City Dionysia: a Chronological Study in Greek Literary History (1903) and Four Plays of Menander (1910). He was editor-in-chief of the University of Chicago Decennial Publications, 29 volumes. CARINTHIA (see 5.336), a territory of the Austrian Republic, is bounded N. by Styria and Salzburg, E. by Yugoslavia and Styria, S. by Italy and Yugoslavia and W. by Tirol. Area and Population.-The total area of Carinthia before the World War was 4,005 sq. m., and the pop. (in 1910) 396,200 (99 per sq. mile). The terms of peace deprived Carinthia of Kanal-Thal together with Tarvis and the lead-mines of Raibl, which were given to Italy; the district of Seeland, S. of the Karawanken, abandoned by Austria; the valley of the Mies with the lead-mines of Mies and Schwarzenbach and the district surrounding the mouth of the Lavant, which was given to the Southern Slavs. The district of Tarvis had (1910) some 7,700 inhabitants, of whom 5,700 were Germans. The districts given to the Southern Slav state then had 17,500 inhabitants, of whom 3,200 were Germans. It was arranged that the basin of Klagenfurt should decide its future allegiance by plebiscite. This plebiscite was taken in two distinct zones, the outer (Zone I. or A) of which reached nearly to Klagenfurt, the capital of the district, and comprised an area of 667 sq. m., with (1910) 72,138 inhabitants, of whom 31.5% were German; the inner (Zone II. or B) included a smaller portion of the district of Klagenfurt, and comprised an area of 132 sq. m., with (1910) 58.600 inhabitants, of whom 89.7% were German. The voting in Zone I. resulted, on Oct. 10 1920, in a choice of allegiance to Austria by 59.1% of the total votes; Zone II., therefore, went Austrian also. In the Carinthia of to-day (apart from the two above-mentioned Zones) 94.8% were German in 1910. Most of the Slovene population is in Gail-Thal. As Zone I. was occupied by the Southern Slavs at the time of the Austrian census of 1920, the total number of the inhabitants of the Carinthia of to-day is unascertained. The portion under Austrian rule in 1920 (inclusive, therefore, of Zone II.) had 297,257 inhabitants (99 per sq. mile). In 1910 the pop. was 299,091; in Zone 1. 72,138. Altogether, therefore, the present-day Carinthia had, on Dec. 31 1910, 371,229 inhabitants (101 per sq. mile). The population of the district which exercised the plebiscite was in 1910 93.3% Roman Catholic and 6·5% Evangelical. The proportion of males to females was as 1,000 to 992; in 1920, however, the proportion was as 1,000 to 1,067. For administrative purposes Carinthia has been divided into seven districts and an autonomous city-the capital, Klagenfurt (pop. 26,111 in 1920). Other important places are Villach (pop. 21,896); St. Veit, until 1518 the capital of Carinthia (pop. 5,927); Wolfsberg (pop. 5,808); Spittal (pop. 4.406) and Bleiberg (pop. 2,861). In the Electoral Zone I. are Völkermarkt (pop. in 1910 2,631) and Oberferlach (pop. in 1910 3,194). Agriculture. Of the Carinthia of to-day (with the exception of the Electoral Zone I.) 8.69% of the soil was unproductive in 1900. Of the productive areas 15.6% consisted of arable, 0·4% gardens, 11% meadowland, 25.1% grazing land (mostly high-lying), 47.7% woodlands (mostly coniferous). Stock-raising is well developed, but suffered severely during the World War. In 1918 there were 164,309 head of cattle (of which 66,501 were milch cows) and 97,766 swine. The Carinthian breeds of cattle (Lavanttaler and Mölltaler) and of horses are greatly prized. Bee culture, in conjunction with the cultivation of buckwheat, is actively pursued. Minerals. The mineral wealth is still noteworthy, notwithstanding the loss of important mining districts. The gold-mines of Tauern are not worked. Copper and antimony ores are being mined, but are not smelted locally. On the other hand, the output of lead (12,000 tons in 1915, or over 92% of the whole present output of Austria) and zinc (400 tons, or 54% of the whole output) ores is important in the Gail-Thaler Alps, especially in Bleiberg and Kreuth. Since the Raibl mines fell to Italy and those of Mies and Schwarzenbach to Yugoslavia, Bleiberg has regained its importance as the chief lead-mining centre in Austria. Consequently its products of lead and lead colours (white and red lead) are considerable. The iron-mining industry, which was once widespread, is now active only at Hüttenberg, at the foot of the Saualpe. The ore raised (in 1915 98,000 tons, or 5% of the whole output of Austria) is carried away from Carinthia to be smelted elsewhere. Lignite (Braunkohle) is found in many parts of Carinthia, especially in Lavant-Thal; the output of this, however, was in 1915 only 84,000 tons, or 3% of the whole Austrian output. Manufactures.-Carinthia is richly endowed with water-power; but, in spite of that, its industries are inconsiderable. The most important are the manufacture of scythes (Himmelberg), the ironworks of Ferlach and Feistritz, the small-arms factory at Ferlach, all kinds of lead-ware, some paper and some woollen factories (Viktring) and machinery (Brückl). Klagenfurt and Wolfsberg are busy centres of the weaving industries and also of the manufacture of and trade in articles in products of wood-notably cellulose, lignine and pasteboard. Communications.-Since the opening of the Tauern and Karawanken lines, Villach has become an important railway centre, being at the intersection of the Salzburg-Trieste-Vienna-Venice and Mar See Norbert Krebs, Länderkunde der österreichischen Alpen (1913), Das Klagenfurter Becken," Geographische Zeitschrift (1909); Martin Wutte, Germans and Slovenes in Carinthia (1918), Das Kärntner Abstimmungsgebiet (1920); Franz Heritsch, Die Österreichischen und deutschen Alpen," Handbuch der regionalen Geologie (vol. ii., part 5, 1915); Victor Conrad, Klimatographie von Kärnten (1913). CARLISLE, GEORGE JAMES HOWARD, 9TH EARL OF (18431911) (see 5.341), died in London April 16 1911. He was succeeded by his son, Charles James Stanley Howard (b. 1867), well known as a Unionist politician under the name of Visct. Morpeth. The 10th earl died Jan. 20 1912, and was succeeded by his son, George Josslyn L'Estrange Howard (b. 1895). CARNEGIE, ANDREW (1837-1919), American "captain of industry " and philanthropist (see 5.364), died at Lenox, Mass., Aug. 11 1919. His ideals are shown by his benefactions and are best described by describing them. In 1910 he gave $10,000,000 for establishing an Endowment for International Peace, to hasten the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our civilization." This Endowment was planned to encourage studies in economics, history and international law so that misunderstandings of peoples be averted by increasing their knowledge of one another. After America entered the World War (1917) the Endowment gathered much international information and furnished it for use at the Peace Conference. In 1910, the Pan-American Union building erected in Washington by Carnegie at a cost of $850,000 was dedicated. In 1911 he established his last and largest endowment, the Carnegie Corp. of New York, and before his death placed in its charge $125,000,000 to be used for promoting civilization in whatever way seems best to the trustees. The variety of its activities is illustrated by the following: American Red Cross ($1,500,000); Knights of Columbus War Work Fund ($250,000); Y.M.C.A. War Work Fund ($250,000); Y.W.C.A. War Work Fund ($100,000); Library Buildings in Army Cantonments ($320,000); Study of Methods of Americanization ($204,000); National Research Council ($5,420,000); Church Pension Fund (nearly $325,000), and Simplified Spelling Board ($110,000). In 1913 the Hague Peace Palace, given by Carnegie and costing $1,500,000, was dedicated. Some of the best known gifts in addition to the above mentioned are: The Carnegie Institute of Pittsburgh, nearly $29,000,000; the Carnegie Institution of Washington, $22,300,000; the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, $10,500,000; the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, $29,250,000; the Carnegie U.K. Trust, $10,000,000; the Scottish Universities Trust, $10,000,000; the Dunfermline Trust, $3,750,000; the Simplified Spelling Board, $250,000; the Church Peace Union, $2,025,000. By the close of 1918 he had erected 2,811 library buildings (1,946 U.S.A.; 660 Great Britain and Ireland; 156 Canada; 49 elsewhere) at a cost of more than $60,000,000. He had provided 7,689 church organs throughout the world, costing more than $6,000,000. To the Carnegie U.K. Trust, founded in 1913, he transferred the charge of all his existing and future benefactions other than university benefactions in the United Kingdom. He gave the trustees a wide discretion, and they have inaugurated a policy of financing rural library schemes rather than erecting library buildings, and of assisting the musical education of the people rather than granting organs to churches. In his will he provided that after certain enumerated bequests the residue of his estate (his family having already been provided for) should pass to the Carnegie Corporation. Appraisal of the estate, smaller than had been estimated, was made in 1921 and showed a net value of $22,880,000. Since according to the law of New York only half of an estate can be assigned as public bequests in case husband, wife, parent, or child survive, the residue passing to the Carnegie Corp. was less than $11,000,000. Before his death Carnegie had made public gifts, including those mentioned above, amounting to $350,000,000. If he did not die poor, as he claimed every man should, he at least had given away all but a relatively small portion of his wealth. His Autobiography appeared in 1920. ), carried out by means of a railway system of low efficiency, needed the utmost care and precaution. General Brussilov, at all events, spoke of the "whole position" being in jeopardy, in an order issued after the Austro-German offensive opened on Jan. 23. of Almiral Sir Frederick William Erskine Hamilton Nicolson, | although the concealment of the concentration, which had to be 10th Bart. (1815-99). He was educated at Rugby and Brasenose College, Oxford, and in 1870 entered the Foreign Office, where he was for some time assistant private secretary to Lord Granville. In 1874 he was attached to the British Embassy in Berlin, and after occupying a succession of minor diplomatic posts became in 1885 chargé d'affaires at Teheran. From 1888 to 1893 he was consul-general at Budapest, in 1894 secretary of embassy at Constantinople, from 1894 to 1895 agent in Bulgaria, and from 1895 to 1904 minister in Morocco. In 1899 he succeeded his father as 11th baronet. In 1905 Sir Arthur Nicolson was sent as ambassador to Russia, where he remained until 1910, and in the latter year returned to the Foreign Office, being until 1916, when he retired, permanent Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs. He received the K.C.I.E. in 1888, the K.C.B. in 1901, the G.C.V.O. in 1905, and the G.C.M.G. in 1906. He was raised to the peerage on his retirement, and took the title of Baron Carnock. He published in 1873 a History of the German Constitution. CAROLUS-DURAN [CHARLES AUGUSTE EMILE DURAND] (1837-1917), French painter (see 5.381*), died in Paris Feb. 18 1917. CARPATHIANS, BATTLES OF THE, 1915.-In Jan. 1915 the E. flank of the continuous battle-front in the Carpathians lay around Baligrod. Farther to the E. as far as the Rumanian frontier, the Austro-Hungarian High Command had so far succeeded in preventing any Russian penetration into Hungary by means of measures improvised to meet the immediate perils such as the use of Landsturm and volunteers. All these means, however, no longer sufficed. West of the Czeremcha road 4 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions of the III. Austrian Army were to pin to their ground 5 Russian infantry and I cavalry divisions. On the E. flank Gen, von Boroević had 11 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions against 9 Russian infantry and 4 cavalry divisions; Gen. von Linsingen 6 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions against one Russian infantry and 2 Cossack divisions, and Gen. von Pflanzer-Baltin 6 infantry and one cavalry divisions against 2 to 3 Russian infantry divisions Reichswehr and 2 Cossack divisions. The Russian effective strengths were certainly the greater, but the Central Powers hoped despite all difficulties to keep the attack going. They were undeceived; and the battle in the Carpathians actually dragged on for some three and a half months. After the Austro-Germans had opened their operations with brilliant initial successes, the winter became, as it were, an ally of their adversaries, and so confined the scope of operations that the Russians succeeded in taking timely counter-measures. The temperature fell 13° F. below zero, and as the troops were operating almost entirely in the open, exposed to all the severity of the weather-and that without relief-sickness and frost-bite soon took a heavier toll even than battle casualties, and the divisions had too few men to fill their battle sectors, which in any case were very wide. In view of the extent of the area of attack, the divisions had, almost without exception, to attack in a single The security of Hungary and the relief of Przemysl were to be effected by an attack on a broad front across the Carpathians, which, if successful, would develop into a flank attack on a large scale against the whole Russian battle-line. In this operation there were to take part: the army group of Gen. Freiherr von Pflanzer-Baltin, from the Rumanian frontier to E. of Wyszków; the German Southern Army, under Gen, von Linsingen (Austrian and German troops); thence to E. of the Uzsok pass; the reenforced right wing of the III. Army, under Gen. von Boroević, thence to the Czeremcha road. line. After the melting away of their offensive energy no reserves were left for the continuance of the advance; after every action the strength of the troops, tried as they were by adverse circumstances, grew weaker; by Jan. 27 the III. Army was no longer in a position to continue the offensive, and between Feb. 5 and 8 the Southern Army was in the same case. According to the unanimous conviction of both leaders and men the attack had literally" stuck fast in the snow," and thenceforward the battle became a defensive one. The Russians on the 26th had replied Success depended largely on the vehemence of the blow and on the Russians being surprised. This surprise was in fact secured, *These figures indicate the volume and Ten infantry divisions, 2 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry divisions and one Landsturm Hussar brigade. 2 Five infantry divisions, 2 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry divisions. page number of the previous article. by a counter-offensive W. of the Mezölaborcz railway, and from the 28th onwards this spread eastwards. The Southern Army managed to hold its hard-won gains; the III. Army E. of Wola-Michowa still contrived to defend Hungary in Galicia behind the Upper San and on the hills N. and W. of Cisna; but the pressure of hostile masses (some 100,000 strong) astride the Mezölaborcz railway and in the Dukla valley forced it back towards the Hungarian plains to the line Wola-Michowa, Stropko, upper course of the Ondava. The arrival on the 8th of the XVII. Corps from the IV. Army and the VIII. from the Serbian theatre brought some relief. The XVII. Corps came into line W. of the VII.; of the VIII., the one division (the 21st Landwehr) was sent to the X. Corps, the other (the 9th) to the XIX. and XVIII. Corps which were most in need of assistance. After the arrival of these fresh forces, Gen. von Boroević commenced on Feb. 10 an attempt to recover the lost ground at Mezölaborcz. This did not prosper, as the Russians here and in the Dukla valley, strongly reënforced, poured everfresh masses into the attack. The position of the III. Army grew daily more serious. Meanwhile Gen. von Pflanzer-Baltin's army group succeeded, in a series of continuous actions from Jan. 31 to Feb. 20, in bearing its standards victoriously through the Bukovina and S.E. Galicia as far as Stanislau. Its Eastern group (three divisions) had liberated the Bukovina and then moved by way of Kolomea to the N.W. in order to join the Western group (three divisions) which had advanced along the MarmarosszigetKolomea railway and north-westwards to Nadworna. The Russians, despite their violent counter-attacks, had by the 17th been defeated at Kolomea and their group, fighting stubbornly at Nadworna, was compelled by the increasing pressure on its flank to fall back towards Stanislau on the 19th. This town was occupied on the 20th by the main body of Pflanzer-Baltin's command, which had been reënforced on the 17th by two cavalry divisions; meanwhile the left wing on the Lomnica wheeled in towards Dolina in order from the rear to open up for the Southern Army the issue from the mountains. Already, however, the concentration N. and W. of Stanislau of powerful Russian forcesthe leading troops of Lechitski's IX. Army-made it evident that the Russians were here preparing a counter-offensive. The well-developed railway system in Galicia facilitated the rapid reënforcement of the Russian eastern wing. With this the Austrian higher command was unable to compete successfully, for on the mountain railway by Marmarossziget only three divisions (5th from the I. Army, XI. Corps from the III. Army) could be brought up by the early days of March. It was this circumstance, and the limited time during which the fortress of Przemysl could hold out, which had meanwhile determined the Austrian higher command, in spite of the experiences of winter in the Carpathians, to assemble behind the right wing of the III. Army the forces made available by the weakening of the Russian forces in Poland and the fortifying of positions there, although here none but a frontal attack was possible, and although to the Austrian higher command the offensive of the Pflanzer-Baltin army group seemed to promise the most decisive result. Since, however, a direct support of this group was impossible within the necessary time limit, the plan was to divert by a new attack over the Carpathians, such strong Russian forces as to enable the eastern wing to continue the offensive. The Southern Army was reënforced by the German 4th Infantry Division. In order to build up the II. Army behind the right wing of the III., from Feb. 6 onward three divisions (27th Inf. Div. and IV. Corps-31st and 32d Inf. Div.) were withdrawn from Poland and the 41st and half the 38th Honved Divisions from West Galicia. On Feb. 15 Gen. von Böhm-Ermolli took over the command of these forces, together with the eastern half of the III. Army (Szurmay's group, consisting of the V., XVIII. and XIX. Corps) which numbered 60,700 rifles. The left wing of the II. Army as now constituted was fighting with its last reserves of strength. The troops were exhausted almost to the point of collapse by continuous fighting and the severities of the weather. The Russian divisions, on the other hand, were in a better position in that they could usually allow two regiments to rest while two others attacked. It was only owing to the most strenuous exertions that the Austro-Hungarian troops succeeded, without reliefs, in holding the crests and preventing the successive waves of the Russian assault from sweeping away the thin line of defence. Again and again reserves drawn from the front itself came to the support of the points most in danger, a process which exhausted the strength of the sions to six and a half. The remainder were in many cases dead tired. Under these conditions the offensive of the III. Army which was ordered at the same time could hardly be very effective, and the main burden of the fighting fell to the II. Army. junction with the III. Army's right wing to strike in the direction of Wola-Michowa, and immediately afterwards to deliver with his concentrated forces a crushing blow northwards from both sides of Baligrod. The attack on Wola-Michowa was intended to recapture Lupków station, the junction of a narrow-gauge railway running behind the front of the II. Army.1 The recovery of this line would considerably facilitate the supplying of that army, the bulk of which was dependent on a single practicable road, of which the condition had alarmingly deteriorated owing to the unusually early thaw. Meanwhile it was no longer possible to ignore the urgent need of support for the W. wing of the army. On Feb. 16 the 16,000 men of the XIX. Corps on this flank were faced by 28,000 Russians, and a division had to be brought into line on the 20th, and another on the 23rd.2 Not only was the opportunity of surprising the enemy lost, but they were allowed still further time to take counter-measures by the postponement of the Austrian attack on account of the condition of the roads. Misfortune pursued it, however, from the first. The peril of Przemysl necessitated working to a time limit and in other ways exercised a powerful influence on decisions taken. The increasing difficulty in the matter of supplies led to the opening of the attack on Feb. 27, before the concentration was complete, and to the choice of the direction of Baligrod for the line of attack as being the shortest road to Przemysl "; while the action planned against Lupków was in the end abandoned owing to the loss of time involved. The Russians, entrenched in their strong snow fortresses, were able continually to bring up reënforcements strong enough to deny to the group under Gen. von Terszstyánsky, advancing astride the Baligrod road, that decisive initial success which later experience in war has shown to be so important in attempts to break through the enemy's line. Immediately after the opening of the offensive, the temperature sank once more to 13° F. below zero. The troops lost heavily from this cause and also from the methods of combat adopted; these latter were conditioned mainly by the necessity of bringing speedy help to the garrison of Przemysl, and the universal idea that this must be achieved at all costs led too often to massed infantry attacks against barbed wire without sufficient artillery preparation. A week had elapsed and no ground had been gained beyond the initial advance of 10 m. in depth astride the Baligrod road. On March 5 the High Command therefore ordered a general attack along the whole Carpathian front. The S. wing of the IV. Army was to advance on the 6th by Gorlice in the direction Jaslo-Zmigrod. This had already been recognized by the Austrian higher command as the weakest spot in the Russian line, but even now it had not sufficient forces available to enable it to make full use of this knowledge. The attack was delayed till the 8th, and succeeded in pinning the Russian forces to their ground; parts of von Woyrsch's army detachment and the IX. German Army attacked N. of the Vistula with the same object between March 6 and 9. The critical position of Przemysl and the continuing concentration of the IX. Russian Army facing the Austrian E. flank induced the Austrian high command to press for an immediate offensive. The Russians had also detached troops from the IX. Army (II. Cav. Corps and 11th Div.) to strengthen Lechitski's army, and the transference thither of other forces from the Nida front (XVII. Corps, 3rd and 35th Divs.) was also probable. In view of the disposition of the railways the only possible method of assisting Pflanzer-Baltin's army group was for the II. Army to attract to its own sector, by means of an early attack, as many hostile troops as possible. This course would considerably increase the difficulties of the II. Army, the special task of which was the relief of Przemysl; but its considerable numerical superiority over its enemies seemed to the Central Powers to afford a prospect of success. South of the Vistula there stood 30 Russian divisions (exclusive of those investing Przemysl) as against 49 Austrian and German divisions; though many of the Austrian divisions had, it is true, been reduced to little more than the strength of infantry regiments. Every attempt was made to assemble superior forces in the decisive sector, from the Dukla pass to E. of Cisna. In the first few days of March, 17 divisions could be opposed to 7 or 8 Russian divisions, if the reënforcements sent to the II. Army were utilized on the W. wing. In addition, one division from the IV. and one from the I. Army were used here, bringing up the total of fresh divi 1 From E. to W., V., XVIII. and XIX. Corps and later IV. Corps. 241st Honved Div. on Feb. 20; 27th Div. on the 23rd. 13th Landwehr and 14th Divs. respectively. 4 During the next few days the III. and Southern Armies carried out no important operations. The II. Army attacked with all its forces along the whole of its front, between March 5 and 10. In spite of this the Russians, by the roth, had succeeded in bringing into action forces equal to those of their assailants; they were able-with the advantage of strong mountain positions-to oppose to the 112,000 rifles of the II. Army about the same number. On the decisive W. wing they had from 21,000 to 28,000 fresh rifles in reserve as against 13,000 fresh Austrian rifles. This was decisive, for the II. Army was by now 37,205 other ranks had been suffered by Terzstyánsky's group, only some 70,000 strong. The offensive of the II. Army culminated on March 10. The Russian counter-offensive, commencing on the 11th with a flank attack by Wola-Michowa, checked the attack astride the Baligrod road, and on the 14th it had to be abandoned as hopeless. The offensive wedge of the II. Army had acted as a magnet to some 5 Russian divisions. Among these were the 35th and 3rd Divs. so that the object of relieving the pressure on PflanzerBaltin's front had been achieved. General Lechitski had commenced his offensive against this group with four corps on Feb. 28, and the Austrian right wing, outnumbered, had fallen back, fighting stubbornly, to N. of Obertyn. Thanks to the timely arrival on March 4 of the XI. Corps from the IV. Army, Pflanzer-Baltin's troops succeeded in holding their new front, although the Russians had by the roth advanced in N. Bukovina as far as the Pruth. On March 18 their offensive against the Austrian E. wing came to a standstill. The relief of Przemysl had thus proved impossible. However, in order to assist the garrison in its attempt to cut its way out, by holding fast as many Russian troops as possible, a striking force was assembled, despite all obstacles, on the E. wing of the II. Army. There could be however no question of coöperating with the garrison, as the sortie attempted on the 19th broke down while still within the fortress area, all stocks of food being exhausted; a capitulation was signed on the 22nd after all war material had been as far as possible destroyed. The failure of the attempts to relieve Przemysl much discouraged the Austrian troops, particularly those of the II. Army. Their endurance and self-sacrifice, however, were not entirely in vain. The attention of the Grand Duke Nicholas had been so riveted on the danger threatening him to the S. of Przemysl that he lost sight of the duty of coöperating with the Western Allies of Russia, and decided to attempt a break-through into Hungary with the forces now assembled to the S. of Przemysl. This was quite in accordance with the wishes of the Austrian and German high commands, which up to that time had sought to defend Germany by continuous attacks in the Carpathians. The strong Russian forces now directed against Hungary were being enticed 1 Killed and wounded. 340 officers 17,210 other ranks 415 11.098 31 1,194 7.703 Sick Prisoners Missing Total 46 into a region where in winter, as had recently been proved, full advantage could not be taken of superiority of numbers, a superiority easier in the circumstances to destroy than to maintain. The last great attempt of the Russians to break through began on March 20 with an onslaught of unexampled violence against the whole front of the III. Army, which, despite all it could do, was gradually forced farther back in the direction of Hungary. Units of the IV. Army 3 arriving on the 28th to reënforce the left wing brought the attackers to a stand; but against the centre and right of the army the Russians continued their attacks with ever-fresh forces, and it was obvious that their object was to break through towards Varanno and Homonna, the most northerly points of the Hungarian plain. This caused the utmost anxiety to the II. Army command. As early as the 23rd a gap existed between the left flank of that army and the retreating right of the III., and although, itself heavily pressed, the II. Army had no option but to put in some march battalions * to fill it. Again on the 26th, at a time when its own front was weakening rapidly, the army dispatched a combined brigade 5 from its W. wing, and one infantry and one cavalry brigade" from its E. wing to the III. Army. (The infantry were sent back later.) Any further successes against the right of the III. Army must have seriously menaced the position of the II. Army stationed N. of the frontier ridge. On the 27th, accordingly, the army command proposed a voluntary withdrawal; but the high command, which throughout these days of dire peril still held firmly to its offensive projects, refused its assent, as the blocking of the Laborcz valley by the German Beskiden Corps (4th German Div. of the Southern Army, 25th Res. Div. of the IX. Army, 35th Res. Div. of Woyrsch's group) had been begun. Meantime, however, the Russians at the end of March had driven the II. Army to retreat. The system of constantly patching the front with troops withdrawn from other sectors was no longer possible, in view of the fact that the enemy's attacks were now simultaneous all along the army line. The lack of good roads prevented these reserves arriving in time or in sufficient numbers to gain isolated successes. The Russians, being superior in numbers, were able to seize the opportunity afforded by the withdrawal of reserves from the centre of the II. Army at Cisna to drive in its front in that sector. Here they seriously menaced 3 Parts of the 26th Landwehr and 8th Div. 5 Lt.-Field-Marshal Martiny's combined brigade. 84 64 4 Col. Biffl s combined brigade. 6: 33 855 officers 37,205 other ranks i.e. 54% of the total strength. 6 128th Honved Brigade. 7 Ist Landsturm Hussar Brigade. 8 Beskiden, i.e. the range of the Carpathians separating East |