Committee at its weekly meetings. The Committee issues critical notes, on points of law, either to the tribunals in general or to individual judges, as the result of the inspectors' reports and its deliberations thereon, but the decisions of the Courts are left untouched as far as the particular suits in question are concerned.

The above is a necessarily brief and incomplete outline of the extremely complicated condition of legislative and judicial affairs in Egypt. Those who desire more detailed information on these matters may be referred to the following publications:-Lord Cromer's Annual Reports on Egypt; the Judicial Adviser's Annual Reports (1892-97, by the late Sir John Scott, K.C.M.G.; 1898 to the present time, by Sir Malcolm McIlwraith, K.C.M.G.); "De la Compétence des Tribunaux Mixtes d'Egypte," by Abdallah Simaika; "Eléments de Procédure Civile et Commerciale d'après le Code indigène comparé au Code Mixte," by Lusena Bey (Cairo, Imprimerie Nationale, 1897-99); "De l'évolution de la Condition Juridique des Européens en Egypte," by Henri Lamba (Paris, Arthur Rousseau, 14 Rue Soufflot); "Régime des Capitulations dans l'Empire Ottoman," by G. Pélissié du Rausas (2 vols., Paris, Arthur Rousseau, 14 Rue Soufflot), etc., etc.

Either. See Stroud, Jud. Dict. s.v. "Either; " and WILL; Judicial Glossary.

Ejectment.-See RECOVERY OF LAND.

Ejusdem generis, rule of.-See INTERPRETATION.

Election, Equitable Doctrine of.-Nature of the Doctrine. It is a principle conformable to good sense and natural justice that a man cannot, in the language of the law, approbate and reprobate that he cannot accept a benefit under an instrument without adopting the whole of it-conforming to all its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with them. His doing so is an implied condition of the benefit. This principle or implied condition is the ground of the equitable doctrine of election (Streatfield v. Streatfield, 1735, Ca. t. Talb. 176; 25 E. R. 724; Noys v. Mordaunt, 1706, 2 Vern, 581; 23 E. R. 978; Dillon v. Parker, 1818, 1 Swans. 359, 381n., 394n.; 36 E. R. 422; 18 R. R. 72; Rogers v. Jones, 1876, 3 Ch. D. 688). It may be made clear by an illustration. Suppose that a testator by his will gives Blackacre, which is not his property but A.'s property, to B., and by the same will gives Whiteacre, which is the testator's own property, to A. In such a case A. cannot keep Blackacre and also claim Whiteacre. That would be approbating and reprobating. He must elect between two courses, to take under the will or against it. If he elects to take under the will he must conform to it by conveying Blackacre to B. If he elects to take against the will, he keeps Blackacre, but he can only get Whiteacre on the terms of making compensation to B. for the loss of Blackacre. This theory of compensation, which has been engrafted by the authorities on the original doctrine of election, rests like the doctrine itself on the implied intention of the donor. works out in this way. Blackacre may be an estate worth £20,000, while Whiteacre may be worth £30,000; but Blackacre may have a pretium affectionis for its owner, and A. elects to take against the will. Equity in such a case assumes jurisdiction to sequester the benefit

It

intended for the refractory donee, in order to secure compensation to the person whom his election disappoints. In the supposed case the amount, measured in money, of B.'s disappointment is £20,000. A., therefore, takes Whiteacre, subject to giving up that money value of Blackacre to B. (Rogers v. Jones, 1876, 3 Ch. D. 689; Re Booth; Booth v. Robinson, [1906] 2 Ch. 321; Gretton v. Haward, 1818, 1 Swans. 443, 444; 36 E. R. 443; 18 R. R. 95; Pickersgill v. Rodger, 1877, 5 Ch. D. 163), and this equity of compensation B. may enforce by action. The amount of the compensation must be ascertained, in the case of a will, at the date of the testator's death, not at the date of election (Re Hancock; Hancock v. Pawson, [1905] 1 Ch. 16).

What will Raise.-To raise a case of election there must appear in the instrument whether it is a will or a settlement, for the doctrine applies equally to both (Green v. Green, 1816, 2 Mer. 86; 35 E. R. 873; 13 R. R. 277; Codrington v. Lindsay, 1872, L. R. 8 Ch. 578, 587), a clear intention on the part of the donor or settlor to dispose of property which is not his own. Whether he erroneously believed it to be his own or knew it not to be his own, makes no difference, but the Court leans as far as possible to a construction which would make him deal only with that to which he is entitled (Maddison v. Chapman, 1861, 1 Jon. & H. 470; 70 E. R. 831; In re Bidwell's Settlement, 1862, 11 W. R. 161). Thus a general devise, primâ facie, passes only property of which the devisor is owner, and the Court will not admit evidence dehors the will to show that the testator intended to compromise in a general devise property which he believed to be his own, but which, in fact, was not his own, for the purpose of raising a case of election (Blake v. Bunbury, 1789, 1 Ves. Jun. 523; 30 E. R. 464; 1 R. R. 111; Stratton v. Best, 1791, 1 Ves. Jun. 284; 30 E. R. 346; Clementson v. Gandy, 1836, 2 Keen, 309). The intent of the testator to dispose of property which is not his must appear on the will (Blake v. Bunbury, supra). If a testator or grantor has only a partial interest in property, and disposes of the whole, giving some of his own property to the owner of the other part, the same principle applies, and the part owner legatee must elect (Howells v. Jenkins, 1863, 1 De G., J. & S. 617; 46 E. R. 244). A precatory trust will not raise a case of election (Re Williams; Williams v. Williams, [1897] 2 Ch. 12, C. A.), nor will an appointment which is illegal as contravening the rule against perpetuities (Re Oliver's Settlement; Evered v. Leigh, [1905] 1 Ch. 191; Re Beale's Marriage Settlement, [1905] 1 Ch. 256).

To found a case of election the person benefited must be entitled in his own right to the property given to another, and not in his representative capacity (Grissell v. Swinhoe, 1868, L. R. 7 Eq. 291; Cooper v. Cooper, 1870, L. R. 6 Ch. 15; affd. 1874, L. R. 7 H. L. 53).

Persons bound to elect are not compellable to do so until all the circumstances which may influence their election are known to them; for instance, the relative value of the properties (Newman v. Newman, 1 Bro. C. C. 186; 28 E. R. 1073; Wake v. Wake, 1791, 3 Bro. C. C. 254; 29 E. R. 521), and for this purpose accounts will, if necessary, be directed to be taken (Boynton v. Boynton, 1785, 1 Bro. C. C. 445; 28 E. R. 1231; Douglas v. Douglas, 1871, L. R. 12 Eq. 617). An election made under a mistake will not be held binding (Pusey v. Deshouverie, 1734, 3 P. Wms. 315; 24 E. R. 1081; Dillon v. Parker, 1833, 1 Cl. & Fin. 303; 6 E. R. 930; 36 R. R. 123).

What will Constitute.-Election may be express, but it may also be implied. What will lead the Court to infer an election must depend on

the circumstances of each particular case. Receipt of rents, settling one of the two funds, lapse of time, are some of the acts or defaults going to evidence acceptance or acquiescence, but to make them effectual for that purpose the person alleged to have elected must have done them with a knowledge of his rights, and with the intention of electing (Stratford v. Powell, 1807, 1 Ball. & B. 1; Brown v. Brown, 1866, L. R. 2 Eq. 481). Illustrations are furnished by Wake v. Wake, 1791, 1 Ves. Jun. 334; 30 E. R. 372; Padbury v. Clark, 1849, 2 Mac. & G. 298; 42 E. R. 115; Tibbits v. Tibbits, 1816, 19 Ves. 656, 663; 34 E. R. 659; 23 R. R. 79; Tomkyns v. Ladbroke, 1754, 2 Ves. 593; 28 E. R. 377. If necessary, the question of election or no election may be ordered to be tried by a jury (Roundell v. Currer, 1786, 2 Bro. C. C. 66, 73; 1 Swans. 382, 383n.; 29 E. R. 39; 36 E. R. 434). If a time is limited for electing, and the person to elect does not do so within the time limited, he will be considered as having elected to take against the instrument. As to the effect of a person under an obligation to elect dying without electing, see Fytche v. Fytche, 1868, L. R. 7 Eq. 490, and Pickersgill v. Rodger, 1877, 5 Ch. D. 163, 175.

Under Appointments in Execution of Powers.-A good illustration of the doctrine of election is furnished by powers. Suppose a fund appointable by will by a father among the children, in default of appointment to go equally among all the children. The father by will appoints part of the fund among his children, and the residue of the fund to a stranger to the power. This is a fraud on the power, and no case of election is raised against the children. They can keep the shares appointed them, and also claim as in default of appointment the share given to the stranger (Bristow v. Warde, 1784, 2 Ves. Jun. 336; 30 E. R. 660; 2 R. R. 235; In re Fowler's Trust, 1859, 27 Beav. 362; 54 E. R. 142), and the reason assigned by Lord Wedderburn is that there must be some free disposable property given to the person whose property is dealt with which can be made a compensation for what the appointor takes away; and in the illustration given there is no such free disposable property, no property is comprised in the will, but that which the father had power to distribute. If there is, if the father by the will, exercising his power of appointment in favour of a stranger to the power, gives also property of his own to the children, a case of election arises. The donee of the power has purchased the right to put an alternative to the object of the power. A case of election cannot be raised on an appointment void for remoteness under the rule against perpetuities (Re Oliver's Settlement; Evered v. Leigh, [1905] 1 Ch. 191; Re Beale's Marriage Settlement, [1905] 2 Ch. 256; Re Wright; Whitworth v. Wright, [1906] 2 Ch. 288). Merely precatory words requesting appointees, objects of the power, to leave the fund appointed to others not objects of the power will not raise a case of election (Carver v. Boules, 1831, 2 Russ. & M. 301; 39 E. R. 409; 34 R. R. 102; Re Williams; Williams v. Williams, [1897] 2 Ch. C. A.; but see 31 L. R. Ir. 531).

Dower-Questions of election in relation to dower, which were very common under the old law, now seldom arise, owing to the large powers given to a husband by the Dower Act to bar dower by sale or declaration.

Who bound to Elect.-Election implies the exercise of a rational judgment by a person sui juris. Persons under disability are incompetent to the exercise of such a discretion. Hence an infant, a lunatic, or a feme covert under the old law cannot elect. In the case of an

infant, election is deferred-as a rule-till the infant comes of age (Broughton v. Broughton, 1750, 2 Ves. 12; 28 E. R. 8); but the Court may, where it is advisable, elect for the infant at once, if the infant's interest is clear (Re Montagu; Faber v. Montagu, [1896] 1 Ch. 549). If it is doubtful, the Court may refer it to chambers to inquire what will be most beneficial to the infant (Chetwynd v. Fleetwood, 1742, 1 Bro. P.C. 300; 1 E. R. 580; Prole v. Soady, 1859, 8 W. R. 131; Lamb v. Lamb, 1856, 5 W. R. 772). The practice with regard to lunatics is similar. The Court refers it to chambers to report what would be most beneficial to the lunatic, and, on the result of this report being certified, elects accordingly for the lunatic. This jurisdiction applies equally whether the lunatic is one so found or not. See LUNACY.

Married Women.-A married woman in respect of non-separate property cannot elect (Cooper v. Cooper, 1874, L. R. 7 H. L. 53; see, however, Ardesoife v. Bennet, 1772, 2 Dick. 463; Nicholl v. Jones, 1866, L. R. 3 Eq. 696); but in respect of property belonging to her for her separate use a married woman is in the same position as a feme sole, and competent and compellable to elect. If, however, the separate use has annexed to it a restraint on anticipation, no case of election arises, and the reason is this; that the value of the married woman's property in such a case to be relinquished by way of compensation has, by the terms of the instrument, been rendered inalienable (In re Wheatley; Smith v. Spence, 1884, 27 Ch. D. 606), nor does the doctrine apply in the case of a married woman to whom an interest, with a restraint on anticipation attached, is given by the same instrument as that which gives rise to a question of election, even though at the time when the question of election arises the married woman has become discovert (Haynes v. Foster, [1901] 1 Ch. 361). The general intention that every part of an instrument shall take effect is rebutted by the inconsistent particular intention apparent in the instrument, that the married woman shall be restrained from anticipation (In re Vardon's Trusts, 1885, 31 Ch. D. 275; Carter v. Silber, [1891] 3 Ch. 553).

Legacy and Succession Duty-As to the effect of the doctrine on legacy and succession duty, see Laurie v. Clutton, 1852, 15 Beav. 131; 51 E. R. 486; and Hanson, P. L. & S. Duty.

As to election in cases of concurrent actions, see STAY OF PRO

CEEDINGS.

[Authorities.-White and Tudor, Lea. Cas., 7th ed., 416-445; Watson, Practical Compendium of Equity, 2nd ed., 176; Vaizey, Sett.; Seton, Judg., 6th ed., 1588-1594; H. A. Smith, Principles of Equity, 3rd ed., 470-485; Snell, Principles of Equity, 14th ed., 199-212.]

The term "Election Agent" previously to the passing of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, was used to denote the person intrusted with the conduct and management

of the business of a parliamentary election. The office of Election Agent in its present sense, however, was created by the Act of 1883, which requires the appointment of an Election Agent on whom specific and stringent duties and responsibilities are imposed with regard to the making of contracts involving, and the payment and return of, election expenses.

In creating the statutory office of Election Agent the purpose of the legislature was to secure the appointment of a person who should be effectively responsible for all the acts done in procuring the election, and more especially to provide an efficient means for the control and regulation of election expenses. The object of the Act, it has been said, was that the affairs of the election should be carried on in the light of day, and that a respectable and responsible man, responsible to the candidate and to the public, should be there to do all that was necessary (per Field, J., Barrow-in-Furness, 1886, 4 O'M. & H. 83).

Who may be Election Agent.-Owing to the liability entailed upon. the candidate, extreme caution is requisite in the selection of an Election Agent, who should be a person not only experienced in the general management of an election, but also fully acquainted with election law, and especially the provisions of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Acts.

There being no essential statutory qualification, as a general rule, any person, whether an elector or a non-elector, may be appointed Election Agent, though where an elector is appointed he may not vote (see Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883, Sched. I. Part I. (7)). But no returning officer for any county or borough, nor his deputy, nor any partner or clerk of either of them, can be appointed Election Agent, sec. 50 of the Representation of the People Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. e. 102, providing that no such person may act for any candidate in the management or conduct of his election, and if any such person does so act he is guilty of a misdemeanor. This section is by the Ballot Act, 1872, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 33, s. 11, applied to any returning officer or officer appointed by him in pursuance of that Act and to his partner or clerk. And a person who has previously been found or reported guilty of corrupt practices must not be appointed Election Agent, the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, s. 44, enacting that if on the trial of any election petition any candidate is proved to have personally engaged as agent for the management of the election any person knowing that such person has within seven years previous to such engagement been found guilty of any corrupt practice by any competent legal tribunal, or been reported guilty of any corrupt practice by a Committee of the House of Commons, or by election judges, or by Election Commissioners, the election of such candidate is to be void.

It is, moreover, not advisable to appoint a registration agent, or an officer, such as the chairman or secretary, of a local political association, as Election Agent, there being in such cases considerable danger from the possibility of the confusion of the registration expenses with the election expenses, and from the possible responsibility of the candidate for the acts of the association. In fact, for these reasons, as is well known, political associations are usually dissolved during an election, and take no part in the election (see Bodmin, 1906, 5 O'M. & H. 234, per Lawrance, J.). In two recent cases candidates have been unseated owing to the acts of their Election Agent, who in each case was the