of the donor perfects it (In re Griffin, [1899] 1 Ch. 408). The passing of the donee's name on the Stock Exchange as transferee of stocks and shares constitutes a perfect gift of them, though the donor dies before the transfers are executed (In re Smith, 84 L. T. 335).]

Where the gift is intended to take effect by way of transfer, the donor must have done all in his power to divest himself of the property which he has in the subject-matter of the gift, and to vest it in the donee.

Thus the gift of chattels passing by delivery, if not made by deed, must be completed by delivery (Cochrane v. Moore, 1890, 25 Q. B. D. 57; Kilpin v. Ratley, [1892] 1 Q. B. 582).

If the property can only pass by deed, there must be a deed to complete the gift; for instance, the delivery of a policy of assurance by way of gift to a donee passes no interest in the policy moneys, but only the right to the paper upon which the policy is written (Barton v. Gainer, 1858, 3 H. & N. 387; Rummens v. Hare, 1876, 1 Ex. D. 169).

And delivery of a title-deed deposited with the donor by way of equitable charge passes no right either to the charge or to the deed (In re Richardson; Shillito v. Hobson, 1885, 30 Ch. D. 396).

Apparently a voluntary assignment of a debt secured by mortgage without a transfer of the securities is incomplete, though the effect may be to give a right of action against the donor, if he afterwards gets in the debts (Woodford v. Charnley, 1860, 28 Beav. 96; 54 E. R. 302; Bizzey v. Flight, 1876, 24 W. R. 957; In re Patrick; Bills v. Tatham, [1891] 1 Ch. 82).

A voluntary assignment by deed of a reversionary equitable interest is effectual (Kekewich v. Manning, 1851, 1 De G., M. & G. 176; 42 E. R. 519; Donaldson v. Donaldson, 1854, Kay, 711; 69 E. R. 303; In re Way's Trusts, 1864, 2 De G., J. & S. 365; 46 E. R. 416).

But a mere voluntary charge on a reversionary interest rests in contract only, and cannot be enforced (In re Earl of Lucan; Hardinge v. Cobden, 1890, 45 Ch. D. 470).

There is some doubt whether, where property is vested in trustees for a donor, an assignment by the donor of his equitable interest is effective, if the legal title is not also vested in the donee (Bridge v. Bridge, 1852, 16 Beav. 315; 51 E. R. 800; Beech v. Keep, 1854, 18 Beav. 285; 52 E. R. 113).

A voluntary assignment of a debt is complete without notice to the debtor (Fortescue v. Barnett, 1834, 3 Myl. & K. 36; 40 E. R. 14; 41 R. R. 5; Donaldson v. Donaldson, 1854, Kay, 711; 69 E. R. 303).

If the gift is intended to take effect through the medium of a trust, and the subject-matter is lands, tenements, or hereditaments, the trust must, having regard to the Statute of Frauds, be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the beneficial owner (see 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 7; Kronheim v. Johnson, 1877, 7 Ch. D. 60).

A trust of personalty may be created by parol (M'Fadden v. Jenkyns, 1842, 1 Ph. 153; 41 E. R. 589; 65 R. R. 354; Peckham v. Taylor, 1862, 31 Beav. 250; 54 E. R. 1134).

As a general rule, a gift, if complete, is not revocable at the pleasure of the donor, but there is an exception to the rule in the case of voluntary assignments for the purpose of paying the assignor's debts. In those cases the Court will examine the circumstances for the purpose of ascertaining whether the motive of the assignor was to benefit his creditors or to promote his own convenience. In the latter case, so long as the deed has not been communicated to the creditors, it is revocable

(Garrard v. Lord Lauderdale, 1830, 3 Sim. 1; 57 E. R. 901; 30 R. R. 105; Smith v. Hurst, 1851, 10 Hare, 30; 68 E. R. 826; New Prance & Garrard's Trustee v. Hunting, [1892] 2 Q. B. 19).

Formerly a voluntary conveyance of land was liable to be defeated by a subsequent sale by the donor for valuable consideration, but this liability has been removed by the Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 21. As to the avoidance of voluntary settlements on bankruptcy, see Vol. II. p. 40. See also GIFT.

Donatio mortis causa is a gift made in contemplation of death, and upon condition that it is to take effect only in case of the death of the donor. The condition need not be expressed. The Court infers it if the gift is made in contemplation of death, and there is nothing to show a contrary intention. If the donor recovers, the gift is revoked (Tate v. Hilbert, 1793, 2 Ves. Jun. 111; 30 E. R. 548; 2 R. R. 175; Gardner v. Parker, 1818, 3 Madd. 184; 56 E. R. 478; 18 R. R. 213; Edwards v. Jones, 1836, 1 Myl. & Cr. 226; 40 E. R. 361; 43 R. R. 178). Therefore an absolute and irrevocable gift cannot be a donatio mortis causâ (Edwards v. Jones, 1836, 1 Myl. & Cr. 226; 40 E. R. 361; 43 R. R. 178).

[A gift may be good as a donatio mortis causâ, although coupled with a trust or condition that the donee shall provide the funeral of the donor. Such a circumstance, however, affords a very strong argument that the deceased did not intend to make a donatio mortis causâ, but only to make the defendant his executor under a nuncupative will (Hills v. Hills, 8 M. & W. 401; Treasury (Solicitor to) v. Lewis, [1900] 2 Ch. 872).]

To constitute a good donatio mortis causâ there must be delivery of the subject-matter of the gift to the donee or to some person on his behalf, though an antecedent delivery, alio intuitu, is sufficient (Powell v. Hellicar, 1858, 26 Beav. 261; 53 E. R. 898; Cain v. Moore, [1896] 1 Q. B. 283).

[The gift of a box containing share certificates and other valuables, where the donor retains the key of the box, is not a good donatio mortis causá (In re Johnson, 1905, 92 L. T. 357).]

As to what property may be the subject-matter of a donatio mortis causâ, it is not easy to deduce any principle from the cases. It is plain that the subject-matter may be of such a kind that the property does. not pass to the donee by delivery, but no general principle can be laid down as to what may or may not be given. It was said in In re William Hughes (1888, 36 W. R. 821) that the subject of donationes mortis causâ must be things the title to which, or the evidences of title to which, passes by delivery.

The following have been held capable of being the subject-matter of a donatio mortis causa:—(a) Coin and banknotes (Lawson v. Lawson, 1718, 1 P. Wms. 441; 24 E. R. 463; Miller v. Miller, 1735, 3 P. Wms. 356; 24 E. R. 1099; Shanley v. Harvey, 1762, 2 Eden. 126; 28 E. R.. 844); (b) bonds and mortgage deeds (Gardner v. Parker, 1818, 3 Madd. 184; 56 E. R. 478; 18 R. R. 213; Duffield v. Elwes, 1827, 1 Bli. N. S. 497; 4 E. R. 959; 30 R. R. 69; Merideth v. Watson, 1853, 17 Jur. 1063; In re Patterson, 1864, 10 Jur. N. S. 578); (c) bills of exchange, promissory notes, and cheques payable to the donor's order and not endorsed (Rankin v. Wegulein, 1829, 27 Beav. 309; 54 E. R. 121; Veal y. Veal, 1859, 27 Beav. 303; In re Mead; Austin v. Mead, 1880, 15 Ch. D. 651;

Clement v. Cheesman, 1884, 27 Ch. D. 631); [as to the gift of a cheque not cashed in the donor's life, see In re Beaumont, [1902] 1 Ch. 889, and authorities there cited]; (d) deposit-receipts, though stated to be not transferable (Amis v. Witt, 1863, 33 Beav. 610; 55 E. R. 509; Moore v. Moore, 1874, L. R. 18 Eq. 474; Cassidy v. Belfast Banking Co., 1887, 22 L. R. Ir. 68; In re Dillon; Duffin v. Duffin, 1890, 44 Ch. D. 76); (e) a policy on the donor's life (Amis v. Witt, 1861, 1 B. & S. 109); [(ƒ) a Post Office Savings Bank book (In re Weston, [1902]1 Ch. 680); but not of a deposit invested by a savings bank in Government stock, even though the certificate investment be given also (In re Andrews, [1902] 2 Ch.394). The Irish Court of Appeal have held that an I. O. U. cannot be the subject of a donatio mortis causá (Duckworth v. Lee, [1899] 1 Ir. R. 405).]

On the other hand, an instrument which forms no part of the title to property cannot take effect as a donatio mortis causâ of the property. Thus, a receipt for South Sea Annuities, which was apparently a document forming no part of the title to the annuities, did not operate as a donatio mortis causá of the annuities. And this principle has been extended to scrip certificates for railway stock (Ward v. Turner, 1751, 2 Ves. 431; 28 E. R. 275; Moore v. Moore, 1874, L. R. 18 Eq. 474; see also In re Mead, Austin v. Mead, 1880, 15 Ch. D. 651).

A donatio mortis causâ is subject to debts, and is liable to legacy duty, but it does not require probate or the executor's assent (Smith v. Cason, 1718, 1 P. Wms. 406; 24 E. R. 446; Thompson v. Hodgson, 1795, 2 Stra. 777).

[Authority-Jarman on Wills, 5th ed.]

Donative Advowson.-See ADVOWSON.

Done. An omission to do something which ought to be done in order to the complete performance of a duty imposed upon a public body under an Act of Parliament, or the continuing to leave any such duty unperformed, amounts to "an act done or intended to be done" within the meaning of a clause requiring a notice of action (R. v. Williams, 1884, 53 L. J. P. C. 64, at p. 71, citing Jolliffe v. Wallasey Local Board, 1873, L. R. 9 C. P. 62). See also R. v. St. John's, Hackney, 1835, 2 Ad. & E. 548; Ongley v. Chatham, 1887, 4 T. L. R. 6; Edwards v. Vestry of St. Mary, Islington, 1889, 58 L. J. Q. B. 165).

Dormant Funds.-The term "dormant funds" is applied to such funds in the books of the Pay Office as have not been dealt with for upwards of fifteen years. With respect to these the Supreme Court Funds Rules, 1905, provide that on or before the 1st day of March in every third year the Paymaster shall prepare a list of the accounts in the books of the Pay Office (other than those where the balances do not amount to £5) to the credit of which there stood on the 1st day of the preceding September any funds not less than £50 which have not been dealt with, otherwise than by the continuous investment or placing on deposit of dividends, during the fifteen years immediately preceding the last-mentioned date. The list must be filed in the Central Office, and a copy inserted in the London Gazette, and exhibited in the several offices of the Court. The Paymaster may in his discretion give any information respecting any funds in Court mentioned in the list, upon a request signed by the person applying for information or his solicitor. The

request, if made by a solicitor, must state the name of the person on whose behalf the application is made, and that such person is in the opinion of the applicant beneficially interested in the funds. If the request be made by any person other than a solicitor, information will not be given unless the applicant is able to satisfy the Paymaster that the request is such as may in the particular case be properly complied with. The Paymaster may omit from the list any account in respect of which he may be informed by or on behalf of a person interested therein that an order dealing with it will be applied for; or any account, the funds standing to the credit of which have been lodged under rule 41 (a) (ie. funds lodged in Court by a legal personal representative under the Trustee Act, 1893, without an affidavit), and remained undealt with for a period not exceeding twenty years (r. 101).

Wherever a cause or matter has been inserted in the above-mentioned list, the fact must be notified on the certificate of fund which is issued by the Paymaster pursuant to rule 99.

Every petition or summons for dealing with funds which have been. placed in the list of dormant funds must contain a statement that such funds have not been dealt with for fifteen years or upwards, and, where such funds amount to or exceed in value £500, a copy of such petition or summons must, unless the Court or a judge shall otherwise direct, be served on the official solicitor of the Court (R. S. C., 1883, Order 22, r. 12b).

The last list of dormant funds was published in a supplement to the London Gazette on March 3, 1905. Such list does not state the amount standing to the credit of each particular account. The aggregate amount of the balances is less than £1,000,000 sterling, distributed over more than 3300 separate accounts. As a rule, the amount of the fund to any one credit is not large, one-half of the balances not exceeding £150 in value, and only about one-twentieth exceeding £1000.

In connection with the subject of dormant funds, it may be stated that it is not the practice to order a fund which has been many years in Court without having been dealt with to be paid out to the legal personal representative of the person to whose account it stands, merely upon its being shown that there are persons beneficially interested; that part of the fund only will be parted with as to which it is directly proved who are the persons beneficially interested; the costs, however, of the legal personal representative and of the other parties will be directed to be paid out of the whole fund (Samson v. Samson, 1870, 18 W. R. 530; and see Orrok v. Binney, 1822, Jac. 523; 37 E. R. 948; Loy v. Duckett, 1841, Cr. & Ph. 305; 41 E. R. 507; Edwards v. Harvey, 1863, 11 W. R. 330; Peacock v. Saggers, 1862, 4 De G., F. & J. 406; 45 E. R. 1240). The ordinary rule of practice until lately adopted was that the beneficial interest would be followed where the person entitled had been dead more than twenty years (cp. Ex parte Roskrow, 1885, W. N. 3). The judges of the Chancery Division have, however, recently given directions that, as a general rule, funds in Court belonging to the estate of a deceased person shall not, after the expiration of ten years from his death, be paid to his legal personal representative without notice to the beneficiaries (Practice Note, 1904, W. N. 135).

[Authorities.-Supreme Court Funds Rules, 1905, rr. 99, 101, 102; R. S. C., 1883, Order 22, r. 126; Dan. Ch. Pr., 7th ed., pp. 1492, 1511; The Annual Practice, 1906, vol. i. pp. 292, 731; vol. ii. pp. 321, 322, 350,

Double Complaint.-See DUPLICITY.

Double Rent and Double Value.-These are statutory remedies which, under certain prescribed conditions, are given to landlords when their tenants refuse to give up possession of the premises demised to them upon the determination of their interests. The former applies when the tenant holds over after he has himself given notice to quit; the latter when he holds over after he has received notice from the landlord. The conditions referred to are, as will be seen, essentially different.

(1.) Double Rent.-The Distress for Rent Act, 1737, 11 Geo. II. c. 19, provides (s. 18) that a tenant who has given a notice to quit, and who fails to give up possession of premises demised to him at the time specified. in such notice, shall thenceforward pay double the rent or sum which he would otherwise have paid, "to be levied, sued for, and recovered at the same time and in the same manner as the single rent or sum," and "to be paid during all the time" he "shall continue in possession." For the statute to operate, the tenant must have given a notice which, by complying with the prescribed requirements as to form and length (see NOTICE TO QUIT), was binding when it was given both upon himself and upon the landlord (Johnstone v. Hudlestone, 1825, 4 Barn. & Cress. 922; 28 R. R. 505). Where, for example, a tenant gave notice to quit as soon as" he "could possibly get another situation," it was held that double rent could not be recovered against him when he held over after the condition was fulfilled (Farrance v. Elkington, 1811, 2 Camp. 591; 11 R. R. 807). It is not necessary that the notice should have been in writing (Timmins v. Rowlinson, 1765, 3 Burr. 1603). The double rent given by the statute may, as has just been seen, be "levied" in the same way as the ordinary rent, and may consequently be recovered by distress (see Humberstone v. Dubois, 1842, 10 Mee. & W. 765). Though the statute has been held not to extend to a weekly tenant (Sullivan v. Bishop, 1826, 2 Car. & P. 359), it applies, as already stated, to any tenant or tenants," and the decision, if correctly reported, would seem to have been given per incuriam. It applies to a tenancy though created only by parol (Timmins v. Rowlinson, supra). A tenant who, after having given notice, holds over for a year paying double rent under the statute, may quit at the end of such year without fresh notice, for the statute in terms provides that double rent shall only be paid while the tenant continues in possession (Booth v. Macfarlane, 1831, 1 Barn. & Adol. 904; 35 R. R. 488).

(2.) Double Value.-By 4 Geo. II. c. 28, s. 1, if any tenant "for any term of life, lives, or years," or any person in possession of any hereditaments by, from, or under such tenant, shall "wilfully hold over" after the determination of such term, and "after demand made and notice in writing" for possession by his landlord or other owner of the reversion or his lawfully authorised agent, such person so holding over shall "for and during the time he . . . shall so hold over or keep the person... entitled out of possession," pay to the latter, his executors, administrators, or assigns, "at the rate of double the yearly value of the . . . hereditaments so detained, to be recovered . . . by action of debt, . . against the recovery of which said penalty there shall be no relief in equity.' There are several important points of difference in the application. and effect of the two statutes here considered. For a study of the language of the Act just set out shows (a) that double value can be