the money could be borrowed at four per cent. In ten years he reckoned that the whole of the licences would belong to the Corporation. He preferred headquarters to a semi-private company, and scouted the idea that there could be any valid objection to municipal trading: all large municipalities were traders already.

The Committee issued a very statesmanlike report on Mr. Chamberlain's evidence, pointing out that it offered the following advantages, viz.: (1) local control; (2) diminution of number of licences; (3) removal of private interest in sales; (4) good liquor; (5) removal of publican influence on elections; (6) reduction of drunkenness, and relief, both directly and indirectly, of the rates. After dismissing the objections as unimportant, and shrewdly remarking that an experiment if successful would benefit the country, and if a failure would injure only Birmingham, the Committee reported in favor of granting the legislative facilities which Birmingham asked for. In the same year Mr. Chamberlain moved the following resolution in the House of Commons: "That it is desirable to empower Town Councils of Boroughs under the Municipal Corporations Acts to acquire compulsorily, on payment of fair compensation, the existing interests in the Retail Sale of Intoxicating Drink within their respective districts; and thereafter, if they see fit, to carry on the trade for the convenience of the inhabitants; but so that no individual shall have any interest in or derive any profit from the sale." This remarkable resolution was supported by 51 members of the House, but rejected by a majority of 52. Amongst those voting for it was Sir Wilfrid Lawson, who, in the course of a long speech, said: "Although I do not agree with everything in this resolution, there can be no doubt that it would, if passed, be the most deadly blow that this generation has seen struck at the liquor traffic as it at present exists." Unfortunately, since that date the House of Lords recommendations seem to have been forgotten.

Reasons for Municipal Management.

Municipal management of the retail drink traffic is the only possible ultimate solution. The reasons for this are so obvious that it is not needful to do more than name them.

(1) The retail liquor trade is a simple one. There is, we are informed, no great variety of drinks to be compounded; new inventions are rare and fashions change but slowly. Much of the stock in hand does not deteriorate but actually improves by keeping.

(2) Bad liquor is said to be largely sold, to the detriment of the consumer and the profit of the seller. No elective body could provide such liquor!

(3) The retail trade is strictly local and national. Temporary mismanagement by an unfortunately elected council could not drive it to foreign, or even to neighboring, competitors.

(4) The trade is already to a large extent in the hands of a few monopolists. This indicates that it is ripening for complete centralization in the hands of public authorities.

(5) It has already been successfully managed by municipal or quasi-municipal authorities, as in Sweden and Norway.

(6) It is in England already under strict governmental control, and a further extension of that control is a simple matter.

(7) It is hugely profitable, and therefore suitable for prompt municipalization.

(8) Municipalization has special advantages in this trade above all others. For instance, it is clearly important that liquor retailers should have no interest in persuading customers to drink to excess, whereas a publican who depends for his living on the profits of his sales, is certain to encourage his customers. Salaried municipal salesmen would have no interest in the drink they sold, and promotion would be more likely to follow well-conducted houses rather than increased sales.

(9) Another special advantage of municipalization of this trade is the destruction at once of the political power of the public-house and the brewers. In England this power is a serious menace. In America it is a hideous monster. We all know how often politics in the States are completely controlled by "bosses" who are nearly always in league with the saloons. This is not the place to describe their methods in detail; it is enough to refer to it as a possibility in England, and to note the dangerous symptoms of the disease already in our midst. It is fatal to the purity of politics that trade should dominate elections. "The Trade" always votes for itself, frankly and unitedly. Politics to licensed victuallers are exclusively a matter of licence laws and liquor duties. Pure downright self-interest alone determines the votes of publicans. We are a nation of shopkeepers by old repute; but it will be an evil day when our politics are run by shopkeepers solely in the interest of their particular shops. The publican differs from most other shopkeepers in that, when he induces his customers to buy more than they need of his wares, the results are specially harmful. The public-house, too, is often the workman's club, and therefore its proprietor has exceptional power to influence his votes. This much, at any rate, is certain, that it is high time that "The Trade" be removed from its position as to no small extent the arbiter of the destinies of our country.

It is true that the present proposal does not necessarily involve the big brewers and distillers. But the power of "The Trade" depends not so much on the long purses of the beer lords as on the fact that every public-house is a committee room for the beer party, and every publican an agent for the politician who favors his trade. A municipal barman will no longer determine his politics by his occupation, will have no motive for seeking to influence the votes of his customers.

Our Proposals.

and

The experience of other countries* seems clearly to indicate that the following are practicable and real reforms :

(1) Determination of a ratio of licences to population, both a minimum and a maximum.

*See Fabian Tract No. 85, "Liquor Licensing at Home and Abroad," by E. R. Pease.

(2) High licence: that is, a charge for the licence approximating, more or less, to its actual value.

(3) A Representative Licensing Authority. (4) Municipal control.

I.-Ratio of Licences to Population.

The first three proposals should be enacted for the whole country at once. A bill should be prepared permitting not more than, say, one licence to every 1,000 persons in urban, and one to 600 in rural, districts, as proposed by the Public House Amendment Bill of 1896, and by the Bishop of London's bill before mentioned, and providing for at least one licence for, say, every 5,000 of population, or part thereof, in any urban licensing area, that is, in any corporate town or urban district. In rural districts the area should be the parish, so that each parish should have at least one licence.*

The bill would require careful drafting, to make allowance for exceptional places, and for hotel and restaurant licences. Moreover, it should operate gradually. During the moratorium of five years the renewal or transfer of existing licences should not be refused, but no fresh licences should be issued if the number exceed the statutory limit. The scandal of excessive facilities for drinking in certain localities is too obvious to need more than mention of the notorious example given by Sir William Harcourt of a street 191 yards in length in which, out of twenty-seven "structures," fifteen were public-houses. Such evils would be remedied by the reforms here proposed.

II.-High Licence.

In the next place, a high licence system should be introduced. There is every possible reason why the value of the licence should no longer be a free gift to the brewery shareholders. On such terms it is no wonder that beer barons are crowding the aristocracy out of the House of Lords, and that brewery and distillery stocks stand at three, four, and five hundred per cent. premium.t The city of Philadelphia received 1,999,200 dollars (say £400,000) for its 2,176 licences in 1894, and Boston received 1,084,194 dols. for the same year. The cry of municipal reformers is everywhere for more money, whilst their opponents call for, and sometimes get, relief for the ever-grumbling ratepayer. Here is a source of revenue ready to hand. The value of every public-house licence should be secured at once for public purposes.

High licence is, under present arrangements, the barest justice. The monopoly created by law and custom is, to use an expressive American phrase, "a valuable franchise." At present it is handed over for nothing to the licensee, and in effect, as a rule, to the

It is curious that law makers and law devisers always give a different proportion to urban and rural districts, but whilst American and Colonial practice is to allow more licences per population in towns, English projects would allow fewer. By the Massachusets law of 1888, still in force, the limitation is I to every 1,000 inhabitants, except in Boston where it is I to every 500.

Guinness Common Stock has touched 611 during 1898. The nominal amount, £1.700.000, is therefore worth about £10,400,000. It pays 19 per cent.

brewing or distilling company. It now goes in the form of enormous dividends into the pockets of the beer lords and brewery shareholders. No wonder the brewing industry is probably the most profitable in the country. If bakers or butchers were protected by licences from competition, and amalgamated into huge combines, big fortunes could as easily be made out of these trades at the expense of the consumer, and the House of Lords could speedily be filled with the owners of tied bakehouses or licensed butcher-shops.

The assessment committee of each union should be ordered to determine the true rateable value of every public-house as a going concern, and also the value of the premises, as an ordinary dwelling house or shop. The ordinary rates should be assessed in the usual way on the latter. The difference, that is, the excess of annual value of the licensed premises over the same premises unlicensed, would clearly be the net annual value of the licence, and this sum should be payable as licence rate to the rating authority. It should, of course, be further enacted that the occupier could deduct such rate from his rent, and any contract to the contrary must, as in the case of income tax, be null and void.

This scheme brings the high licence duty within the compass of existing law. No doubt for a time the licence rate would be inadequately levied. But the farmers and shopkeepers who form rural assessment committees and as hereafter explained these would be mainly concerned-are not as a rule interested in the brewery companies that own the majority of the public houses, whilst they are interested in relieving their own rates. Difficult questions would of course arise, but precedent would rapidly facilitate their settlement, and the law courts would be the courts of appeal in this as in other rating problems.

An alternative method would be that usual in the United States, viz., raising the Justices' Licence from its present figure, a few shillings, to a suitable sum graduated on a regular scale. Pennsylvania the scale by the law of 1890 is: licences in cities of the first and second class, 200; third class, 100; in other cities £60; in boroughs, £30, and in townships 15. This law doubled the fee in first and second class cities, but it had no effect in reducing the scramble for licences. It is clear, therefore, that these fees are easily paid and do not represent the monopoly value of the licence. This simple system no doubt has advantages, though it would work more irregularly than the assessment plan, and would probably leave a larger monopoly value in the hands of the owner of the public-house.

"High licence prevails in Pennsylvania, and appears to be a success. The tone of the whole trade has been raised. The improved character of the saloon is remarked by all observant citizens. Sunday selling has ceased, and minors are usually kept out of the saloons. The wholesale dealers have stopped selling liquor to be consumed on their premises. In many places great care is taken not to sell to persons already visibly under the influence of liquor."t The Liquor Problem, pp. 234-240.

The Liquor Problem, Report on Philadelphia, p. 249.

"Speak-easies," "kitchen-bars," and other characteristic American institutions have sprung up since the Brooks Law of 1887, but that is a danger we must face. Probably we shall find it easier to cope with such offences in England, because it is our custom to carry out what the law enacts. In the United States the case is otherwise, and under the Brooks Law in Philadelphia during the years 1893 and 1894, fines amounting to 78,340 dols. (15,668) were imposed, and the sum collected was 16.75 dols. (£3. 75.). The rule is that persons fined are let off if they swear that they really cannot afford to pay, and this seems to be the usual state of affairs amongst the Philadelphia publicans.

III. Representative Licensing Authority.

This proposal is by no means a novel one. In 1835, Lord John Russell included in his great Municipal Corporations Bill a clause which transferred the power of granting ale-house licences to the municipal councils. It passed the House of Commons, but was struck out by the House of Lords, and abandoned by the Government. In 1890 a similar proposal was made in regard to County Councils, but it was also withdrawn.*

We now propose that every County, Town and Urban District Council should in the first place be constituted the licensing authorities for their respective areast: that is, that the duties of the Justices in Brewster Sessions should be transferred to a local representative body. There is no reason why any appeal against their decisions should be given to any other body. Each council would by this enactment obtain complete control over the locality of the licences in its district, and over their number subject to the maximum and minimum law. For a period of five years (or such other term as should be decided) they would be restrained from refusing existing licences except for offences, and they would have no fresh compulsory powers of dealing with the traffic.

IV. Municipal Control.

The fourth is by far the most important of our proposals. The first point to determine is by no means an easy one. Are we to confer on Town Councils (and to save repetition that phrase must hereafter be interpreted as including the London County Council and Urban District Councils, but not other County Councils) the power to municipalize, or shall we create new boards elected ad hoc? Both courses are open to serious objection.

On the one hand the liquor issue will too often be an allpowerful one in determining the election of councillors. The timehonored distinctions between Liberal and Tory, Progressive and Moderate, will sink out of sight. Past services will be forgotten; promissory programs will attract no votes; elections from Perth See Fabian Tract No. 85.

† County Councils (except that of London) would of course be the authorities for the Rural Districts only.

See Fabian Tract No. 85.