perceive that they were only a part of the great scheme of omnescience, and were as much within his view at the time of creation as the proximate issue itself.*

The animal world again is equally under the guidance of an unerring law. The powers of the various species, their instincts, their habits, their succession, fill us with wonder and astonishment; and no one ever yet contended that as individuals they were thus the objects of our admiration; and yet as gregarious beings they were the sport of accident, and directed by no common principles, which were beneficial to the whole body.

It will scarcely be disputed, I should apprehend, that there are some principles implanted in man, which are subject to the same, or similar, comprehensive laws as those governing the inferior animals. Such for instance are our appetites; the more violent passions; the pleasures and pains derived from our senses of tasting, smelling, hearing, seeing, and so on. All these are subject to some control, and directed by some unseen influence, which we cannot resist

without uneasiness to ourselves; and the conclusion at which all practical persons arrive, is, that there must be some common cause operating upou us to produce this consentaneous end.

So

We speak of this order of nature, by analogy, as if it were a law. Not that we mean to insinuate, that the Deity governs his creation by verbal rules which he lays down for himself or his creatures; but it is a brief and convenient way of speaking of that constant order of succession in physical and moral events, whether good or evil, so conspicuously established in the world. when we speak of the more comprehensive laws of our nature, such for instance, as that happiness arises from the proper exercise of our powers; we must include all the consequences of this state of being, evil as well as good and when we allude to the general laws of the universe, we mean to include all the consequences, which were within the view of the Deity at the creation. As laws are rules of action, the word principle seems to be employed by us to express, abstractedly, the highest sources of intelligence to which the human understanding can ascend.

But it is not the stronger lineaments of our nature alone that discover order and arrangement. All the passions and affections and propensities may be traced to some common principles, which it is impossible not to conceive have a connexion with the consequences flowing from them. The study of these has engaged the wisest men in every age; and it would be truly ridiculous to suppose, that all this while they have been traversing a wilderness in pursuit of phantoms, or following a path for the absurd purpose of discovering it ended in an inextricable labyrinth. The dif ficulties of the study occur just where we should expect them; in the state of human affairs, which are under the control of a moral government.

Still it must be confessed, great progress has been made in our acquaintance with the motives of action in men, and with their moral constitution; and frequently it has happened, that what appeared faulty in it, has been found to be wise and good. Further advances have opened larger views; new light has appeared; objections have been answered; and every step has contributed to shew the order that prevails from the beginning to the end; from the attributes of

the highest rational existence to the meanest animal, that is the sport of the winds and waves. This should encourage us to proceed, as well as teach us diffidence with regard to whatever we may still be unable to account for.

If the constitution of man considered individually is so clearly established upon fixed and unerring principles, and he is not the child of chance and accident, acting without motive and without end, we may safely proceed a step farther, and insist, that as a social being he is under the guidance of the same intelligent laws. The greater part of his passions and affections have their source in this connexion; and these are so interwoven with those which belong to him as a solitary being, that, though the attempt has been frequently made by the most acute philosophers, no one has yet been able to draw the line to determine when the one class begins and the other ends. This attempt has even given rise to systems of the Passions and of Morals, which have failed chiefly from the impossibility of separating the two parts of our nature.

It is not only the affections which are exci

ted in the most intimate connections, such as the conjugal, the parental, and those arising from the various degrees of consanguinity, but all the benevolent and malevolent qualities of our nature are necessarily called forth, and sustained, by certain corporeal and intellectual relations, that exist with the animated creation, and especially with that part of it which partakes of our

own nature.

The social relation calls into exercise the greater number of human virtues. All philanthropic actions spring from this source; and it is hard to conceive that these are not within the scheme of Providence. Besides the virtues, no excellence could be obtained in any branch of art or science without the assistance and incentives that this union affords. All improvement in society, from the barbarous hordes of America to the polished nations of Europe, may be traced to the conflicting interests, which are created by the gregarious disposition of mankind. It is the struggle for bread between one man and another, which awakens and preserves industry it is the emulation inspired by more liberal pursuits, which creates excellence. All these provocatives to virtue and