ALTERATION OF BOUNDARIES. SECTION 13. Unless the constitution of the State otherwise provides, a State legislature has authority to extend or limit the boundaries of a county, enlarge or diminish its area, divide the same into two or more counties, or consolidate two or more counties into one. State constitutions, however, very frequently contain provisions limiting the area of counties, each to a certain number of square miles, and inhibiting the reduction of counties below that amount and forbidding the taking of any territory from any county less than the prescribed area, and where a State constitution thus prescribes the area of counties, an act of the legislature diminishing such area is unconstitutional and may be treated as null and void by a county court." REQUIREMENT OF SUBMISSION OF QUESTION TO POPULAR VOTE. SECTION 14. Many of our State constitutions contain a provision that the legislature shall not abolish, divide, consolidate, or annex territory to counties or change their boundaries without submitting the proposed act to the voters of the territory to be affected for their approval. The Ill. Const., See 11 Cyc., page 349, and numerous decisions cited. "Counties are public corporations, and can be changed, modified, enlarged, restrained, or repealed, to suit the ever varying exigencies of the State-they are completely under legislative control. Coles vs. The County of Madison, 1 Ill., 154. Woods vs. Henry, 55 Mo., 560. Under the Ill. Const. of 1848, it is provided, that no new county shall be formed by the general assembly, which will reduce the county or counties from which it shall be taken to less than four hundred square miles, nor shall any county be formed of less contents, nor shall any line thereof pass within less than ten miles of any county seat of the county or counties proposed to be divided. People ex. rel. Stephenson vs. Marshall, judge of Twelfth Judicial Circuit, 12 Ill., 391. 1870, under Article X, contains the following provisions: "Section 2. No county shall be divided, or have any part stricken therefrom, without submitting the question to a vote of the people of the county, nor unless a majority of all the legal voters of the county, voting on the question, shall vote for the same." "Section 3. There shall be no territory stricken from any county, unless a majority of the voters living in such territory shall petition for such division; and no territory shall be added to any county without the consent of the majority of the voters of the county to which it is proposed to be added." POWERS AND EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS. SECTION 15. Counties, as has been shown, are mere political divisions of the territory of the State, as a convenient mode of exercising the political, executive, and judicial powers of the State. All their powers are conferred and duties imposed by the legislature and statutes of the State. Were it not for constitutional restrictions, the legislature might change county seats at pleasure, or it might alter and change county lines, and even abolish counties and create new ones to suit public convenience or interest. The general rule seems to be, that counties can only exercise such powers as are granted by express words and those powers which are necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and those powers essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient but indispensable." Rock Island County vs. Sage, 88 Harris vs. Board of Suprs. of WHO TO EXERCISE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT. SECTION 16. The corporate powers of a county are ordinarily exercised by a board of county commissioners or county supervisors, who represent the county in the management and control of its property and financial interests. The law is well settled, that courts will not interfere with such boards in the lawful exercise of the jurisdiction committed to them by law, on the sole ground that their actions are characterized by lack of wisdom or sound discretion.10 The principle is well established, that where an inferior tribunal, as a board of county commissioners or supervisors, is invested by law with authority to decide any matter that may be submitted to it, it cannot be compelled to decide a given question, one way or the other. Such a tribunal may be compelled to act, but how it shall decide a given case is always a matter for its judgment, and with the exercise of which no other tribunal or court may interfere." The decisions of county ooards and supervisors in the exercise of their judicial discretion are ordinarily conclusive, and not subject to control or review, unless there is a clear abuse of such discretion, or evidence of fraud or collusion." ORDINARY CORPORATE POWERS OF COUNTIES. SECTION 17. (1) To sue and be sued. A county could neither sue nor be sued at common law, and it is only by virtue of statutory authority that 10 Monroe County vs. Strong, 78 Miss., 565; Platter vs. Elkhart "The People ex rel. vs. McCormick "State vs. Prince, 45 Wis., 610; State vs. Tippecanoe County, 131 Ind., 90; Walton vs. Greenwood, 60 Me., 356. an action can be maintained by it or against it; being merely a part of the State government, it partakes of the State's immunity from liability. The State is not liable, except by its own consent; and so the county is exempt from liability, unless the State has consented.18 The liabilities of counties, whether grounding in tort or contract, are the mere creatures of statutes; and they possess no power, and can incur no obligations, except such as are specially provided for by statute. In the absence of statute there is no county liability." SECTION 18. (2) To take and hold real and personal property within their respective limits for county purposes. Counties possess only such powers respecting the acquisition of real estate as are given them either expressly or impliedly by statute, and they are generally given power by statutory enactment to acquire and hold both real and personal estate for the public use of the county.15 SECTION 19. (3) To make contracts. Counties are corporations to the extent that they may lawfully enter into contracts through their authorized officers or agents, usually the board of county commissioners, with the limitation that the officers or agents of a county cannot bind the county by any contract beyond the scope of its lawful powers or foreign to its purpose. The law is well settled, that all persons dealing with officers or agents of counties are bound to ascertain the limits of their authority or power as fixed by statutory or organic law, and are Browning vs. City of Springfield, 17 Ill., 142. Granger vs. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark., 37; Russell vs. Men of Devon, As the power of a county to ac quire and hold real estate is purely statutory, the mode to be pursued as provided in the statutes, must be strictly followed. chargeable with knowledge of such limits, and such officers or agents cannot bind the county unless strictly within the limits so imposed.10 SECTION 20. (4) To borrow money. The weight of authority upholds the doctrine, that counties being the creatures of statute, that the power to borrow money and issue bonds will not be implied, but must be expressly granted to authorize its exercise. The mode by which a county may exact from its people funds needful for lawful expenses of the county, the purpose for which said funds may be expended, and the manner of its disbursement from the county treasury, are defined and regulated by statute.17 The statutes or constitutions of many of the states expressly limit the amount of the indebtedness counties may contract, and in some jurisdictions, an affirmative vote of the people of the county is required to authorize the borrowing of money.' 18 COUNTY AID IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF RAILROADS OR OTHER WORKS OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT. SECTION 21. It was at one time a matter of grave controversy among courts of the highest respectability, whether furnishing aid to the building of railroads was so far a corporate purpose that a municipal corporation could, even in pursuance of express legislative authority, lawfully issue its bonds or incur indebtedness in futherance of such purpose. 16 11 Cyc., pages 467 and 468. 17 Power to borrow money is not an incident to local political government, and upon principle a county cannot exercise it in the absence of express authority of law so to do. Hewitt vs. School Dist., 94 Ill., 528; Law vs. The People, 87 Ill., 385; Newgass vs. New Orleans, 21 Amer. St. Rep., 368; County of Hardin vs. McFarlan, 82 Ill., 138. 18 See numerous cases cited in 11 Cyc., page 503, footnotes, |