S.W., stormed the works on the 15th, and on the 16th entered Jaroslaw and crossed to the E. bank of the San.

The IV. Army reached the Russian lines on the Vistula-San angle on the same date, and took up a position on the W. bank of the San as far as the Wislok. S. of the Wislok the XI. Army had established itself on the left bank of the San, in face of the fortress girdle of Przemysl and extending to the San S. of Mackowice; the III. Army aligned itself as far as Husaków before the S. W. and S. fronts of Przemysl, while the II. Army had worked its way forward to the entrenched line extending over Krukienice to the Wielki Bloto. S. of this marshy area the Southern Army had driven Cherbachev's XI. Russian Army back on Stryj and Dolina, which had been formed out of the Stryj detachment early in May. Pflanzer's Army was compelled to withdraw before the Russian IX. Army (Lechitski) to the Pruth between Czernowitz and Kolomea, and there made preparations to hold this line, while coöperating with its reënforced left wing in the offensive of the Southern Army.

N. of the Vistula the Russian IV. Army was forced back by the armies of Dankl and Woyrsch to the line Nowe Miasto-MniszekIlza-Opatów-Klimontów, after heavy fighting in the Czarna and Lysa Gora areas, and small rear-guard actions elsewhere. Before the IX. German Army the Russians held their ground.

In 14 days of fierce battle the Central Powers had gained a great victory, and had pushed back the Russian “ steam-roller some 110 m. eastwards, besides securing 170,000 prisoners, 128 guns, 368 machine-guns and immense quantities of war material.

A pause in the operations now ensued, which was devoted to the preparations for a further offensive, to comprise the forcing of the San line, the capture of the fortress of Przemysl, and the storming of the heights S.E. of the fortress,

The San itself at this season was not a serious obstacle, and its passage presented no difficulties in itself; but on the far bank there existed strong and well-prepared positions, while the Russians had received considerable reënforcements; their front E. of the Vistula having been strengthened by some 9 divs. at the beginning of May. The fortress of Przemysl had been reconstructed by the Russians and was now too strong to capture by a coup de main. The bringingup of heavy artillery would therefore be necessary, and the strong positions S.E. of the Vistula also demanded a carefully planned attack. It appeared, moreover, that the Russians had recovered their breath in this new position, and that they intended to oppose an energetic resistance to the pursuit. Fresh and thorough preparations had, therefore, to be made for the continuance of the attack. The transport of supplies could not keep pace with the troops during their rapid advance, for the Russians in their retreat had carried out a thorough work of destruction. The roads and railways could not be used, and the bridges had been blown up. Only after hasty restoration had been carried out could the necessary heavy artillery and ammunition be sent forward.

As the front became shortened during the advance, the Austrian VIII. Corps was on May 10 taken out of the line on the III. Army front, transferred by rail to the IV. Army, and attached to Kirchbach's group where it was to be assigned the part of storming Sandomierz. The 41st Honved Inf. Div. was also transferred from the III. to the I. Army, coming into line on the 19th at Staszów.

The imminent entry of Italy into the war had no influence on the continuance of the offensive, apart from the fact that the VII. Corps (17th Inf. Div. and 20th Honved Inf. Div.) were entrained on the 21st at Mezö Laborcz for the S.W. front. There was, however, a spontaneous pause during which both sides made their preparations for the forthcoming great battle. The Austro-German troops were engaged on their front in securing favourable conditions for their impending attack, while the Russians endeavoured, in a series of powerful counter-blows, to check the progress of their pursuers and even to prepare the ground for a possible offensive.

The occupation of Jaroslaw early on the 16th, and the construction within the next few days of a regularly fortified bridge-head, in which was included the village of Sieniawa, captured on the 18th by the Austro-Hungarian 10th Inf. Div., afforded a favourable sallyport for the next advance. Despite the gallant counter-attacks of the III. Caucasian and XXIV. Corps, the German X. and Guard Corps and Arz's Austrian Corps were able to consolidate their positions in this sector. The 12th Div. of the last-named corps on the 20th carried out a successful advance towards Radymno. The XI. Army Command, in order to assist the II. and III. Armies, which were making little headway, projected an attack on the 24th with the left flank along the Szklo on the E. bank of the San. If the part played by the Russians opposed to the XI. Army was mainly passive, they showed a more aggressive spirit opposite the IV. Army on the Lower San. Units of their IX. Corps near Misko, and of their X. Corps near Stare Miasto, delivered violent attacks on the 18th, which were defeated. On the 19th, after being reënforced, they again crossed the San between Rudnik and Stare Miasto but had to return hurriedly to the E. bank as the result of a counter-attack by the 3rd Inf. Div. Heavy fighting also occurred near Rudnik, where the 8th Inf. Div. defeated with the utmost gallantry the repeated Russian efforts to effect a break-through.

During the pause in the fighting here, violent fighting took place in the bend of the Vistula on the front of Dankl's and Woyrsch's

armies. The pursuit, which had been begun on the 12th by the former army, had been successively taken up by Woyrsch's armies and by Kövess's army group. The right wing of Dankl's army encountered strong resistance on the 16th on the line KoprziwnycaKlimontów, advanced to the attack but failed to break through; the same fate befell the II. Corps on his left wing, which had to relinquish its initial gains in face of a violent Russian counterattack. Woyrsch's right wing, which was in touch, was also held up; on his left wing, however, the 16th Inf. Div. took Ruski Brod near the source of the Radomka and drove the enemy back in flight. During the 17th indications of a Russian counter-offensive between the inner wings of Dankl's and Woyrsch's armies increased in number, and Bredow's div. (Woyrsch's right wing) and the II. Corps actually had to resist a series of violent assaults which, in the case of Dankl's army, even suggested the necessity of a retreat behind the Czarna. On the 18th, however, the expected counteroffensive failed to materialize against Dankl's left wing; the Russians devoted all their efforts on this and the following day to the capture of Bredow's positions, and they also exercised considerable pressure against Dankl's southern wing; all their attacks, however, were beaten off.

On the 20th the main body of the Austro-Hungarian 7th Cav. Div. came into action on Bredow's right, and the 41st Honved Inf. Div. from the III. Army, on the II. Corps' left; and the Russians in this part of the front thereupon fell back before this corps and Bredow's div. to an entrenched position on the line Brody (on the Kamienna)-Wasniów-Kobylany. The pursuers worked forward to this on the 24th. Nothing of moment occurred in the centre and on the northern wing of Woyrsch's army, or on the fronts of Kövess's army group and the German IX. Army.

The Russian attempt to break through in the mountain area N. of Kielce, to relieve the pressure on their retiring troops N. of the Vistula, had thus failed; 6,300 prisoners had been lost.

S. of the Vistula there now began the violent struggle prepared for since the 12th, which in the battle of Przemysl, was to introduce the second phase of the great spring campaign in Galicia.

The Battle of Przemysl (May 24-June 6).-On May 24 the attack by Mackensen's army, which had been planned four days earlier, began along the Sklo in an E. and S.E. direction. At the same time the II. and III. Armies were to advance in a N.E. direction along the Mosciska-Przemysl road, with the object of driving the Russian field army away from the fortress from the S. The IV. Army, securing the San crossing at Sieniawa, was to direct its main effort against the strong Russian positions in the angle between the San and the Vistula about Rudnik and Machów, while the Southern Army was to continue its attacks in the Drohobycz-Stryj area. As early as the 24th the XI. Army forced back the enemy along all the front of attack. The German XLI. and Austro-Hungarian Corps, on this and the following days, accomplished the brilliant feat of storming Radymno, which the Russians had erected into a powerful bridgehead by means of three exceptionally strong lines connected with the northern defences of Przemysl.

A violent and extremely effective artillery preparation begun early in the morning made it possible to take Ostrów and Radymno on the 25th, and finally for the VI. Corps to capture the bridge-head of Zagrody. The Russians fled over the San in complete disorder. By the premature destruction of the bridge over the river, 21,000 of them were cut off, and fell into the hands of the victors, who also captured 39 guns and 40 machine-guns.

By the evening of the 25th Mackensen's attacking wedge had been driven forward on the E. bank of the San to the line Radwa-Zapalów (on the Lubaczowka)-Laski-Lazy. On the W. bank the Bavarian 11th and German 119th Divs. had already on the 24th reached the heights S.W. of Zablotce. On the 26th the XLI. Corps succeeded in gaining possession of the S. end of Swiete on the W. bank of the San, while the VI. Corps took the villages of Nienowice and Chotyniec. The Guard established itself on the line Zaleska Wola-Zapalów, The Russians had made every effort to check Mackensen's advance, particularly by means of violent counter-attacks at night, but in vain. Mackensen's advance had progressed so far to the E. that Przemysl was now encircled from the north. He proceeded to consolidate his positions in this area, partly in order to counter a Russian offensive which was just beginning, partly in order to await the moment when the II. and III. Armies should be able to deliver a direct assault on Przemysl from the south.

The right wing of the II. Army and the whole of the III. continued their attacks on the 24th with the utmost energy. On the previous night a Russian counter-attack had pressed the XVIII. Corps back a little, but on the morning of the 25th the position was restored, largely owing to the arrival of the 13th Landwehr Inf. Div.

Field-Marshal-Lt. Schmidt's group (7th Inf. Div. of the IV. Corps and the XVIII. Corps), attacking on the left wing against Mościska, gained some small successes, but the German Beskiden Corps farther to the left made no advance on this day. On the 26th it was able to storm two hills near Husaków, but as against this all the efforts of Schmidt's group broke down before the strong Russian positions, which were in part concreted and consisted in places of seven successive lines of trenches. Owing to the lack of heavy artillery the attack here could progress only by systematic

sapping, and in this manner it had, by the 28th, worked its way up to the Russian wire entanglements.

Meanwhile the Russians had resolved on a counter-offensive with superior forces against the S. wing of the IV. Army. Their plan was to advance from the N. and N.E. over the San at Sieniawa and to the N.W. of it, and thus to put a term to Mackensen's progress.

On the 27th the strongly reënforced III. Caucasian Corps (Gen. Irmanov) delivered a surprise attack upon the Sieniawa bridge-head. The Austro-Hungarian 10th Div., consisting in part of untrustworthy Czech troops, gave way, and was thrown back to the W. bank of the San and the Lower Lubaczówka, losing 9,000 prisoners, 9 guns and 4 machine-guns. Strong reënforcements hurried forward from other divisions succeeded in stiffening the badly weakened right wing of the army on the W. bank of the San, and in averting the menace to Mackensen's left flank. On his front also the Russians on the 27th delivered unexpected but unsuccessful attacks against the Lubaczówka and the positions of the VI. and XLI. Corps at Chotyniec and Starzawa.

On the 28th the Russians renewed their attacks in this area and on the San. On the Lubaczówka they succeeded in penetrating the lines held by the German X. Corps, but were driven out by a flanking movement. On the next day they again delivered strong assaults in the Sieniawa area and made vain attempts to pass the San. The N. wing of the IV. Army, in conjunction with the I. Army on its left (now under Kirchbach, in place of Dankl, who had been appointed to the command in Tirol), moved forward on the 24th to attack the fortified line Machów-Rudnik, and by the 26th had forced the Russians back to the S. of Grebów. The Russian attack at Sieniawa, however, necessitated the immediate withdrawal of forces to strengthen the right wing of the IV. Army and the cessation of the N. wing's offensive. On the 30th, therefore, there was a temporary cessation of activity; at the same time indications were observed of a renewed Russian blow against the inner flanks of the IV. and XI. Armies. The Supreme Army Command gave expression to this fear in instructions to these armies to devote special care to the strengthening of their positions and to hold reserves in readiness on their threatened wings. The III. and II. Armies were meantime to pursue their attacks.

During the following days, from May 30 to June 3, Przemysl was stormed (see PRZEMYSL). Throughout this period hard fighting was also taking place immediately S.E. of the fortress and on the San between Przemysl and Rudnik. In the latter area it was the Russians who took the initiative. Since the capture of the Sieniawa bridge-head by the III. Caucasian Corps, it became clear that strong forces were being concentrated against the XI. Army, and that the Russian IX. Corps in the Ulanów-Rudnik area was being reënforced. The XIV. and XV. Corps of the Russian IV. Army had been brought over the Vistula to the area Sandomierz-Nisko.

In front of the Austro-Hungarian IV. Army and the northern wing of the German XI. Army (in all, 11 inf. and 2 cav. divs.) stood the whole of the Russian III. Army (some 20 inf. and 4 cav. divs., with 6 militia brigades). The Russians appeared to be planning an energetic counter-attack; on June 2 the Austro-Hungarian IX. and XIV. Corps had had to repulse heavy attacks and to prevent attempts to cross the San.

On the evening of June 1 the 8th Inf. Div. on the left wing of the XIV. Corps W. of Rudnik had been hard pressed and forced to fall back to its next line of defence; all attacks on the 2nd were beaten off, but there was danger of a Russian break-through just W. of Rudnik, as the whole XIV. Corps in conjunction with the IX. Corps had been pressed back to the line running from the heights W. of Tarnagora, by Jezowa to Jata, where it came into touch with the right wing of the VIII. Corps which was bent back on the line Stany-Przyszow. In the case of this latter corps nothing worth mentioning occurred. All attacks on the Lubaczówka were repulsed by the German X. and Guard Corps, on the northern wing of Mackensen's army.

On the following day the IV. Army front continued quiet, the troops fortifying their new defensive line, which was not attacked. The fall of Przemysl having freed troops of the III. Army for use elsewhere, the Austrian X. Corps (24th and 25th Divs.) was hastily dispatched to Lancut and Rzeszow, to reënforce the IV. Army. Troops were also dispatched to the XI. Army, the German 22nd Div. to Lancut, the 8th Bavarian Div. to Radymno, the German XXVI. Corps to Jaroslaw, and the 107th Div. to Przeworsk.

On the 4th the Russians renewed their massed attacks against the IV. Army, but these were all repelled with heavy loss. The 59th Regt. near Tarnagora repulsed an attack by the four regiments of the Russian 61st Inf. Div. The northern wing of the XI. Army also dealt successfully with a series of Russian attacks delivered as late as the night of the 4th. On this day the Russians' power of attack seemed to have exhausted itself. They had suffered enormous losses and the driving-back of the Austro-Hungarian XIV. Corps was the only success they had to show. Only on the 6th did strong forces from the Russian VIII. Army once more attempt a counter-attack on Mackensen's eastern front; but this did not succeed in preventing the establishment of the XLI. Corps on the line Starzawa-Czerniawa. On the front of the IV. Army all was quiet on June 4. The Russian plan of holding the San line, and relieving

their hard-pressed VIII. Army by a powerful counter-offensive in the Rudnik area, had thus failed.

While Przemysl was being invested and captured Puhallo's and Böhm's armies were engaged with Brussilov's left wing S.E. of the fortress. The former had taken over the III. Army from Boroević, who on May 24 was put in command of the V. Army against Italy. Early on June 2 Böhm made an energetic attack in conjunction with the German Beskiden Corps on the right wing of the III. Army, but on this day met with no success. Only by slow degrees and step by step could the divisions of the II. Army work their way forward up to the strong hostile positions. On the 3rd the Beskiden Corps succeeded in breaking through the Russian lines at Husaków and in establishing itself on the heights W of Myslatycze, while the divisions of the XVII. Corps in touch with it to the W. gained a firm footing on the crest N.W. of Husakow. The success of the attack was greater next day. In conjunction with the XI. Army the XVII. Corps pushed forward to the heights E. of Wola Locka, and there met with strong resistance. The Beskiden Corps was engaged by the evening against the hostile positions W. of Czyski and N. of Rakosc (S.W. of Mosciska), where it connected with the left-wing corps of the II. Army, which had itself done excellent work in the area to the S. of the Beskiden Corps and in conjunction with it.

Battle of Stryj, and Fighting on the Pruth and Dniester (May 24June 15). Simultaneously with the attacks of the IV., XI., III. and II. Armies, there began on May 24 on the German Southern Army front a 48 hours' intense artillery preparation, which was followed by the actual attack on the morning of the 26th. The front of Linsingen's army extended from Hruszów on the Bystrycza E. of Drohobycz, S. W. of Stryj, and E. of Bolechów to the Dolina area. The 5 inf. divs. of Shtcherbachev's XI. Russian Army were opposed by 8 inf. divs. and 3 independent brigades.

The results of the first day's operations were brilliant. FieldMarshal Szurmay's corps on the left stormed the hostile positions at Gaje, while the 38th Honved Inf. Div. and the left wing of Gen. Count Bothmer's German Corps in touch with it pressed forward successfully before Stryj. Hofmann's Austro-Hungarian corps also made progress N. of Dolina. Gen. Gerok's XXIV. German Reserve Corps fighting on the right wing to the S.W. of Dolina, on the other hand, beat off all attacks. As on the second day, however, the Russians everywhere maintained their strong positions with the utmost stubbornness, the attack was brought to a standstill, and recourse had to be made to sapping, as on the II. Army front.

During the next few days the Russians endeavoured to clear their front by a series of strong counter-attacks mostly delivered by night against Hofmann's Austro-Hungarian corps; and they succeeded by the morning of the 30th in forcing it back behind the Swica to the line Lisowice-Hoszów. Here, however, their progress was checked by Hofmann and the 24th Reserve Corps.

On the 31st Bothmer's energetic attack on Stryj turned the scale of victory in favour of the Southern Army. Advancing in conjunc tion with Szurmay's S. wing from the Holobutów area, he defeated the enemy, taking 9,050 prisoners, 8 guns and 15 machine-gunsand, pushing on through Stryj, established himself on the line Lisowice-E. of Stryj-S. of Brigidau.

The effect of this was immediately felt on the Southern Army front. Szurmay's left wing, on June 1, stormed the Russian line N.E. of Drohobycz, and pursuing by Kolodruby and Mikolajow, drove the enemy back on Medenice. The 1st Cav. Div. and 5 bat talions of the II. Army, which had joined in the attack, were placed under the Southern Army. On June 2 Bothmer's corps took Lisiatycze, but its 1st Div., fighting E. of Stryj, made no progress. The 38th Honved Inf. Div. and Szurmay's right wing during the night drove the Russians back to the Dniester.

The Supreme Army Command now proposed, while securing its flank on the Dniester, to push Bothmer's corps and the main body of Szurmay's corps eastwards towards Zurawno against the flank of the Russian IX. Army, thus relieving the pressure on Pflanzer Baltin. The execution of this scheme produced excellent results. Yielding to Bothmer's pressure, the whole Russian line was in retreat early on the 4th. While Szurmay on the line of the bridge-heads of Mikolajow and Kolodruby undertook to guard the flank facing the Dniester, Bothmer advanced on Zurawno with the 38th Honved and German 1st and Guard Divs. By the evening Hofmann and Gerok, taking up the pursuit towards Kalisz, had reached the line Zawadka-Holyn. Here on the 5th the right-wing corps of the Rus sian IX. Army stood stubbornly at bay, while Bothmer was already preparing to force the Dniester at Zurawno, which he had taken by a coup de main. Meanwhile the 1st Cav. Div. had advanced by Tejsarow on Zydaczów, and on the W. flank Szurmay repulsed pow erful counter-attacks by the Russian XXII. Corps.

On the 6th Gerok and Hofmann broke the resistance of Lechitski's right wing at Holyn and Zawadka, and pursued the XI. Corps, which had been in action there, by Kalisz on towards Wojnow. Bothmer, with the 38th Honved Inf. Div, and the Guard Div. stormed the heights N. of the Dniester, and on the 7th, after violent fighting with parts of the Russian XVIII. Corps, forced the Rus sians to retire from Nowoszyny. The 38th Honved Div. reached Bukaczowce that evening. On the 8th Hofmann's troops forced

the passage of the Lomnica, and pressed on towards Halicz and Jezupol, while Gerok entered Stanislau.

The task of the Southern Army, to roll up the hostile line in front of Pflanzer's army by an attack eastwards, was more than fulfilled when it had reached the line Halicz-Stanislau. The right wing of the Russian IX. Army had indeed been in retreat since June 9.

Pflanzer-Baltin's army had been forced back behind the Pruth by the Russian counter-offensive in the middle of May, and only at Kolomea did it continue to hold a position somewhat in the nature of a bridge-head on the N. bank. Its line ran from Delatyn, which it enclosed N.E. of Pasieczna to the Perehinsko area, where it touched Linsingen's right. On May 21 the Russians had stopped their advance and entrenched themselves along their whole front: they had some II inf. and 8 cav. divs. as against 8 Austro-Hungarian inf. and 5 cav. divs., with 5 independent brigades. On June 1 they delivered an unsuccessful attack against Pflanzer's left-wing corps under Field-Marshal-Lt. Count Schönburg; and next day they turned against the neighbouring corps, the XIII., S. of Nadworna, which also held its ground. On the 3rd, however, the Russian 2nd Rifle Div. managed to force a passage to the S. bank of the Pruth at Sadzawka, but was thrown back to the Pruth next day, after heavy fighting, by the hastily reënforced Eastern Group under Field-Marshal-Lt. von Czibulka.

In view of the change which had meantime taken place in the situation on the German Southern Army front, the Russians seemed determined to press forward in the direction of Delátyn, in order to secure a fresh success against the VII. Army and to put a stop to the Southern Army's progress. During the whole of the 5th they assailed the 5th Inf. Div. and Czibulka's group with the utmost violence, and forced the latter back to the line Mlodiatyn-Peczeniczyn. By the evening, however, the Austro-Hungarian troops, reënforced by some battalions from the neighbouring groups and by the 8th and 10th Cav. Divs., succeeded in driving them back to the line Kniazdw'or-Mlodiatyn, and in holding this line until the 6th.

At noon on the 4th Pflanzer-Baltin, hearing that the Russian XI. Army was withdrawing on its whole front, issued orders to Count Schönburg, in command of his left-wing group, and to Gen. Baron von Rhemen, commanding the XIII. Corps, to assume the offensive, which would also relieve Czibulka's hard-pressed troops. Schönburg was to advance eastwards with his main body on Bohorodczany, and with his right wing on Solotwina, while Rhemen was directed on Nadworna and Krasna. By the evening Schönburg had succeeded in getting forward to the heights S.E. of Maniawa, and to the line Kryczka-Jablonka-Majdan-Krasna. His advance came to a standstill on the 5th, but by then the flank attack of the Southern Army had begun to make itself felt. During the 6th the Russian attacks on Rhemen's and Czibulka's front entirely ceased, and in front of Schönburg's group rearward movements suggested that the Russian front was about to be withdrawn.

On the 7th Pflanzer-Baltin assumed the offensive all along the line. The Russians were thrown back again over the Pruth at Sadzawka, and the 36th Div. pursued them on to the far bank. The XIII. Corps got well beyond Nadworna, while Schönburg continued his attack in an easterly direction, and by nightfall stood on the Bystrycza Nadwornianska at Grabowice. Marschall's corps took Żablotów, and Korda's XI. Corps and the 5th and 6th Cav. Divs. crossed the Pruth below the confluence of the Czeremosz. On the 8th Schönburg reached the Ottynia area, while Rhemen, Czibulka and Krautwald (III. Corps) reached the line ChlebiczynKorszów-Kamionka Wk.-Gwozdziec and the area E. of Wolczkowce. The right wing was advancing victoriously beyond the Pruth between Czernowitz and Sniatyn.

The 9th saw further successes; the centre and left wing forced the Russians back from the line of heights N.E. of Ottynia and Obertyn and S.W. of Horodenka. At this date Field-Marshal Lt. von Kaiser assumed command in place of Gen. von Marschall, who had been appointed to a command in the Southern Army.

Meantime, however, events on the Southern Army's front had taken an unfavourable turn, which had its repercussion on the operations of the VII. Army. Gerok's corps and the German 5th Cav. Div. had to be detached from the right of the Southern Army to its left, which was in a perilous position. This transfer, together with the fact that Schönburg and Rhemen were pushing eastwards, could not fail to create a gap in the area of Stanislau which would involve considerable danger to the inner wings of the Southern and VII. Armies if the Russians became aware of it in time. The direction of the VII. Army's advance, therefore, had to be changed from E. to N. Schönburg and Rhemen were to move to the_Mariampol-Nizniow area, Czibulka to Potok Zloty, Krautwald to Czernelica, Kaiser to the adjoining Zaleszczycki area, while Korda was to attack in the direction of Toporoutz.

The Russians had meantime resolved on a counter-offensive against the Southern Army. Bothmer's advance in the Zurawno area, the possible loss of the Mikolajow bridge-head, and an advance by the Southern Army in the direction of Lemberg, would have a serious influence on the Russian situation, both in the battle of Przemysl and on the Lower Dniester.

On the 7th the right of the XI. Russian Army reënforced by 2 divisions delivered a series of fierce attacks against Szurmay's group, which were driven back by the 8th to the line Derzów

Bilcze-Medenice. At the same time a similar counter-blow was delivered against Bothmer in the Zurawno area; he held his ground successfully on the 8th, but on the morrow the superiority of the enemy on his front was so overwhelming that he withdrew to his old positions behind the Dniester. Szurmay's group also, attacked on both wings, had again to retire, and was withdrawn to the line Ruda-Tejsarów-Wolica-Letnia-Dobrowlany-Hruszów.

Faced with the urgent necessity of assisting his hard-pressed left wing, Gen. Linsingen left on his right wing before Stanislau and Halicz only Marschall's group and Hofmann's Corps. Gerok's corps (19th Inf. Div. and 38th Honved Inf. Div.) was entrusted with the defence of the Dniester between Ostrów and Zurawno, while Bothmer, with 1st Inf. Div., the 3rd Guards Div., the 48th Reserve Div., and the 40th Honved Inf. Div., counter-attacked from the Salatycze-Zurawno area in the direction of Ruda and Zydaczów. Meanwhile Szurmay's group, covered on its left by the 4th Cav. Div., had, without any assistance from other troops, forced back the enemy to Litynia, and assumed the offensive all along its front.

On the 11th the 1st Inf. Div. stormed Zurawno, and the 3rd Guard and 40th Honved Inf. Div. approached Zydaczów, while Marschall's group repulsed all attacks on Stanislau, and Hofmann's Corps prepared to carry Halicz.

The Russians, however, who had observed all their preparations, were ready with the necessary counter-measures. Reenforced by contingents from the VI. Corps, they made an attempt to break through Szurmay's front along the road to Stryj, but all their attacks failed. On the 4th, reënforced by two new divisions (33rd and 44th) of the XXI. Corps, they again attacked all along the front, and Szurmay's troops had once more to be withdrawn.

Meanwhile, the VII. Army's offensive northwards had met with great success. On the right wing Korda's corps threw the Russians back over the heights of Brdo Horosdyszcze on to the Bessarabian frontier, while Kaiser's group, despite fierce resistance, took the village of Zaleszczyki and reached the N. bank of the Dniester at Zezawa; the centre stormed the heights S. of Czernelica, while Rhemen and Schönburg on the left wing occupied Jezierzany and the area S. of Tysmienica.

On the 12th these two corps crossed the line Tysmienica-Tlumacz, and then moved against the fortifications of Nizniow, which were stormed after a short artillery preparation on the 15th. On this date the S. bank of the Dniester was in German-Austrian possession from Mariampol to Kosmierzyn, where units of the 15th Inf. Div. (XIII. Corps) crossed to the N. bank. After a short but violent resistance the Russians were driven back, and the advance was resumed on Potok Zloty.

Korda's corps on the 12th drove the Russians over the frontier, and pursued them by way of Chotin and Wladiczna to beyond Nowosielica. During the pursuit the 6th Cav. Div. encountered hostile resistance at Raszków, which was quickly overcome. As any further penetration over the frontier, however, involved the danger, not only of being as an isolated advance, unsuccessful, but of opening too wide a gap in the line near Zaleszczycki, the Austro-German front was withdrawn over the frontier on the 15th.

A favourable influence on the situation on the right wing had been exercised by the break-through achieved by Mackensen's Army Group, after the battle of Przemysl, at Mosciska and Lubaczów.

The Break-through at Mosciska and Lubaczów (June 12-15).— After the fall of Przemysl, the armies of Mackensen, Puhallo and Böhm pursued Brussilov's army with rapidly succeeding attacks until June 5. On the heights W. and S.W. of Mosciska, as far as Wielki Bloto on the one hand and on the Middle and Lower Lubaczówka on the other, Brussilov hoped again to hold up the AustroGerman advance. After Mackensen's capture of Starzawa on the 5th the attack came to a standstill before the strong Russian positions. Here, as before Przemysl, the II. Army had recourse to sapping, which by the 12th brought it sufficiently far forward for the assault of the enemy lines.

Mackensen had now assumed command of the IV., XI. and II. Armies; the III. Army had been broken up, its X. and XVII. Corps going to the IV. Army after the fall of Przemysl, and the Beskiden Corps to the II. Army. He determined to make use of the breathingspace for a thorough preparation of the attack. Reserves had to be brought up to strengthen the armies, which in the matter of material also had to be made again fit to take the field by bringing up a sufficient store of munitions and by establishing a new base of supplies. Mackensen's Army Group was organized on June 10 as follows: The IV. Army (Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) stood on the front held by it during the Russian counter-offensive; the VIII. and XIV. Corps on the left wing to S. of Tarnagora; the X. Corps, brought up from the III. Army, extended thence to Stare Miasto, and the IX. Corps from Stare Miasto to the Wislok. S. of that river as far as the heights at the confluence of the Lubaczówka, stood the XVII. Corps, also from the III. Army. The total strength of the Army amounted to 14 inf. and 11⁄2 cav. divs. From the Lower Lubaczówka to S. of Czerniawa by way of Zapalów, E. of Chotyniec and Starzawa, the XI. Army held the line. It was composed from N.W. to S.E. of the combined corps, the German X., XXII. and Guard Corps, the Austro-Hungarian VI. and the German XLI. Corpsin all 14 inf. divs. The positions of Böhm's II. Army, which adjoined it, extended from S. of Czerniawa in a circle W. of and S.W.

or important, any real progress having been checked by the World War, while in the rush to make up for loss of time post-war developments have also been few and far between.

As far as cotton-dyeing is concerned the most striking feature was the continued demand for the fast colours produced by means of vat dyes (indanthrene dyes, thioindigo red, etc.) which were introduced prior to 1914. These colouring matters, of which a wide range is now available, are being extensively used, in spite of their high price, for dyeing casement cloths, warp or weft threads to form the pattern in "grey or unbleached piece goods which are subsequently bleached in the piece, and for the production of the fastest class of work in calico printing. Effects are thus obtained, even in bright colours and tints, in a degree of fastness formerly unknown, and this circumstance should go far to strengthen public confidence in the permanence of high-class coloured cotton goods.

44

1

Of colouring matters produced on the fibre, aniline black 1 is by far the most important, and is used in increasing quantity. This black may be produced on the fibre by different methods, but the one almost universally employed to-day is a modification of Lightfoot's original process patented as long ago as 1863. Commercially known as a copper black," it is obtained by impregnating the material with a liquor containing aniline salt, copper sulphate and chlorate of soda, and, after ageing at a moderate temperature, running the goods through a hot dilute solution of bichromate of soda. This latter treatment constitutes the improvement on Lightfoot's process.

The production of insoluble azo dyes on the fibre, which was originated by Holliday in 1880 and has since been improved upon, is largely employed especially for the brilliant para-nitraniline red, a colour which also lends itself to the production of cheap but very striking resist effects in calico printing. The substitution of the anilide of beta-oxynaphthoic acid (naphthol A.S.) for beta-naphthol in the "prepare may be regarded as a distinct recent advance in this class of dyeing, for the resulting colours are not only fuller and more level but the new colouring matters are tinctorially about twice as strong as those obtained with beta-naphthol. A still further improvement has recently come about by which the number of operations required to produce the colour is reduced to padding and steaming. To this end the fabric is padded with a mixture of naphthol A.S. and a nitrosamine (the nitrosamine obtained from diazotized ortho nitro para-toluidine) and the colour developed by steaming in a rapid ager. It appears likely that this class of colour will have considerable application in the future.

Among the direct cotton colours a complete range is now available (of the benzo fast red and other types) which yield shades of remarkable fastness to light, a property which was rarely shown by earlier representatives of this class of dye. For goods such as casement cloths this property is naturally an advantage, for the colours are not only easier to apply than the vat colours but are considerably cheaper. It should, however, be borne in mind that although they possess fastness to light they are liable to bleed in washing as badly as their predecessors.

Other improvements in cotton-dyeing relate mainly to laboursaving devices in the dyeing of yarn. Dyeing in the cop, "cheese or on the beam (for warps) is more largely practised than formerly and various appliances are employed for the purpose. The principle in all of these is, however, the same, i.e. instead of the yarn being moved about in or passed through the dye liquor, the material to be dyed is held in situ and the dye liquor is caused to percolate evenly by pumping or other suitable contrivance. It is easy to understand that only such colouring matters as can be obtained in perfect solution can be employed for this kind of dyeing. The process requires skilful management to get good results, but if such can be achieved with certainty it not only saves much labour but the yarn remains in a better condition. In hank dyeing and washing the turning of the hanks to ensure uniformity of treatment requires much hand labour. This is now largely dispensed with by the use of suitable machinery for the purpose.

As regards wool-dyeing no great changes have taken place in the ordinary run of bright and most fancy colours, which are mainly got with acid dyes. For blacks and browns and other sombre colours which were formerly dyed almost exclusively with mordant colours (and are still so dyed for the best class of work), two classes of azo dyes have come into prominence which are rendered faster by means of chromate or bichromate of soda. Diamond black may be taken as a type of the first class. The wool is dyed with this colour in the ordinary way in an acid (acetic) bath, and at the end of the operation bichromate of soda is added to the

1 Through an oversight the copper sulphate (10 parts) was omitted in the recipe given in 8.751. The total volume of the liquor (200

bath and the boiling continued for some time, this additional treatment resulting in a considerable improvement in fastness and at the same time darkening the shade. Colouring matters of this type are known in the trade as " after-chrome" colours. The other class comprises the "meta-chrome" colours, and of these meta-chrome brown may be taken as typical. The dye-bath is made up with colouring matter, chromate of soda and ammonium sulphate. When the temperature of the bath approaches the boil ammonia is given off and the bath gradually becomes acid, causing both colouring matter and some of the chromium to be taken up by the fibre.

As in the case of cotton, machine-dyeing is now largely practised in dealing with wool in the loose state, in slubbing and in yarn. Here also a considerable saving in labour is effected and the valuable qualities of the fibre are much better preserved.

As far as silk-dyeing is concerned what changes have occurred are not of sufficient importance to merit special mention here. into the market in ever-increasing quantity, is dyed like cotton, Artificial silk, especially that obtained from viscose which comes but requires more care in manipulation since in the wet condition its tensile strength is considerably diminished.

Effects of the War.-During the years preceding 1914 Great Britain had been drawing roughly nine-tenths of its requirements in coal-tar dyestuffs (about 18,000 tons valued at £2,000,000 annually) from abroad-mainly from Germany. It was therefore clear at the outbreak of war that, unless the deficiency could be made up the British trade in coloured textiles would be severely handicapped as soon as the stocks in hand were exhausted. As manufacturers, colour manufacturers and colour users, styled early as Sept. 1914 a strong committee of British chemical "The Dyewares Supply Enquiry Committee," was inaugurated in Manchester under the auspices of the Society of Dyers and Colourists to discuss ways and means to meet the situation. This committee held numerous meetings at which various recommendations were made, some of which were ultimately taken up by the Board of Trade. The cardinal point which it was sought to elucidate from the start was the wants of the colour users, and to this end it was sought to make a classification of the imports before suggesting any definite course of action. The users were therefore appealed to, but although the majority readily responded several large users, including two of the large combines, refused to coöperate and the whole scheme fell through. The list, which would have been of great use and would not have taken long to compile, was completed and published at the instance of the Board of Trade five years later. In the meantime, stocks had long since become exhausted, and in spite of the enormously increased activity of the English colour makers and of the timely assistance of the Swiss colour works, the supply was nothing like equal to the demand. The enormous profits realized by makers were largely devoted to extending and improving their works, but the prices of dyestuffs-both artificial and natural-nevertheless soared to unheard-of figures. The shortage of dyestuffs was brought home to the public by the miserable quality of the colours in wearing apparel offered for sale. Khaki for the army was dyed on wool mainly with a colouring matter of the meta-chrome series, whereas for cotton the old method (in which chromium and iron salts supply the colour without the use of any dyestuff) was available, but khaki shades were also dyed largely with sulphide colours. Indigo for navy clothing was not available in sufficient amount to go round, and its place was taken on wool by an azo dye known as coomassie blue. For indigo-blue shades on cotton sulphide blues were mainly employed.

2

The principal makers of coal-tar colours in England in 1914 included the following firms: Ivan Levinstein & Co., Blackley, Manchester; Read Holliday & Co., Huddersfield; Claus & Co., Droylsden; The Clayton Aniline Co., Manchester (owned by a Basle firm and mainly concerned with intermediates); The British Alizarine Co. of Silvertown; a works at Bromborough owned by a combine of three German colour works, and a works at Ellesmere Port owned by another German combine. The two latter were sequestrated by the Board of Trade and subsequently disposed of

2

Seeing that the Swiss colour makers were likely to help the British textile industry out of their dilemma, the German Government stopped supplies of raw materials to Switzerland, and these were sent from England on the understanding that an equivalent