3. Therefore, where one, having effects of another in his hands, and being also his surety in a note over-due, was summoned, as his trustee in a foreign attachment, and then was compelled by suit to pay the note; it was held, that the effects in his hands were still bound by the foreign attachment, and that he could not retain them, by way of indemnity against the note he had paid.

lb.

TENANT AT WILL.

1. Where a tenant at will assented to an extent upon the land, as his property, pointing it out to the creditor, assisting the surveyor, and not giving notice that the land belonged to another; this was held, to be a determination of his tenancy at will. Campbell v. Procter, 6 Greenleaf, 12.

2. In such a case, the landlord may have trespass against the judgment creditor, for his entry on the land and treading down the grass. TRESPASS.

lb.

The purchaser of a right in equity of redemption at a sheriff's sale, may maintain trespass quare clausum fregit against the mortgager in possession, who cuts and takes off the growing grass; the mortgagee never having entered for condition broken. Fernald v. Linscott, 6 Greenleaf, 234. TROVER.

Where a tenant at will erected a dwelling house and other buildings on the land, with the express consent of the landlord, and died; and his administrator sold them to a stranger;-it was held, that the purchaser might maintain trover for them, against the owner of the land. Osgood v. Howard, 6 Greenleaf, 452, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.

1. E. C. bequeathed four slaves to C. C. and F. T. trustees, in trust, to apply the profits to the maintenance of the testator's daughter, J. B. and her husband, S. K. B. and their children, during the lives of the daughter and husband, and of the survivor, remainder to the children of the daughter by that husband; both trustees declined the trust; no trustee was substituted; the executor delivered the slaves to Mrs. B., her husband being then in Europe, where he died; Mrs. B. then married V. who in 1798 sold to R all the trust slaves, for his wife's life, R. having notice of the trust, R. removed them from Fredericksburg to Augusta, held some there, gave some away, sold others; the second husband, V., died in 1806. Upon a bill in chancery, by Mrs. V. and her children by B., against R. praying discovery of names, &c. of the slaves and their increase, restoration of them, and account

of profits, and, (on a charge that R. would remove the property out of the state,) an injunction to restrain him from doing so ; and R. not pleading to the jurisdiction; decreed, that

1st. R. had no right to hold the slaves, even during Mrs. B.'s life, as they were a trust subject, and the profits applicable to maintainance of her and her children; though quære how far her interest passed by her second husband's sale to R.

2d. R. could not protect himself under the statute of limitations, because he bought with notice of the trust, and so was charged with it; and because his removal of the slaves to a distant country, thus keeping the owners in ignorance where they were, was an obstruction to the assertion of their rights by action, precluding him from pleading the statute within § 14, I, Rev. Code, c. 128, p. 491. Rankin v. Bradford, 1 Leigh, 163. 2. M. by deed of trust conveyed (inter alia) twenty slaves to a trustee, to secure a debt due to W. & Co. payable twelve months after the date of the deed; within the year M. sold one of the slaves to A. two to B. one to C. and one to R. who alleged that M. sold at the request and by the authority of W. & Co.: when the debt fell due, all the rest of the trust subject was sold, and the proceeds fell far short of the debt due W. & Co.: W. & Co. brought suit in chancery against M. the purchasers of the five slaves, and the trustee ; denying M.'s authority to sell the five slaves; praying a foreclosure of the equity of redemption thereof, and that the purchasers be decreed to deliver them up to be sold under the deed of trust; Held, that though W. & Co. might have brought actions at law in the trustee's name, to recover the slaves of the respective purchasers, yet their case was properly relievable in equity. Ambler v. Warwick, 1 Leigh, 195.

VARIANCE.

In covenant, defendant takes oyer of the covenant, and afterwards pleads covenant performed. Held, that the defendant by oyer has made the covenant itself a part of the record, and cannot at the trial of the issue object to the covenant, as evidence, on the ground of variance between it, and the covenant set forth in the declaration. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 1 Leigh, 491.

VENDOR AND VENDEE.

Venders of land, bound to make a conveyance thereof, are bound so to execute it in presence of witnesses, or so to acknowledge it before magistrates, that the vendee may have it recorded according to law. Tapp v. Beverly, 1 Leigh, 80.

VERDICT.

1. In trover for certain promissory notes, where the title, and not the value, was the only subject of controversy, the jury being sent out late in the evening, with permission to separate after agreeing and sealing up their verdict, did so, and returned a verdict the next morning for the plaintiff, with the amount of damages in blank; the foreman observing that they had some doubts as to the time from which interest should be computed, and that some supposed this would be done by the court; whereupon, by direction of the Judge, they retired again, and returned a new verdict for the amount of the notes and interest; and it was held well. Bolster v. Cummings, 6 Greenleaf, 85. 2. Where the prevailing party in a cause tried by jury, previous to the trial, but during the same term, conveyed one of the jurors several miles, in his own sleigh, to the house of a friend, where he was hospitably entertained for the night; the verdict was, for this reason, set aside. Cottle v. Cottle, 6 Greenleaf, 140.

3. A paper drawn up by the plaintiff, containing a statement of the items composing his claim for damages, having been accidentally passed to the jury, with the other papers in the cause, though not by them regarded as evidence regularly before them; the verdict, which was for the plaintiff, was for this cause set aside. Benson v. Fish, 6 Greenleaf, 141.

4. Where the jury, after they retired to deliberate on a cause, received and were influenced by the declarations of one of their fellows, discrediting a material witness of the plaintiff; it was held to be no good cause to set aside the verdict. Purinton v. Humphreys, 6 Greenleaf, 379.

5. Neither will a verdict be set aside because the jury, without the privity of the prevailing party, and being fatigued and exhausted with the length of the trial, were furnished with some refreshments at their own expense, during their deliberations on the cause; however liable the jurors might be to personal admonition from the court for such misconduct. lb.

6. But if ardent spirits constitute part of such refreshments, and appear to have operated on any juror so far as to impair bis reasoning powers, inflame his passions, or have an improper influence upon his opinions, the verdict would probably be set aside. 1b.

7. An agreement between a prisoner's counsel, in a capital case, and the counsel for the people, that the jury, if they agree, may deliver their verdict to the clerk, is irregular, and a verdict

delivered in court under such an agreement, in the absence of the jury, will be set aside for such irregularity. Nomaque v. The People, 1 Breese, 109.

8. A prisoner has a right to the presence of the jury when they deliver their verdict, as he is entitled to have them polled, and a verdict is not final until pronounced and recorded in open court. lb.

WILLS.

1. An attestation of a will of lands made in the same room with testator, is prima facie an attestation in his presence, according to the statute of wills; an attestation not made in the same room is prima facie not an attestation in his presence; but as in the one case the attestation is good, if shown to have been made within the scope of testator's view from his actual position; so in the other it is not good, if it appear that in the actual relative situation of testator and witnesses, he could not possibly have seen the act of attestation, nor have so changed situation as to have enabled him to see it; without aid from others, which was at hand, but was neither asked nor given. Neil v. Neil, 1 Leigh, 6.

2. Will, disposing of real and personal estate, but not duly executed as to the real, was admitted to probate by county court, in general terms, in 1785, and never contested: Held, this was full probate; the heir could only have contested the will, by bill in chancery, within seven years; and he, instead of so contesting it, having taken, as devisee under it, it must now be regarded as a complete will of lands. Vaughan v. Green, 1 Leigh, 287.

WRITS.

1. Appearance and pleading will cure a voidable, but not a void writ. Coleen & Claypole v. Figgins, 1 Breese, 3.

2. The omission in a writ of the words 'The People of the State of Illinois, to the coroner,' &c. is a mere misprision of the clerk, and is amendable. State Bank v. Buckmaster, 1 Breese, 133.

LEGISLATION.

INDIANA.

At the session of the legislature of Indiana in 1830 a general revision of the statute laws was made, and is now published; all of a general nature are contained in one volume of 596 pages, which also contains the declaration of independence; the constitution of the United States; the act of Virginia ceding the North West Territory and others supplementary thereto; the ordinances of Congress for the government of the territory North West of the river Ohio; the several acts of Congress dividing that territory; the act of Congress to enable the people of the Indiana Territory to form a state government, and for its admission into the Union; the ordinance accepting of the land; the constitution of the state of Indiana; and the laws of the United States respecting naturalization.

The statute laws are comprised in 111 chapters on the following subjects.

Ch. 1.-Mills. The owner of land on a stream, desirous of building a dam thereon, shall apply to the circuit court for a writ of ad quod damnum, which is directed to the sheriff to empannel twelve jurors to meet on the land; ten days notice of the time of meeting is to be given to the owner of the land on the other side of the water course, by personal service on himself or agent if resident, otherwise by advertisement at the court house door for two terms. The jury are to view the land, to locate one acre where the abutment of the dam is to be placed, if the same does not belong to applicant, to appraise the value, to examine the land above and below, and ascertain the damage it may sustain, whether the mansion house, or appurtenances immediately belonging thereto, will be overflowed, whether, and in what degree, fish of passage, or navigation will be obstructed, how same may be prevented, and whether the health of the neighborhood will be injured. This inquest being returned to court, summonses issue to the several owners or tenants on the land to show cause why the dam shall