiers had set eyes on during the two months of the war—aroused a wholesome enthusiasm among the dispirited defence troops. Unhappily, this assistance could be no more than a moral stimulus for a fresh burst of energy.

Meanwhile, the German infantry E. of the Senne advanced steadily as near to the N ethe line as the Belgian fire permitted, while the medium and heavy artillery moved up to new positions, and the super-heavy batteries, freed by the fall of all works between Waelhem and Fort Lierre inclusive, got into place to attack Fort Breendonck on the left flank and Fort Kessel on the right—three German 30-5 batteries W. of Hombeek engaging the former, and the Austrian 3o-5’s at Heykant and one 42-cm. battery2 at Isschot the latter. On the 4th the six pieces concentrated upon Fort Kessel at ranges of 9,ooo—9,3oo yd. quickly finished their work, the place being ruined and evacuated just before midday. It was not until the 6th, however, that fire was seriously directed upon Fort Breendonck.

Gen. von Beseler’s original scheme was that each unit on the III. Res. Corps front should strive on its own account and at its own time to obtain a foothold beyond the Nethe, while the Marine Div. remained echeloned back on the left, and the 26th Landwehr Bde. advanced on the right as close to Fort Kessel as possible. The fire directed upon the half-exposed left of the 5th Res. Div., however, soon made it necessary that the right of the Marine Div. should also attempt to advance. In this it was unsuccessful, and during the 4th the whole of the 5th Res. Div. and part of the 6th could do no more than approach the water-line.

On the right of the 6th Res. Div., on the contrary, a bold advance carried the Germans into Lierre, and there began in that town a prolonged and fierce struggle, the British Marine Bde. deployed along the Little Nethe and the 5th Belgian Div. on the Nethe between Lierre (excl) and Hit Ven (excL) completely holding up both the right of the 6th Res. Div. and those troops of the 26th Landwehr Bde. which, on the fall of Fort Kessel, had pushed up to Klosterheyde.

0n the evening of Oct. 5 the German force in Lierre was still pinned down by the fire of the Marine Bde. Further south, under cover of a very heavy bombardment, they had succeeded in crossing the river, but were held a short distance beyond it, along the road from Hit Ven to Lierre, with only precarious com— munications behind them.

On Oct. 6 at dawn the 5th Div. tried, by a general counterattack, to throw the enemy back to the S. of the Nethe. But with the whole mass of the German artillery free to cover its infantry the counter-attack was foredoomed. The Belgian guns vigorously supported it, and a determined attack near Ringenhof was for a moment successful and produced a crisis in the German line. But no more could be done. The assistance of Fort Broechem was at an end, since on this day it was taken under fire by the 42-cms. and the Austrian 3o-5-cms. which had ruined Fort Kessel and then advanced to their third positions at Vythoek and Koningshoyckt respectively. More and more German infantry was, by one means or another, got across the Nethe, and the débris of the rst, 2nd and 5th Divs. and the English Marine Bde. fell back little by little in the afternoon

without fi hting) at Baesrorle. The whole force on the left was placed un er the 4th Ers. Div. staff, but until the arrival of further troops from the governor- eneral's forces (1st Res. Ers. Bde.) nothing could be done. On ( ct. 4 the arrival of these troo s, behind which the 1st Bav. Lw. Bde. was also coming up, relea. the 7th Lw. Bde. from Alost, and an advance was made by this briga e to Schoonarde on the Scheldt, with a view to forcing the passage there and reaching Termonde from the rear. On the 4th. th and 6th, however. attempts to do so were repulsed by the de enders, and throughout the critical davs the Germans were unable to interfere with movements in the Lokeren region. (C. F. A.)

’ The 42-cm. hatterv which had attacked Forts Wavre Ste. Catherine and Koningshoyckt was a railway battery, and had to remain inactive for t e time being. . . -. _- (C. F. A.) a

to the line Contich-Bouchout, where civilian labourers and recruits had dug some rough trenches.‘

Meanwhile, along the Scheldt, the enemy's attitude was becoming more and more aggressive in the efforts to gain the crossings at Baesrode, Termonde and Schoonaerde. The situation of the Belgian 4th Div., on a front of 18 m., began to be serious. There lay the gravest danger which threatened the Belgian army—that of being invested in the fortress. The 6th Div., which with the 3rd Div. still held the fort line between the Willebroeck canal and the Scheldt, now received orders to cross the Scheldt at Tamise to reinforce the 4th Div. and safeguard the army's communication with the west.

Withdrawal of the Belgian Field Army—The defence troops were becoming extremely fatigued, the bravest among them being daunted by the uninterrupted bombardment and the persistent feeling of helplessness in the face of the weapons which had pulverized forts and lines of defence in succession. Soon the enemy would be bringing up his batteries to bombard the city itself. If it had taken only a week to reduce the prin~ cipal line of resistance constituted by the modern forts on the S. of the Nethe, still less would sufhce to break up the old forts of the inner line. The fortress could now offer no prolonged resistance. Moreover, all hope of linking the Antwerp front with'that of the Franco-British armies had to be abandoned. Two new English naval brigades, recently formed, had arrived in the fortress on the 5th, bringing the effective of the Royal Naval Div. up to 10,000 men; a French naval brigade had been moved from Dunkirk to Ghent and the British 7th Div. and 3rd Cavalry Div. under Gen. Rawlinson had landed at Zeebrugge and Ostend. Had these troops arrived a few days earlier a combined operation against the left wing of the besieging force might have changed the face of the war. But it was too late. As Mr. Churchill said:—“ A week earlier, the result would have been a certainty . . . a little later 200,000 men could not have carried the operation through.”

On the one hand, the Germans were threatening the line of retreat through Termonde. On the other, liaison with the Allies was compromised, for the German right wing in France was now hardly more than 30 m. from the sea, whereas the distance from

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the Nethe to Nieuport was 85 miles. This being so, one consideration now dominated all others—the Belgian army must avoid being surrounded. On the evening of Oct. 6 the King decided to separate the lot of the main body of the army from that of the fortress, and gave orders to cross to the left bank of the Scheldt during the night of the 6th—7th. The troops were then to continue their march westward. It was high time, for, on the 7th, the Scheldt was forced at Schoonaerde, the Germans making every effort to throw back the 4th Div. on Lokeren.

The fortress was still to be defended to the utmost by Lt.Gen. Deguise, the governor. The garrison proper (personnel of the forts and fortress troops) with the 2nd Div. and the British Naval Div., some 50,000 men, were more than enough to do what could be done with the remains of the fortress.

The Final Resistance—On the 6th Fort Broechem, battered all day by four 3o-5’s and two 42-cms., had been put out of action and dismantled. The improvised line Aertselaer-ContichBouchout was merely a row of light shelter-trenches, lacking in depth and with both flanks in the air. General Deguise considered it too risky to commit his forces, very inferior as they were, to a determined defence of this exposed position.‘ He therefore placed the and Belgian Div. and the English Div. on the line of forts No. I to N0. 8. These two divisions stofcally endured there the usual bombardment throughout the days of the 7th and 8th. Meanwhile the main body of the Belgian army

l_| 1The German oflicial account criticizes the inactivity of Gen. Paris in not seizing the opportunity offered by the success at Riugenhof. \Vhether this criticism be well founded or not it shews that the position at that moment was regarded by the German command as critical.

2 On the night of the 6th the German line ran from a point S. of Fort Broechem, along the Little Nethe and in advance of the Nethe, to a point about I m. \V. of Duffel Station. The Marine Div. wa's still short of the general alignment, not havin crossed the river. On its left, the th Ersatz Div. faced the line 0 the south-western forts, of which ort Breendonck was beginning to be subjected to bombardment. The left of the 4th Ersatz Div. was at St. Amand and Baesrode on the Scheldt, in touch with the forces operating at and above Termonde. On the extreme right, detachments were advanc

ing in the direction of Massenhoven redoubt and Santhoven.
(C. F. A.) ,

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was moving between the Scheldt and the Dutch frontier, seeking contact with Rawlinson’s force and the French Naval Bde. which were collecting towards Ghent.

In the afternoon of the 7th, under instructions from O.H.L., Gen. von Beseler informed the governor of his decision to bombard the city of Antwerp, commencing at midnight, in default of previous capitulation. This attempt at intimidation had not the smallest effect upon either Gen. Deguise or on the Communal Council which, convoked by the governor, declared itself to be “ willing to accept the consequences of prolonging the defence to its extreme limits,” and assured him, moreover, that it never would try to influence the decision of the military authorities responsible for such defence.

The bombardment began at midnight.1 It was directed especially on the gates of the enceinte. Certain quarters of the town were attacked by long-range guns. On the same night (7th—8th) part of the III. Res. Corps pushed its patrols up to the fort line of defence.

On the 8th, Gen. Paris, the English general, and Lt.-Gen. Dassin, commanding the Belgian and Div., came to the conclusion that resistance to a determined attack on the following day would be hopeless. On hearing this and also that Gen. Paris, after telephonic communication with the British Admiralty, had received orders to bring away the Naval Div., Gen. Deguise at 5:30 P.Il. gave up the idea of holding the fort line of defence any longer, and decided to take advantage of the night to withdraw all the troops occupying it to the left bank of the Scheldt.

The orders were :—

(1) The British Naval Div. to cross in the night and entrain at St. Gilles Waes for Ostend.

(2) The 2nd Belgian Div. to accompany the British Div., covering its entrainment at St. Gilles Waes against the German troops reported near Lokeren (see below), then to march westward and try to rejoin the rest of the Belgian army.

(3) The forts still intact to defend themselves individually to the utmost.

(4) The enceinte to be handed over to the Germans when they ap ared before it, in order to save the city from unnecessary damage.

5) A force of some 20,000 men of the garrison tree 5, under Gen. Deguise himself, to hold out as long as possible in t e entrenched camp formed by the Scheldt and the forts of the left bank.

These movements took place in the night of the 8th—9th without being disturbed by the Germans (who had no suspicion of them), but not without a good deal of confusion. Meanwhile the bombardment of the ,city continued.

On the 7th the Germans had succeeded in forcing the passage of the Scheldt at Schoonaerde. The advance was pushed to within 2 m. of Lokeren, wher'e sharp resistance was again met. The Belgian army was in fact streaming past the front of this small force in several columns; neither side, however, was in a position to take the initiative of an encounter battle, the Germans owing to the tactical, the Belgians owing to the strategical risks that this action would have involved.

Next day the Belgian divisions, though the enemy did not know it, were past the reach of attack and in touch with the French and British forces at and north of Ghent, leaving no baggage or stragglers to be picked up, since all impcdimenta had been removed in the transfer of base to Ostend several days earlier.

On the 9th, therefore, the three German brigades, now followed by the rest of the 4th Ersatz Div., struck a blow in the air, while the rst Res. Ers. Bde. from Alost advanced on Ghent, and at Melle became involved in a very heavy fight with the French Naval Bde. and some Belgian batteries (Oct. 9 and 10). On the 10th, wheeling inwards to invest the fortress, and thus turning their backs to the Belgian field army, the five German brigades N. of the Scheldt pushed on to the line St. Gilles Waes-St. Nicolas, Kettermuit. But instead of the expected main body of the Belgians they only encountered the and Belgian Div., which passed under fire of their guns at Moerbeke westward

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and the two last battalions of the British Naval Divr, which were caught at St. Gilles Waes and forced over the Dutch frontier.

Thus did the greater part of the prey which the Germans counted on capturing at Antwerp escape them.

Meanwhile Gen. Deguise was preparing to defend the entrenched camp on the left bank of the Scheldt. But his remaining troops were of mediocre quality. The men of the fortress battalions were old, their officers few—hardly one per company -and nearly all either reserve officers or newly commissioned. The N.C.Os. were scarce and did not know their men. In fact, Gen. Deguise had 20,000 men in uniform rather than‘ 20,000 combatants. On troops such as these the fury of the bombardment naturally had produced a great efiect, and the departure of all field troops, and that of the English whom they had we]comed so hopefully, led them to look upon themselves as so many units written off. During the whole of the 8th and 0th their lines were crossed by crowds of civilians who, carting their families and their furniture and driving their live stock in front of them, filled all the roads and routes leading westward, repeating as they went the stories, a hundred times magnified. of Visé and Louvain, of Dinant and Aerschot.

The spectacle of this deplorable exodus completed the depression of the soldiers. It was no longer possible to expect this almost shepherdless flock of men at bay to defend themselves in open trenches when they had seen armour and concrete ruined in a few hours.

On the evening of the oth Gen. Deguise, knowing that the Germans were near Lokeren and believing, through an erroneous report, that they had also crossed the river at Antwerp itself, became convinced that no further organized resistance was possible. Ofiicers and units were allowed to leave the fortress at will and were to attempt to rejoin the field army. Many acted upon this and some succeeded, the rest taking refuge in Holland. On the 10th the general sent a flag of truce to Gen. von Beseler to enquire the conditions of surrender. But meantinie the civil authorities, seeing the city to be empty of troops, had acted on their own account. The situation was grave. At about twenty points fires had been started by the bombard~ ment. The waterworks at Waelhem on the Rupel having been in German hands for a week, the firemen could not undertake to master the flames in the fire areas. With a sudden violent wind the whole city might be set ablaze.

To save the city from a disaster, which could be of no advantage from a military point of view, the leading townsmen had sent a deputation to Gen. von Beseler to obtain a cessation of the bombardment, and on the afternoon of the 9th an agreement was signed suspending the bombardment on condition of the surrender of all the works of the fortress the following day at noon. Gen. Deguise had no choice but to ratify this agreement.

Deep as was the impression made upon the world by the fall of Antwerp, the material strategic gain to the Germans was far less than had been anticipated. Although in military stores and economic resources their booty was considerable, not only had the whole of the Belgian field army made good its escape, but not even the fortress troops were left to adorn the German triumph. As to the works which had not been attacked, they were empty and in most cases rendered useless by their commandants.

Antwerp—Port Arthur— Verdun—The rapid fall of Antwerp in 1914 may seem astonishing when compared with the resistance of Port Arthur in 1904 and that of Verdun in 1916. It is neces~ sary, however, both in appreciating the resistance of the Belgian fortress and in deducing technical lessons from the siege, to compare the conditions of the three cases in some detail.

Although Port Arthur possessed no cupolas and several of its forts were unfinished, yet the Russians had six months’ leisure to prepare, not a line, but a zone of defence 3 m. deep, in which forts, trenches and redoubts formed a tangled system, cleverly applied to very difficult ground. Dug out of hard rock, these entrenchments offered an exceptionally good resistance to the engines of destruction. The artillery of the defence was ample and well distributed in the intervals. Finally, the Japanese siege material included at first no calibres above 15 cm. It was only after two months of the attack that 28-cm. mortars were brought up. Of these the Japanese brought 18 pieces into action, and their projectiles broke through the 1-metre concrete of the permanent forts. But even so the artillery played a secondary role. Under these conditions the moral of the defence was bound to be excellent, and the fortress was taken by Nogi only after sapping, mining and very heavy sacrifice of life.

At Verdun the Germans used the same calibres and somewhat the same methods of attack as at Antwerp. The bombardment was to annihilate the defence, the infantry to reap the results of the bombardment, and in fact the progress made during the first days was considerable. If they failed in their undertaking it was because the French promptly brought up a great quantity of artillery and established a regular system of reliefs for the troops in line‘; because the broken ground on the banks of the Meuse was favourable to the defence; because the forts had been strengthened by reinforced concrete (some of them, notably Fort Vacherauville, were entirely of reinforced concrete), and because the nature of the soil allowed the garrison to dig themselves into shelters, proof against even the 42-cm., right under, the concrete masses of the forts.

In contrast to these conditions the fortress of Antwerp was built on a uniformly flat site, with water only three feet below the surface. This made it necessary to build all the fortifications above ground and to forego the advantage of deep shelter. The forts were of simple concrete, proof to 21-cm. shells at most. The whole Belgian army was in the line from the outset without hope of reinforcements, fresh artillery, or relief. Added to this, the army, which had at all costs to avoid being surrounded in the fortress, had a vulnerable flank.

It will be seen, therefore, that Antwerp, Port Arthur and Verdun represent three absolutely distinct military situations.

German Occupation: Reconstruction 0 the Fortress._—Onee masters of Liége and Namur, the Germans hat lost no time in repairing all the works. They restored the concreted works to their original thickness and filled up all fissures and craters. At Namur most of the cupolas were replaced, but at Liege on the contrary they removed all guns and even numerqus armour parts, and proceeded to organize the forts exclusively for infantry and machine-guns. The mechanical and tele honic installations and the ventilation system were improved.1 6001' and window apertures were made smaller and a great number of the latter walled up. _

At Antwerp, as at Liege, the Germans converted the forts into infantry works in accordance with the principles already'apphed at Metz. They restored the earthworks of the forts, but did not as a rule reconstruct the chambers destroyed by bombardment. Charnbers not taken into use were walled up. In the intervals they mamtained only the western and northern fronts. On the west front (Blaesveld—Bornhem and the left bank of the Scheldt) the existing trenches were consolidated and formed into two lines goinin the gorges of the permanent works. A considerable number 0 smal concrete shelters also were built here for machine-guns or observers, and some for flanking guns. On the north front, facing l-lolland, from the Lower Scheldt to Fort Schooten, the Germans took pains to maintain in good order the old permanent forts and the interval trenches. The latter were made into a continuous system, enerally double, with communication trenches, and concrete she ters and posts. In front were two continuous belts of wire. The flanking was ensured by the traditore batteries of the repaired works and by concrete machine-gun emplacements. This line was prolonged by an analogous organization, facing north, all along the Turnhout canal up to and including that town. _

The defence system of the river as organized by the Germans consisted of the following elements (all save the last-named on the right bank): Santvliet gun-spur (four emplacements for railway guns on pivot platforms, two for 28-cm. guns, two for two 17-cm. guns paired; near the platforms were reinforced concrete shelters for ammunition and personnel); Blauw aren battery (four 12-cm. guns in separate reinforced concrete sheltersg); Lilla battery (four 15-cm. guns without overhead protection); Liefkenshoek battery (two 12_-cm. guns 1n concrete shelters); Ste. Marie battery (51X 24-cm. guns in casemates).

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To sum up, the Germans in restoring the fortress of Antwerp treated the permanent works on the rinciples applied at Metz, and the intervals as if they formed part 0 an army front.

BIBl.IOGRAPHY.—Thc Belgian oflicial account of the operations of 1914 appears in instalments in the Bulletin Belge des Sciences Milftaires. 11 official German account (A nt'werpen 1914) by E. V. Tschi~ schwitz, senior general staff officer Ill. Reserve Corps at the si e, was published in 1921 at Oldenburg. For the British part the oflicial naval history by Sir Julian Corbett should be consulted.

(R. van 0.)

AOSTA, DUKE OF (EMANUELE Frunnnro) (1869— ), Italian general, was born Jan. 13 1869, the eldest son of Prince Amedeo of Savoy, Duke of Aosta (see 1.804), and Maria Vittoria, Princess of Pozzo della Cisterna (1847—1876). In 1895 he married Princess Helene of Orleans, daughter of the Comte de Paris. Devoting himself seriously to the military career, he in due course commanded the rst Div. at Turin and‘the X. Army Corps at Naples. A very serious illness caused a break in his career, an on the eve of Italy’s entry into the World War he was still on the reserve list. Following upon the clash between Cadorna and General Zuccari, who had been appointed to the command of the Third Army, the duke was chosen to succeed the latter, and he retained this post throughout the war. The duke’s command of the Third Army was conspicuously successful. His task was thankless, for the duty of his army was to hammer against the iron ramparts of the C arso. Various notable successes were won, though the territorial gains were very limited, and in the process of wearing down the enemy the Third Army played a great part. The duke’s rank possibly told against him to begin with; but the qualities which he showed speedily made it clear that he was no figurehcad, and that he held his command by merit. In the end the fact of his being a royal prince was only a help to the position he had established for himself, for it put him outside the field of ordinary jealousies. He had the invaluable faculty of establishing harmony and a spirit of cooperation among his subordinates, and he won a great popularity among the troops, for whose welfare he did all that lay in his power. His qualities as a leader were so highly estimated that he would probably have been chosen to succeed Cadorna if it had not been thought unwise to place upon a royal prince the responsibility of so grave a moment.

The Duchess of Aosta served throughout the war as inspectress general of Red Cross nurses. In spite of delicate health, she rose superior to continuous fatigue and frequent hardship, and the award to her of the silver medal for valour was no mere compliment. Their two sons Amedeo, Duke of Apulia (b. 1898), and Aimone, Duke of Spoleto (b. 1900), both served in the war.

APPONYI, ALBERT, COUNT (1846- ), Hungarian statesman (sce 2.226), was from 1906 to 1910 Minister of Education in the Wekerle Cabinet. In consequence of Francis Kossuth’s illness Apponyi undertook the greater part of his business as president of the party of Hungarian Independence, calling itself the party of 1848. In the message sent to the party just before his death Kossuth designated him as his most suitable successor. At the outbreak of the World War he adopted in Parliament the standpoint of a “ truce of God.” Together with Count Julius Andrassy and Rakovszky, Apponyi was from July 6 to Aug. 2 5 1916 a member of the commission established by the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies to watch over the conduct of foreign policy. In internal affairs Apponyi fought for universal suffrage. After the outbreak of the October revolution of 1918 he retired for a time into private life. In 1919 he was elected as a non-party deputy to the National Assembly, and was head of the Hungarian peace delegation in Paris. He became a member of the League of Nations Union, and as a politician standing outside party was in 1921 perhaps the most influential man in Hungarian politics. .

His published works include: Recollections of a Statesman (1912.); Die rechtliche Natur der Beziehungen zwischen 0esterreich and Upgarn in the Oesterreichische Rundschau (vol. xxviii); and in Hungarian Hungary in the World's Press (1915).

ARABIA (see 2.254).—The political frontier of Arabia on the N.-was indeterminate ing1921 except in so far as the boundarihs

between Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, as laid. down in the 'FrancolBritish Convention of Dec. 23 1920, affect it (see SYRIA). The limits of the various independent states of the peninsula, with the exception of the N. boundary of the Aden protectorate, all remain equally undefined. A natural frontier on the N. runs in an irregular curve from Akaba (‘Aqaba) first NE. and then SE. to the Persian Gulf, following the fringe of cultivation, which fluctuates according as the nomadic or sedentary population is the stronger. This line excludes Kerak, but leaves the transition area of the Hamad or Syrian Desert within Arabia, to which, both physically and ethnographically, it seems to belong.

Topography—Up to 1914, even the best knowledge of Arabia was sketchy, but considerable advance has since been made by the discoveries of recent travellers and as a result, direct or indirect, of war operations. The progress to be noted falls under three main heads: new light has been thrown on the drainage of the peninsula; the positions of a number of places, previously very imperfectly known or only guessed at, have been accurately fixed; and a vast amount of topographic and ethnographic detail has been accumulated.

The compilation of the map of Arabia on the million scale has kept pace with discovery. For this purpose, the route traverse in northern and central Arabia from Huber’s J ournal, extending over 3,000 m., was replotted on a large scale and formed a groundwork on which to place the more hurried surveys of Wallin, Palgrave, Doughty, etc. All the labours of recent travellers, starting with Leachman (1910), and ending with Bell (1914), were reconsidered from the originals and adjusted with due regard to the proportionate value of each, while the information collected by Col. Lawrence during the World War and the surveys of Philby were incorporated. The work of compilation was undertaken by D. Carruthers in 1914 and in 1921 was still in progress. Provisional sheets covering the northern half of the country had already been issued.

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The course of the main watershed of Arabia can now be traced with general accuracy. Prolonged northward from the highlands of Yemen and Asir, it passes inland between Taif and Wadi l‘uraba and runs E.—not \V. as was previously supposed—of the Hejaz railway through the Kheibar harm, or lava outcrop. Perhaps some of the hi her peaks of the ‘Aweiridh ridge overtop it.

Wadi Elamdh, the main drainage basin of the short western slope of Arabia, previously thought to have its head-waters in the vicinity of Medina, at about lat. 24’ N., in all probability has its source in W. ‘Aqiq, at least 3’ farther 5., thus giving it a total length of 700 to 800 in. including windings. The 'Aqi ,rising S.W. ol Taif, passes well to the E. of Mecca and W. of Me inn and is said to lake the name \V. Shaiba between these two towns. Some doubt remains whether the Shaiba discharges wholly into the Hamdh 'ust N. of Medina, or whether it also forms a tributary eastward in \ . Rumma (Rima). Wadi ‘Ais, coming from the N., and W. jizil from the 3., and joining W. Hamdh in the plain of jurf are its two main affluents, and their courses, to ether with the middle reaches of the Hnmdh, have been explore in great art and mapped.

Much new information has been obtained as to the drainage of the long eastward slope—effected mainly by the great wadi s stoms of the Dawasir, Sahabu and Rumma (naming from S. to l\.). The town of Dam, in \V. Dawasir, central Arabia, previously mapped near lat. 23° N., has had its position definitely fixed in lat. 2o’ 27' N. and long. 44° 40’ E. The direction of the course of W. Dawasir. a matter long in dis ute, roves to be 5.15. towards the Ruba‘cl Khali, or Great Southern esert, and not N.E. as the old maps show. The point of 'unction of the important Asir wadis— Ranya, Bisha and Tathlitlli—is in all probability in the plain of Hajla about 50 111. NW. of Dam. As to W. Sahaba, which has a practical monopoly of the surface-waters of the central mass of Arabia and the drainage of which trends to the sea at the southern end of El Qatar, it was found to have its remotest head-waters in W. Sirra in the very heart of the peninsula. Under the name of W. Birk, the Sirra breaks through the Tuwaiq plateau and, turning northward as W. ‘A'aimi, joins W. Hanifa some 60 m. SE. of Riyadh (lat. 24°37’ ., long. 46°41’ E.). \V. Hanifa ultimately falls into the Sahaba, but the latter probably carries no surface-water, at any time, farther than the western fringe of the Dahana, about long. 8° E. Wadi Subai, rising somewhere in lat. 22° N., is probably t e most southern tributary of W. Rumma.

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