the Crown or the Lord Lieutenant, or two justices of the peace for the county in which the meeting is (s. 1).

It is not quite clear whether this provision creates a substantive misdemeanor, or whether it merely defines the general elements of the two offences next to be described.

Persons who attend such a meeting to train or drill others, or who train or drill others at such meeting, or assist to do so, are guilty of felony, and punishable by penal servitude, from three to seven years, or imprisonment for not over two years, with or without hard labour (60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 1, s. 1; 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1).

Persons attending to be drilled or trained, etc., or being trained or drilled, etc., are guilty of misdemeanor, and punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not over two years, with or without hard labour (60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 1, s. 1; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1).

It is said that this offence is not triable at Quarter Sessions (5 & 6 Viet. c. 38, s. 1 (16); Archbold, Cr. Pl., 23rd ed., 1007); but the Act itself (s. 2) speaks of committal for trial at Quarter Sessions.

Prosecutions must be commenced within six months of the offence (60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 1, s. 7). But it is not essential to state in the indictment the date of the offence (R. v. Hunt, 1848, 3 Cox C. C. 215). The offences under the Act are alternative to any other offence constituted by, or incidental to, the particular unlawful meeting (60 Geo. III, and 1 Geo. IV. c. 1, s. 4; 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 33).

Meetings forbidden under the Act may be dispersed by justices or the police, and persons present may be arrested or detained without warrant. An arresting justice may commit the offenders to the assizes, unless sufficient bail is given (60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 1).

Indictments on this Act have been rare in England, and since the Chartist riots of 1848, almost, if not quite, unknown. (See R. v. Hunt, 1848, 3 Cox C. C. 215.)

Illegal drilling has been of far more frequent occurrence in Ireland than in England (Gogarty v. R., 1849, 3 Cox C. C. 306).

Drinking Fountains. - Drinking fountains for the gratuitous supply of drinking water to persons or animals in the public streets have usually been provided by private benefactions; and when provided have been vested in trustees for the public benefit. Where not so vested, but given to, or used by, the public prior to 1875, they are vested in the local authority of the district (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, 8. 64).

The local authority may cause such works to be maintained and plentifully supplied with pure and wholesome water; or may substitute for them and supply other such works equally convenient. In London, similar powers are given to the sanitary authorities of different districts, who are further empowered to provide and maintain public wells, pumps, and drinking fountains in such convenient and suitable situations as they may deem proper (54 & 55 Vict. c. 76, s. 51). Outside London there seems to be no express power for a local authority to erect drinking fountains, but merely a power to maintain fountains already existing, and to keep them supplied. Where fountains are vested in trustees or private individuals, those persons must provide the requisite water. They cannot require the local authority to procure a supply or provide it gratuitously.

Driving.-Penalty on furious driving (see 5 & 6 Will. iv. c. 50, s. 78; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 35); omnibus or stage carriage driver in the county of London (see 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 28; 13 & 14 Vict. c. 7; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115); regulations as to drivers within the Metropolitan police district (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 54); driving cattle, or more than four horses at once, or a cart laden with timber, ladders, etc., exceeding 35 ft. in length, except between 10 A.M. and 7 P.M., in specified places in the Metropolitan police district (30 & 31 Vict. c. 134, ss. 7, 16). (See also NEGLIGENT DRIVING.)

Droit d'angarie is the right to detain, to use, and even, if necessary, to destroy property belonging to neutral States in time of actual warfare. All jurists recognise this as an undoubted belligerent right-Hall, De Martens, and Bluntschli, without any reservations; but Heffter and others seem unwilling to admit a principle justly regarded by them as a great curtailment of neutral rights. In practice, the right of angary was sanctioned by both England and Austria during the Franco-German war, the former in the case of the German seizure of English vessels required for the blocking-up of the Seine, and the latter in the case of some Austrian rolling-stock which was seized and converted into use, though subsequently restored.

[Authorities.-Hall, International Law, Oxford, 1904, p. 737; Bluntschli, Droit Int. Codifié, trans. Lardy, Paris, 1886; Heffter, Droit International, s. 150, trans. Bergson, Paris, 1883.]

Droit d'aubaine was the right of the French sovereign to attach the movable and immovable property of an alien dying in France, notwithstanding the claims of the alien's testamentary, legal, or ab-intestate successors. It was abolished in 1819.

Droits of Admiralty.-See ADMIRALTY, THE (Vol. I. p. 192).

Drover.-See DRIVING and SUNDAY. A special penalty is imposed on a drover found drunk on a highway, by sec. 12 of the Licensing Act, 1872, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94.

Drowning.-See MURDER; SUICIDE.

Druggist. See CHEMIST.

Drugs. See ADULTERATION; POISON.

Drunkenness.-The law as to the civil capacity of drunkards is identical with the law as to the civil capacity of insane persons. The whole subject is discussed in the article LUNACY. Here it may suffice to cite a few leading authorities-Molton v. Camroux, 1848, 2 Ex. Rep. 487; 1849, 4 ibid. 17 (which must now be compared with Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, [1892] 1 Q. B. 599 (contract)); Matthews v. Baxter, 1873, L. R. 8 Ex. 132; and see Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 2; Co. Rep. iv. 123 (b), n., and Ayrey v. Hill, 1824, 2 Add. 209 (testamentary capacity, where the evidence to be adduced in such cases is discussed); and ep. the American cases of Peck v. Carey, 1863, 27 N. Y. 9, and Julke v. Adam, 1863, N. Y. Surr. 1, Redf. 454.

The law as to the criminal responsibility of drunkards differs from

that as to the criminal responsibility of insane persons, or, at least, presents special features which must be briefly examined here. According to Coke (Co. Litt. 247), the drunkard (whom he described as voluntarius damon, the state being dementia affectata) has no privilege in consequence of his condition, "but what hurt or ill soever he doeth, his drunkennesse doth aggravate it." Hale (P. C. 32) restated this proposition in a more accurate form, namely, that a person suffering from this voluntarily contracted madness "shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses," and admitted the existence of two "allays "(1) temporary frenzy induced by the unskilfulness of a physician, etc.; (2) habitual or fixed frenzy, caused by drunkenness.

In R. v. Grindlay, 1819, cit. 1 Russ. on Crimes, 6th ed., 144, Holroyd, J., said that drunkenness might properly be considered by a jury where the question is whether the prisoner's act was premeditated or not. This dictum was, however, disapproved of in R. v. Carroll, 1835, 1 Car. & P. 145, and according to R. v. Meakin, 1836, ibid. 297, would be peculiarly erroneous where a prisoner employed a dangerous or deadly weapon. It has, however, met with some degree of recognition in Scotland. Drunkenness may be material, however, to the question whether there was capacity to form a particular criminal intent; cp. R. v. Cruse, 1838, 8 Car. & P. 541; R. v. Monkhouse, 1849, 4 Cox C. C. 55; R. v. Doherty, 1887, 16 Cox C. C. 306; R. v. Moore, 1852, 3 Car. & Kir. 319.

Drunkenness is also a factor of which a jury may take account where a prisoner acted in self-defence (R. v. Gamlen, 1858, 1 F. & F. 90), or under provocation (R. v. Monkhouse, supra; R. v. Thomas, 1837, 7 Car. & P. 817; Pearson's Case, 1835, 2 Lew. C. C. 144; Burrow's Case, 1823, 1 Lew. C. C. 75; Marshall's Case, 1830, ibid. 76; Goodier's Case, 1831, ibid. n.). In Rennie's Case, 1825, 1 Lew. C. C. 76, and in R. v. Davis, 1881, 14 Cox C. C., per Stephen, J., at p. 564, it was laid down that drunkenness is no excuse for crime unless the mental derangement arising from it is fixed and continuous. But this ruling has been departed from at Nisi Prius (ep. R. v. Baines, Times, Jan. 1, 1886, per Day, J.). Involuntary drunkenness, resulting from a temporarily diseased condition, will exempt a prisoner from responsibility; cp. R. v. Mary R., 1887, cit. Kerr's Inebriety, 2nd ed., p. 395; and R. v. Mountain, April 1888, Leeds Assizes, per Pollock, B.-both, however, Nisi Prius cases. See further HABITUAL DRUNKARD; INEBRIATES ACTS; INTOXICATING LIQUORS; LICENSING; POLICE.

[Authorities.-Russ. on Crimes; Pope on Lunacy, 2nd ed.; Wood Renton on Lunacy, pp. 911-913.]

Dry Rent. Another name for rent seck, which was a rent issuing out of land, and which was so called because it could not be distrained for. As such rents were, however, made distrainable by 4 Geo. II. c. 28, s. 5, the term has now no meaning; rents since that statute being divisible into (1) chief rents, (2) rent charges, and (3) rents incident to a reversion. [Hood and Challis, Conveyancing and Settled Land Acts, 6th ed., p. 125.]

Due. As the effect of the Statute of Limitation is only to bar the remedy for a debt, and not to destroy it, the debt still remains "due." So where an order obtained on the application of the judgment debtor himself directed an account of what was "due" to his judgment

creditor, it was held that the debtor could not avail himself of the statute, although he might have used it as a defence to proceedings taken against him by the creditor (Ex parte Cawley, 1889, 34 S. J. 29).

Where a testator directed his executors "to forgive to any tenant all rent or arrears of rent which may be due and owing from him at the time of my decease," it was held that the effect of this direction was to forgive to the tenant the rent due at the quarter day preceding the testator's death, and that the Apportionment Act, 1870, did not affect the bequest so as to entitle the tenant to be forgiven the rent down to the date of the testator's death (In re Lucas; Parish v. Hudson, 1885, 55 L. J. Ch. 101).

Where an operative is engaged on a weekly hiring, and he or she leaves work before the end of the week, no wages are "due" within sec. 11 of the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875; it is otherwise if the operative is employed to do piece-work (Warburton v. Heyworth, 1880, 6 Q. B. D. 1).

The word "due" may mean either owing or payable, and what it means is determined by the context (per Jessel, M.R., in In re Stockton Malleable Iron Co., 1875, 2 Ch. D. 101). See Stroud, Jud. Dict.

Due Attestation.-See ATTESTATION; BILLS OF SALE.

Due Cause.-As to removal of official liquidator under sec. 93 of the Companies Act, 1862, on "due cause shown," see Vol. III., P. 343.

Due Course.-As to the holder of a bill of exchange "in due course," see Vol. II. p. 207.

Due Course of Administration.-As to, see Scott v. Moore, 1844, 13 L. J. Ch. 283.

Due Diligence.-As to meaning of in sec. 32 of the Patents Act, 1883, see article PATENTS.

Due Inquiry.—“Due inquiry" must be made before the General Medical Council can, under sec. 29 of the Medical Act, 1858, direct the registrar to erase a practitioner's name from the medical register for professional misconduct. As to meaning of, see Allbutt v. General Medical Council, 1889, 23 Q. B. D. 400; Leeson v. General Medical Council, 1889, 43 Ch. D. 366; Allinson v. General Medical Council, [1894] 1 Q. B. 750.

Due Regard.-The Charity Commissioners, in dealing with a scheme which abolishes or modifies any privileges or educational advantages to which a particular class of persons are entitled, must, by sec. 11 of the Endowed Schools Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 56, have "due regard" to the educational interests of such class of persons; and a similar duty is imposed by sec. 5 of the Endowed Schools Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 87. Any substantial privilege adapted to the altered construction of the school, given to the particular class of persons in lieu of the privileges abolished, is a compliance with the direction to have “due regard" to their interests (In re Hemsworth Free Grammar School, 1887, 12 App. Cas. 444; see also In re Hodgson's School, 1878, 3 App. Cas. 857;

In re Sutton Coldfield Grammar School, 1881, 7 App. Cas. 91; Ross v. Charity Commissioners, 1882, 7 App. Cas. 463). The powers of the Charity Commissioners under these Acts were transferred to the Board of Education by Order in Council dated August 11, 1902 (Stat. R. & O., Rev. 1904, vol. iv., “Education" (England), p. 6).

Duel.-In English law the duel is known in two senses:

1. As a form of judicial combat the duel was legal until 1819. See BATTLE, TRIAL BY. At present the title and functions of the ancient office of royal champion, still held by the Dymokes of Scrivelsby, are the sole remaining vestiges of this mode of testing legal rights.

2. Theoretically the English law has always refused to recognise as legal any form of duel, except that above mentioned, carried on under the forms of law. Jousts and tournaments, even those held under royal sanction or patronage, were condemned as unlawful (R. v. Coney, 1882, 8 Q. B. D. 534, 549, see Stephen, J.). Killing men in CHANCE MEDLEY (q.v.), i.e. on a sudden quarrel, was also illegal.

James I., while only King of Scots, had passed a law (Scots Acts, 1600, c. 12, and see 1696, c. 35, both repealed in 1819, 59 Geo. III. c. 70) making it murder to kill a man in a duel held without royal sanction. Immediately on his accession to the English Crown he procured the passing of the Statute of Stabbing (1 Jac. I. c. 8) against killing, even on sudden provocation, with daggers: an Act said to have been due not merely to the personal aversion of that king to cold steel, but also, and chiefly, to the propensities of his Scotch retainers (see Foster, Cr. Law, 2nd ed., 297). In 1613 he issued a royal edict (Inner Temple Tracts, 11 K. 3) against private combats in the field on challenge, whether within or without the realm-and against the combatants, their seconds, accomplices, and adherents. This ediet, and the Star Chamber decree on the subject, Jan. 26, 1614 (Spedding's Bacon, iv. 409), never had the force of law, but from their issue may be dated the continuous and finally successful hostility of the King's Courts (see 3 Co. Inst. 158; R. v. Tavernier, 1629, 3 Bulst. 172) to all forms of duelling, from which it results that though the word "duel" is only once named in the statute book, every step towards or during a duel is an indictable offence, and a duel is not regarded as an affair of honour, but as an unlawful assembly in cold blood for the purpose of assault with lethal weapons to avenge some insult or settle some quarrel.

(a) Sending a challenge to fight a duel is incitement to a breach of the peace, or an unlawful assembly (3 Co. Inst. 158; 1 Russ. on Crimes, 6th ed., vol. i. 593; R. v. Master, 1848, 5 Cox C. C. 356). Carrying the challenge where the messenger is not an innocent agent is the same offence (R. v. Morgan, 1780, 1 Doug. 314; R. v. Young, 1835, 4 Nev. & M. (K. B.) 850). Provoking a man by speech or writing to fight a duel (apart from any question of defamation) is an offence of the like nature (Rot. Parl. (11 Hen. IV.), vol. iii. pp. 630, 632; R. v. Philipps, 1805, 6 East, 464; 5 R. R. 712; and cp. R. v. Adams, 1888, 22 Q. B. D. 66; Steph. Dig. Cr. Law, 6th ed., p. 54). This was a Star Chamber matter (see A.-G. v. Kelly, 1632, Star Ch. Cas. Camden Society Publ., p. 112). In the case of the commission of any of these offences the person challenged instead of indicting the offender may swear the peace on him. See ARTICLES OF PEACE.

(b) If a duel takes place in a public place it is an AFFRAY (Russ. on Crimes, 6th ed., vol. i. 588).