proceeded to despatch forces to their northern flanks, with the object of outflanking the hostile battle line. There thus ensued what is known as "the Race to the Sea," which ended about the middle of Oct. in the establishment of a continuous front from the Belgian coast to Switzerland. On this front, after a series of furious battles which raged until well into Nov., both sides settled down to trench warfare on the advent of winter. The first attempt to outflank the German right N. of the Oise was entrusted to the French Second Army, under Gen. de Castelnau, which was transferred from Lorraine from Sept. 10 onwards. This army, consisting of the XIII., IV., XIV., XX., and XI. Corps, was eventually opposed by the German IX. Reserve, II., XVIII., XXI., I. Bav., II. Bav. and XIV. Reserve Corps, brought up from various parts of the line, and after heavy fighting, in which first one side and then the other held temporary and local advantages which proved impossible of exploitation, thèse forces were left facing each other on the general line Lassigny-Roye-Chaulnes-Albert-Hebuterne, on which they finally fortified themselves. The battle on the front of the French Second Army died down in this fashion about the middle of October. Before this date the further prosecution of the mutual attempt at envelopment by both sides had brought about an extension of the fighting to the neighbourhood of Arras and Lens. Battle of the Tenth French Army around Arras, Sept. 29-Oct. 10. The front of the Second Army was prolonged to the N. by the group of Territorial Divisions (the 81st, 82nd, 84th and 88th) under Brugère, which had been ordered on Sept. 29 to push forward detachments to cover the detrainment of reinforcements at Arras and Lens, and by the 1st Cavalry Corps (Conneau) (1st, 3rd, 5th and 10th Cavalry Divisions) which was holding the line of the Cojeul on the left of the territorials. On Sept. 30 Gen. de Maud'huy was given command of a Detachment of the Second Army," consisting of the X. Corps, two divisions (the 70th and 77th) formed into a Provisional Corps under D'Urbal, and the 1st Cavalry Corps; his orders were to concentrate in the region of Arras and to act against the right flank of the German corps facing the Second Army. It was believed that this flank would be found about Bapaume. Of the forces at Maud'huy's disposal the X. Corps was on this date marching from Amiens in the direction of Arras, being still some two days' march from the latter place, while the divisions of the Provisional Corps were commencing to detrain at Arras, covered by the 1st Cavalry Corps in the line of the Cojeul and a mixed Territorial detachment at Douai. The situation of the enemy on the front of the detachment, somewhat obscure on Sept. 30, became clearer on the following days. Strong hostile forces (the IV. German Corps) were reported as moving N. and halting for the night in the neighbourhood of Quéant, with the evident intention of falling on the flank of the Second Army, at this time around Courcelles. The advanced guards of these columns had got into contact with the French cavalry on the line of the Sensée. Further to the N. other German troops (the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps) had driven the advanced troops of the Territorial detachment back to Douai. Despite the fact that the battle showed as yet no signs of dying on the Second Army front, that the enemy were pressing hard against his centre, and that a shortage of munitions was beginning to make itself felt, Gen. de Castelnau adhered to his original intention of enveloping the hostile left with the detachment under Maud'huy on Oct. 2, and orders to this effect were sent to the latter on that evening; Maud'huy had already made his preparatory dispositions. The X. Corps was to be assembled around Ficheux, the divisions of the provisional corps N. of Neuville Vitasse and at Gavrelle, the Cavalry Corps N. of Monchy-le-Preux; all were to be in position by 6 A.M. The X. Corps and the 77th Division and the main body of the cavalry were to be ready to advance south-eastwards next morning against the flank of the enemy around Quéant, while the 70th Div. at Gavrelle was in a position either to cooperate in this | In continuance of these instructions, the X. Corps was directed early next morning to move eastwards to Mercatel, whence it was to advance against the line Ervillers-St. Leger, and thence in the general direction of Mory, as soon as orders were received from Gen. Maud'huy. Before, however, the X. Corps had reached its area of concentration around Mercatel the 77th Div. on its left was assailed from the E. by newly arrived German troops (the IV. Corps), who forced it back from the Cojeul to the line GuemappeMonchy-le-Preux, while at the same time the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, which had entered Douai on the evening of the Ist, was pushing its advance westwards to the north of the Scarpe an advance which the 70th Div., delayed in its march from Lens, where it had detrained, to Gavrelle, was not yet available to oppose; the X. Corps was therefore ordered to change the direction of its proposed advance from S.E. to N.E., and assigned as its new line of attack the course of the Cojeul and as its objective the crest N. of Croisilles and W. of Heninel. The Corps would thus strike in flank the enemy advancing S. of the Scarpe, who by 2 P.M. had taken Monchy-le-Preux and driven back the 77th Div. to the line Neuville Vitasse-Feuchy Chapel. Meanwhile the 70th Div. on the N. bank of the Scarpe, advancing towards Gavrelle, had been held up and thrown on the defensive on the front Rouvroy-Izel-Bailleul, so that between it and the 70th Div. to the S. there existed a wide gap, which the 1st Cavalry Corps was urgently ordered to fill to the best of its ability. Owing to the change of direction which had been ordered the attack of the X. Corps was not delivered till the late afternoon, and made little headway against the IV. German Corps, so that at the end of the day a further gap in the French line was formed between the left of the X. Corps and the right of the 77th Div., which had to be filled by troops from the general reserve. Gen. de Maud'huy, despite the disappointment of the day, ordered that the X. Corps should be prepared to resume its attack next morning, the 3rd on the N. bank of the Cojeul in the direction of Monchy-le-Preux, while the remainder of the detachment was to maintain its positions of the previous day. The X. Corps, however, met with no better fortune on this day; the Germans maintained themselves in Neuville Vitasse after heavy to-and-fro fighting, and the retirement of the Territorial troops to the S., who were forced out of Courcelles by the attacks of the German Guard Corps, compelled the X. Corps to throw back its right in conformity, under severe enemy pressure, as far as the line Ficheux-Mercatel. Both the 77th and 70th Divs., however, succeeded in repelling all the violent efforts of the enemy; the gap between these two divisions in the Scarpe valley was successfully closed by Conneau's 1st Cavalry Corps; and reinforcements consisting of the XXI. Corps (Maistre), detraining at Armentières, Merville and St. Pol, and the 2nd Cavalry Corps (4th and 5th Cavalry Div.) under De Mitry, then holding the front Benifontaine-Lens, were placed at the disposal of De Maud'huy. These forces were increased by the 45th Div. detraining at Arras, which was assigned to D'Urbal's corps. On the front of this corps fighting continued throughout the night, and the 70th Div. was forced to withdraw some three miles westwards to the line Vimy-Farbus-Bailleul, along the eastern slopes of the Vimy ridge. This retirement uncovered Lens, which fell into German hands early on the 4th. The situation of the detachment, which now found both its flanks in the air, was by no means an easy one; Maud'huy's orders for the 4th, however, were that the positions then occupied were to be held at all costs. The X. Corps was to maintain itself on the line Tilloy-Beaurains-Mercatel, with its right flank thrown back if necessary to Ficheux, and to reestablish the connexion with the left of the Second Army which had been lost owing to the retreat of the Territorials. D'Urbal's corps was to hold its ground on the front Vimy-Bailleul-Athies-Feuchy Chapel, so as to allow time for the XXI. Corps to advance by La Bassée against the flank of the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, which was secure the left of D'Urbal around Givenchy-en-Gohelle. One brigade of the 45th Div. which had already been despatched to Arras was sent forward to reinforce the Provisional Corps, and the second was detrained at Beaumetz and passed on to Duisans in general reserve. The German attacks continued without cessation throughout the 5th. Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding the Sixth German Army, arrived at Douai and took command of the whole battle front between the Somme and the Lys. On the French side Gen. Foch was entrusted with the coördination of the front N. of the Oise, and with the general control of the Second Army, the Territorial group, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps and Maud'huy's command, which now became the Tenth Army; Foch moved his headquarters to Doullens on the 5th, Maud'huy's remaining at Aubigny. During the greater part of the day the Tenth Army successfully held its ground, but in the evening its left was forced to retire still further W. by the vigorous attacks of the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, to the N. of which the 2nd German Cavalry Corps of von der Marwitz was now coming into action. Givenchy fell into the hands of the Bavarians, and while their right advanced beyond it to Souchez their centre assaulted and carried the Vimy ridge as far S. as Thelus; the French cavalry were driven back to Villers au Bois and Mont St. Eloi, while the 70th Div., reinforced by all available troops of the 45th Div., again made head against the enemy on the line CarencyNeuville St. Vaast-Roclincourt-Athies. This was the situation reported to Gen. Maud'huy on the morning of the 5th; and shortly after this bad news had been received the X. Corps announced that its right had been forced back from Boisleux, where it had maintained itself throughout the previous day, to Ficheux; that hostile columns were reported moving round its flank by Blaireville; and that the stations of Beaumetz and Saulty on the Arras-Doullens railway were being bombarded. by La Bassée and Lens on Vimy. Various untoward circumstances combined to thwart the execution of this plan. The attack of the Cavalry Corps began late and with insufficient forces, could make little impression on the strong front held by the enemy between Notre Dame de Lorette and Angres, and the 43rd Div. to the S. of it was also held up, while the enveloping attack of the XXI. Corps from La Bassée failed to develop. Elsewhere on the front the German attacks were repulsed, and by the evening the army held the line Beaumetz-Arras (X. Corps), Arras-W. of Neuville St. Vaast (Provisional Corps)-CarencyAix-Noulette (43rd Div. and Cavalry Corps)-S.E. of GrenayLoos (XXI. Corps) with cavalry towards Pont à Vendin and Carvin. Arras was being shelled by the enemy. This was about 10 A.M., and in view of the extreme gravity of the situation on both his flanks Gen. Maud'huy was already taking preparatory measures for the evacuation of Arras and for a withdrawal in the direction of St. Pol, should such become necessary as a result of further progress by the enemy, when Gen. Foch arrived at his headquarters and it was decided to make another effort to restore the position. The Germans had not pressed their advantage against the left of the army to the extent that had at first been feared; the Cavalry Corps was therefore ordered to advance against the right, which had pushed no further forward than Souchez, and disengage the left of the 77th Division. D'Urbal's corps, which was about to fall back to the line Mont St. Eloi-Etrun-Warlus (W. of Arras), was directed to maintain its ground with its right and centre and cooperate with its left in the attack by the cavalry. Meanwhile reconnaissances had revealed the fact that neither the German IV. Corps nor the Guard had yet taken advantage of the gap between the X. Corps on the right of the Tenth Army and the Territorials on the left of the Second Army; the former was therefore instructed to maintain its line and echelon troops in rear of its right between Ficheux and Gouy. Accordingly on the evening of the 5th the X. Corps had established itself firmly on the front Beaurains-Rivière. The attacks of the Cavalry Corps and the 70th Div., however, made no headway, and their line was established at the end of the day at the western foot of the Vimy ridge on the front E. of Mont St. Eloi-S. of Neuville St. Vaast-Ecurye-Roclincourt-St. Laurent. Further S. the line was continued by the 77th Div., which had been drawn back in conformity with the retirement of the formations on both its flanks to the second position prepared in rear, between Blangy and Tilloy. The orders for the 76th were for a renewal of the attack on the left wing of the Tenth Army; it was to be carried out by the 43rd Div. (of the XXI. Corps) which was assembling W. of Carency, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps which were to advance between Souchez and Liévin, and the XXI. Corps (less the 43rd Division) which was to envelop the enemy's right advancing According to army orders the XXI. Corps commenced its attack early on the 7th against the enemy reported to be on the line Angres-Liévin-Lens, while the cavalry and the 43rd Div. continued their endeavours to press forward towards Notre Dame de Lorette and Souchez. The Germans, however, had strengthened their positions during the night, and little progress. could be made. Moreover, it had become evident that the battle line must be extended yet further to the N. in order to meet a renewed German attempt to envelop the French left by the valley of the Lys. Accordingly the 1st and 2nd Cavalry. Corps were withdrawn from the battle-front in the late afternoon preparatory to their despatch to the N., the 13th Div., then in the vicinity of Lille, being ordered S. to take their place in the Tenth Army. On the rest of that army's front the situation underwent no important change during the 7th. From this date forward the fighting at Arras died gradually away. Renewed efforts by the XXI. Corps on the 8th and 9th ended in the recovery of Notre Dame de Lorette. On Oct. 20 further fighting E. of Arras resulted in an advance by the 10th Corps, and on the 22nd the 77th Div. was forced back N.E. of Arras by strong enemy forces, who were compelled next day to relinquish part of their gains. These were but the dying flickers of the fire of battle which had long since shifted its main focus to the north. Extension of the Battle to the Lys Valley, Oct. 3-12.-While the battle of Arras was still at its crisis, the German right wing was already being extended further to the N. into Flanders. On Oct. 3 a mixed detachment of Landwehr entered Tournai; the 4th Cavalry Corps (3rd, 6th and Bavarian Cavalry Divs.) had come into line on the right of the 1st Cavalry Corps, which was then engaged with the French 2nd Cavalry Corps, with its right S. of La Bassée. The right of these fresh forces advanced on Lille, from Tournai and Orchies, while its left advanced from Douai on La Bassée; by the 4th contact had been made with the French in the western outskirts of Lille. To meet this new threat the French Higher Command had. moved up the 2nd Cavalry Corps (4th, 5th and 6th Cavalry Divs.) under De Mitry to the area between Lens and Lille, and had garrisoned the latter city with the 13th Div. (of the XXI. Corps) which had detrained at Armentières, covered by the 7th Cavalry Division. The first attacks of the German cavalry on the city were beaten off and the suburbs cleared; but, as has already been related, the 13th Div. was then called away to the S. to rejoin its corps, and left behind it only a weak detachment of six battalions and four squadrons to hold the city, and of these two further battalions were withdrawn on the 8th. Meanwhile to the S. between Lens and the Béthune-La Bassée canal the XIV. German Corps had come into line, forcing back the French cavalry to the W. of the Lens-La Bassée road to the line Vermelles-Cambrin; on this line heavy and continuous fighting took place from Oct. 10 onwards, where the position gradually became stable. Further to the N. the German cavalry continued their advance, extending their right as far as and beyond the Lys and covering the whole country from La Bassée by Lille, Tourcoing and Wervicq to Ypres. The centre and left of De Mitry's cavalry fell back before them, pivoting back on their right from Neuve Chapelle by Estaires and Merville to Hazebrouck and Cassel; this line was reached about Oct. 9. The main body of the German cavalry appeared to be assembled around Bailleul and Steen- | N. was completed by the arrival of the I. Corps at Poperinghe, voorde, while behind it strong forces of infantry were advancing, the XIII. Corps to the S. and the XIX. to the N. of Lille. The garrison of the city, although reinforced on the 10th by a detachment, were unable to make head against these overwhelming forces, more especially as the presence of the German cavalry in all the area to the W. deprived it of all hope of succour; and after two days' bombardment Lille surrendered to the enemy with its garrison on Oct. 12. St. Omer and Cassel. The battle of the Lys now became merged in the greater battle of Ypres, in which the whole British force was engaged from Oct. 20 to Nov. 20, and the description of the fighting between these dates on the front of the British II. and III. Corps will be found under that head. It may be said, however, that neither the British nor the Germans, despite their utmost efforts, succeeded in bringing about any material change in the situation on the front between the Béthune-La Bassée The battle, however, was now about to enter on a new phase canal about Givenchy and the Lys to the N. of Armentières. with the entry into action of the British army. (B) FRENCH OFFENSIVES IN ARTOIS, 1915.-During the month of Oct. 1914 the western front had stabilized across Picardy and Artois, from the Oise to the neighbourhood of La Bassée. The line had not been chosen at the will of either party, but marked the points which each side had reached and held during the confused and rapid series of actions known as the "Race to the Sea." While there was still open country to the north it had been worth no one's while to attempt to dislodge an enemy present in any force. And when the sea had been reached and the German attacks upon the Yser repulsed, neither side retained the energy to advance. Both, therefore, had time to elaborate their defences in comparative peace, and thereby the sinuous and haphazard line already established became permanent. Operations of the British in the Lys Valley, Oct. 10-18.-The transfer of the British from the Aisne to the left flank of the French army in Flanders had first been proposed by Sir John French on Sept. 29; the details were quickly arranged between him and Joffre, and the withdrawal from the line commenced on Oct. 1. The cavalry moved off first by road on the 2nd, and were followed by the infantry between the 8th and 12th. Sir John French, on his arrival at Abbeville on the 8th, had planned a general advance by the II. Corps, then detraining there, to the line Aire-Béthune, covered in front and to the left by the Cavalry Corps, and the detraining of the III. Corps to the N. at St. Omer. The IV. Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Div., under Gen. Rawlinson, which had been landed on the Belgian coast in order to assist the Belgians in the defence of Antwerp and had assisted in covering their retirement to the line of the Yser, had been holding the line of the Lys around Ghent on the 11th, and were instructed to maintain themselves | Ablain, Angres, Liévin, and La Fosse Calonne. North of Fosse between that town and Courtrai for four or five days, if possible; it was intended to bring the rest of the army up on the right of the IV. Corps, so as to hold the Lys line from Ghent southwards. Rawlinson was authorized, however, in case he was attacked by strong hostile forces, to fall back in the direction of St. Omer, and as a matter of fact the retreat of the Belgians to the N. of him eventually necessitated his retirement by way of Thielt and Thourout to Roulers, where the IV. Corps arrived on Oct. 12, unmolested by the enemy. On the 10th French visited Foch, and a plan for a combined Allied offensive for the 13th, to reach the line of the Lys from Lille-Courtrai, was then drawn up. The British were to advance with their right N. of Lille, to force the river Lys at Courtrai and join up with Rawlinson's IV. Corps below that town. The Belgians were also to coöperate in the north. In accordance with this plan, the British cavalry pushing forward on the 11th came into contact with the German IV. Cavalry Corps, operating before the right wing of the VI. Army, in the neighbourhood of Nieppe forest, and forced them back towards the Lys; the II. British Corps reached the line of the Aire-Béthune canal. By the 14th the cavalry had cleared the country to the E. as far as the Wytschaete-Messines ridge and pushed patrols forward to the crossings of the Lys; but the II. Corps, wheeling up its left in the direction of Merville, became heavily engaged with German infantry (the XIII. and XIX. Corps of the VI. Army), which prevented their making much headway. The III. British Corps, having completed its movement to Hazebrouck by the 13th, began its advance eastwards, to bring it level with the left of the II. Corps. This objective, however, was not attained without serious and sustained fighting; the Germans (XIX. Corps and IV. Cavalry Corps) stubbornly defended Bailleul, Meteren, Neuve Église, Sailly and Nieppe one after the other; by the 16th, however, the British were in possession of all these places. The II. Corps also had worked their way forward by dint of determined efforts to the line AubersGivenchy, and came into touch with the XXI. Corps on the left of the French X. Army, on the Béthune-La Bassée canal. While the II. Corps, despite determined and unceasing attacks, found further progress impossible beyond the line GivenchyFestubert-N. of Aubers, which it reached on Oct. 18, the III. Corps entered Bois Grenier and Armentières, and was able to establish itself on a line E. of these places, while the Cavalry Corps, guarding their left, continued the line along the Lys to About Arras the line bulged eastward, leaving Beaurains German but making St. Laurent-Blangy, Roclincourt, and Ecurie French. To the north was a westward bulge which gave the Germans Neuville-St. Vaast and La Targette, Carency and Calonne the line ran straighter to the west of Loos, Hulluch, Artois is a chalk country. The surface soil is clay, with patches of sand unsuitable for cultivation and therefore wooded. The principal natural feature of the region is a long isolated ridge running from N.W. to S.E., which overlooks all the countryside. This ridge culminates at the chapel of Notre Dame de Lorette. East of the chapel there is a gap marked by the village of Souchez. East of Souchez again, the ridge continues as Vimy ridge and gradually dies away south of Vimy village. The sector was of first-rate importance both for economic and for strategic reasons. North of the ridge ran the principal French and Belgian coal seam the axis of which in Artois is roughly the line Béthune-Lens. Although the public mind was naturally slow to grasp the fact, nevertheless as soon as it became clear that trench warfare would result in the postponement of a decision, first-class economic objectives, such as the coal-mines, began to increase in general military value and continued to do so until the decisive campaign of 1918. Strategically, the German lines in Artois covered the LilleDouai-Cambrai railway, their main transversal line behind all this part of their front. Should this line be cut, were it even brought under effective artillery fire, their railway traffic would be compelled to use the inferior line Lille-Orchies-SomainCambrai. Although the final elaboration of trench warfare was a matter of years, its general characteristics, especially the strain and hardship of remaining immobile and in close contact with the enemy, appeared at once. The possibility of manœuvre disappeared and war became an affair of ever-increasing masses of material. In Artois, the importance of the sector and the nature of the soil made the fighting fierce and continuous and the hardships peculiarly bitter. The clay soil churned into a soft and sticky mud into which men sank deeply and sometimes even were lost. Everywhere the ground was humid; the Lorette ridge itself was honeycombed with springs so that trenches dug even on its summit were difficult to keep clear of water. Weapons often became unserviceable, and the men themselves looked like walking lumps of mud. Nevertheless, the fighting was not only savage but continuous. A major operation was merely a crescendo in a never-ending series of furious lesser combats, all centring about the commanding Lorette-Vimy ridges. Throughout the first three years of trench fighting on the major operation except Verdun, the Allies attacked. Save in that one case, the Germans held to their decision to stand upon the strategic defensive in France and Belgium, from Nov. 1914 to March 1918. In order to attempt a decision, it was, therefore, necessary to attack their entrenchments. The strength of the defensive in trench warfare, and the corresponding difficulty of the attack, were realized only with time. Originally, the entire Lorette ridge was occupied by the Germans during the race to the sea; the French swept them off in a brilliant little attack. Then the Germans moved in again and took the chapel and all the eastern end of the ridge nearly to the wood of Buvigny, not by assault but because the place had been left entirely unguarded during the night of Oct. 7-8 in the course of a relief of the French troops in the sector-an incident altogether typical of the race to the sea. As regular trench warfare began, the Germans had the best of the artillery fighting. Their guns were both heavier and more numerous, and their fire control better suited to the new and unexpected sort of fighting. Their batteries were emplaced near Liévin and Angres, behind Vimy ridge, and behind the butte of Monchy-le-Preux. In Nov. they began to use hand grenades, the first of the typical trench weapons to appear, or rather to reappear. The French did not begin manufacturing grenades during the following winter, and were not able to issue them to the troops until March 1915. Nevertheless, despite the German heavy artillery and grenades, the month of Nov. saw such an improvement in the French defensive works that casualties became fewer, although it was not yet possible to put out continuous wire. Early in Dec. the situation changed for the better with the arrival of several units of French heavy artillery, whose fire compelled the Germans on Lorette ridge to take cover in their deep dug-outs. The French Higher Command ordered the XXI. Corps, which had held the Lorette sector since its stabilization, to attack in the hope of a break-through. The Corps commander, Gen. Maistre, was doubtful of the success of the operation proposed, judging the means insufficient and the obstacles to be encountered too strong. Nevertheless, the attack took place on Dec. 17 at 1:10 P.M. on a front of a mile and a quarter, with diversions against Auchy-les-La Bassée, and Loos, and in front of St. Laurent-Blangy. Near Lorette the artillery preparation had not been sufficient to prevent the assaulting troops coming under heavy fire, especially from machine-guns, as they left the trenches. The German wire was strong and had been very little cut. Nevertheless, they struggled on through deep mud, and succeeded in taking some trenches. For four days the operation was persisted in. The artillery support was weak, partly because of the winding, irregular front line, partly through insufficient liaison with the infantry. Against such handicaps the infantry strove bravely but in vain. At last, after murderous losses which justified only too well Gen. Maistre's forebodings, the attack was broken off. An unbroken series of minor operations took place throughout the winter and early spring. In the afternoon of Dec. 27 ten battalions of Chasseurs Alpins, commanded by Gen. Barbot, attacked the hamlet of La Targette, after two hours of artillery preparation. "No-man's-land was here a quarter of a mile wide, quite flat and without cover save for a single sunken road. Hence losses were heavy and only half a mile of first-line trenches were taken. As the winter went on, the sticky mud became even worse, and the heavy German trench-mortar projectiles added still more to the danger and discomfort of the trenches. On March 3, at dawn, after a short but violent preparation by heavy artillery and heavy trench mortars, an entire German division made a sudden attack along the crest of the ridge, and drove the French into Buvigny wood. Two days of counter-attacks recovered most of the ground lost, and throughout March and April a series of local attacks and counter-attacks slightly improved the French position at a cost in casualties disproportionately large in comparison with the ground gained. The dead were not all Frenchmen. Already the German troops were beginning to call the ridge "Totenhügel," the Hill of Death. In April the first French 58-mm. trench mortars, few in number, were put in service. The French had already begun the use of hand grenades in March. About May 1 the French Higher Command decided upon a general attack, and chose Artois as its sector. It was desirable that something be done on the western front in the hope of relieving the pressure upon the Russians, on whose front the great blow was about to fall. The British agreed to support the operation by a diversion in Flanders. From the original formation of the French " Group of armies of the North,” Gen. Foch had been in command. This command he still retained, and his was the decision as to the length of front to be attacked. Even at this early stage of trench warfare, he saw clearly that to estimate the possible width of an assault according to the number of infantry available was nonsense. He therefore insisted upon calculating the front to be attacked according to the available quantity of heavy artillery, insisting that a clear superiority in heavy pieces was necessary over the full width of the operation proposed. On the western front as a whole, the Germans still disposed of superior numbers in this particular arm, so that it seemed impossible to obtain a sufficient superiority of fire over a front of much more than six miles. As a result of Foch's insistence the width of the attacking front was limited accordingly. The right of the proposed assault was fixed in the neighbourhood of Roclincourt, the left on the northern slopes of Lorette ridge. At this stage of the war it was still believed that a violent effort, even on so restricted a front, stood a fair chance of breaking through the opposing trench system and restoring a war of movement. From May 4, the German Higher Command was convinced that a considerable attack was to be expected. Nevertheless, so high ran their hopes of victory in the east that even Falkenhayn, usually so chary of reinforcements for that theatre, drew yet another division thither from France.1 In Artois, the French order of battle was as follows: the left of the XVII. Corps was around Roclincourt. North of them stood the XX. Corps, its left facing La Targette and extending a little north of that village. North of the XX. came the XXXIII. Corps, commanded by Pétain, the future commander-in-chief of the French armies on the western front. His extreme left faced Ablain. North again of the XXXIII. Corps, astride the Lorette ridge and on to the Arras-Béthune high road, stood the XXI. Corps which, always under Maistre, had held the sector from the beginning. The XX. and the XXXIII. Corps had three divisions each, the other corps two. All four corps formed part of the X. Army, now commanded by D'Urbal, who had relieved Maud'huy, the original army commander, in March. Foch shifted his headquarters from Cassel to Frevent on the Doullens-St. Pol road in order to follow the operation more closely. The troops were in high spirits at the prospect of quitting the foul and muddy trenches, and in the hope of fighting in the open thenceforward. Opposite them, the German defences were formidable; indeed the painstaking German national character is well adapted to the construction of elaborate works. Each of the solidly built French villages was a complicated little citadel. North of Ecurie a huge tangle of trenches formed a strong point, known as the Labyrinth, covering more than half a square mile. A series of works, known to the French as the "Ouvrages Blancs," ran in a concave line from a hummock in front of La Targette to the western end of Carency. On the Lorette ridge itself, the ground favoured the defence. The southern slopes were precip itous and were, moreover, cut by deep ravines which the French likened to the grooves in a melon rind. Of the five spurs between these ravines, the Germans held the easternmost three, their front line running from a point a thousand yards west of the ruins of the chapel, across the summit of the third spur, and so to the western end of Ablain-a curious position which only the great strength of the modern defensive made possible. To the 1 Falkenhayn, Die Oberste Heeresleitung, p. 74. At this period, Falkenhayn says, the total German combatant strength in the western theatre was 1,900,000 against an Allied total of 2,450,000. |