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of the word, or absolutely, impart them, though it may enable the mind to draw them forth, as the word implies, and to recognize them as something congenial to its own nature-in fact, as truth, commanding its implicit assent, immediately they are fairly brought under its notice.

SECT. II.

Of the primary elements of Reasoning.

From the preceding considerations, it will follow, that all enlargement of the mind, all improvement of its capacities, all real knowledge, must consist, and can only consist, in the evolution of its own powers, as these are severally acted upon by external things, or by external qualities of mind in others. For as external material things have a congruity to the natural senses, and vice versa, the eye to light, the ear to sounds, the tongue to sweets, the smell to per fumes; so the qualities or manifestations of mind in our fellow creatures, as gratitude, humanity, justice, honesty, sincerity, temperance, modesty, and their opposites, have a congruity to certain innate powers in us, affecting us with pleasure or pain, love or aversion, the sense of good or ill desert, and many other feelings common to our nature. But it is a low and degrading idea to suppose that the cultiva

tion of mental power consists in the mind being as it were mechanically filled with its thoughts or emotions from without, as jewels are placed in a casket; or in its being ornamented with outward resemblances and images, as figures are represented in a looking-glass. This analogy may at first sight appear plausible, for on abstruse subjects we are willing to lay hold of any analogy that may seem calculated to explain even part of the difficulty; but, if it is examined, it will be found not to have one particle of the analogy of nature; and therefore to be false and to lead to erroneous conclusions. Knowledge has no relation whatever either on the one hand to empty shadows, or, on the other, to the gross materials of a cabinet. For, real substantial knowledge in the mind, must be as unlike any thing received from without, or discovered without, except in the minds of others; as a piece of bread is unlike a living muscular fibre, or as air, earth, and water, are, in themselves, unlike the living organized system of a plant. What is communicated from without, may, indeed, be assimilated by intellectual labour, till it constitute effective and substantial truth or knowledge; as air, earth, and water, with the aid of heat and light, may be subdued and assimilated by the power of vegetation to the very nature and substance of the plant. Neither perception, nor memory can do this. The mere act of treasuring ideas in the memory does not add a single iota to the real intellectual power of the mind.

This observation, I apprehend, to be intimately connected in principle with that theory of original seeds or elements of thought in the mind, which I am disposed to maintain. I shall now subjoin a few illustrations.

On this head the language of Boyle is particularly appropriate: because he does not argue for one opinion more decidedly than another; I shall, therefore, give several extracts from his writings.

"God hath made us men of a limited nature in general, and of a bounded capacity; and accordingly hath furnished man either with certain innate ideas or models, and principles; or with a faculty or power and disposition easily to frame them, as it meets with occasions to excite them. But, because God intended the mind of man of a limited capacity, his understanding is so constituted, that the inbred or easily acquired ideas, and primitive axioms, wherewith it is furnished, and by relation or analogy whereto, it judges of all other notions and propositions, do not extend to all knowable objects whatsoever; but reach only to such as have a sufficient affinity, or bear some proportion to those primary ideas and rules of truth; which are sufficient, if duly improved, to help us to attain, though not the perfect knowledge of truth of the highest order, yet the competent knowledge of as much Truth, as God thought fit to allow our minds, in their present state of union with our bodies."

"The innate light of the rational faculty, is more

primary than the very rules of reasoning." "There are some things which the intellect usually judges of in a kind of organical way;—that is, by the help of certain rules or hypotheses”—“ but there are others which it knows, without the help of these rules, more immediately and, as it were, intuitively, by evidence or perception.' "And it seems

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to me that the internal light which the Author of nature has set up in the mind of man, qualifies him, if he makes a right use of it, not only to apply the instruments of knowledge, but also to frame and examine them.'

It cannot be doubted that the preceding passage applies exclusively to the elements of reason: as does the following from Sir Matthew Hale. I have already taken notice of the analogy drawn by this writer

* See Boyle's works abridged by Shaw, vol. 2, pages 201, 206, 209, and 220.

"The rational soul that is already furnished with primitive ideas and rules of true and false"-in other words, "when duly excited, is furnished with a light that may enable her to judge, even of many of those original notions, by which she judges of other things." "For, by the help of this light, the understanding is enabled to look about, and both to consider apart, and compare together, the nature of all kinds of things; without being necessitated to employ in its speculations, the rules, or dictates of any particular science, or discipline; being sufficiently assisted by its own light, and those axioms and notions, that are of a general nature, and perpetual truths; and so of a higher order than the dictates or rules of any particular or subordinate science."

"These are supposed to be connate-and are assented to upon their own account, without needing any medium or discursive act to prove them: because, that, as soon as they are plainly proposed to the understanding they discover themselves to be true so manifestly by their own light, that they want no proposition to make the understanding acquiesce in them.”

Foyle's works abridged, vol. 2. p. 201–206.

between human and brute instincts. He says that "as there are animal instincts in brutes, directing them to what is useful and convenient to the sensible life; so there are engraven in the soul certain rational instincts; implanted and connatural anticipations, antecedent to any discursive ratiocination;-which, though they are not so distinct and explicit as the former (those of brutes) yet they are secret biases whereby it is disposed, and inclined to the good and convenience proportiouable to a rational and intellectual life." Besides this, Sir Matthew Hale considers that each individual has a certain congenite stock of rational sentiments and inclinations; implying that he has original instincts determining him to such a way of life as is suitable to his nature.”* And he observes, that "the high exercise of ratiocination might evince the truth and excellency of these connatural principles, because they are in themselves highly reasonable, though there were no such originally inscribed in the mind. But this no more concludes against the supposition, (of their being originally inscribed), than it would conclude against the supposition of implanted instincts in brutes."+ See page 62.

* Hale Prim. orig. sect. 1. ch. 2.

+ In the 4th section, the same idea is expressed in other words:"As we find in the sensitive natures certain congenite or connatural instincts, whereby they are secretly and powerfully biassed, and inclined, and carried to their proper sensitive good"-" so there seems to be lodged in the intellective and rational nature certain rudiments and tendencies whereby they are carried to the good of an intellectual life,

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