In 21 H. 6, 31, cited Bro. coverture, pl. 25, Newton and Paston held against Markam and Ascue, that at common law an infant could not bind himself as an apprentice. But Markam and Ascue held that he might, for it was for his benefit.

In Maddon v. White, 2 T. R. 159, where a lease had been made by an infant, Buller J. said 'that the infant could not avoid a lease for his benefit; that notwithstanding the old doctrine in Co. Litt. 380, b, and in Brounlaw, was to the contrary, the modern cases were so. In Drury v. Drury, 5 Bro. Par. Cas. 570, Lord Mansfield laid it down as a general principle, that if an agreement be for the benefit of an infant at the time, he shall be bound by it; and Lord Hardwicke afterwards adopted the same rule.

On the whole the question does not seem to be directly settled. The general doctrine of the common law seems to admit that such a contract, independent of the Stat. 23 Edw. 3, is not binding, and the elder authorities accord with that doctrine The late cases exhibit an anxious struggle in the courts to support contracts, made for the benefit of the infant, as good; but it is evident that the courts rather wish, than decide it, as a general principle.

See Com. Dig. Justices 50 to 63; Bac. Abr. Master and Servant; and 15 Vin. Master and Servant (J.) Sheppard's Epitome, Infant, p. 474, sect. 7, 17.

1810.

Since this note was written it has been decided in Rex v. Inhabitants of Arnesby, 3 Barn. and Ald. 583, that a parent at common law has no right to bind his child as an apprentice without his assent. But it seemed admitted that an infant might by deed bind himself an apprentice. And so it was decided in a later case, because it is for the benefit of the infant. Rex v. Inhabitants of Arundel, 5 M. and Selw. 257, and Rex v. Inhabitants of Rotherfield, 1 Barn. and Cress. 345, Best, J. said that at common law minors are at liberty to contract to serve the state, notwithstanding the parental authority. 1823.

Reports of Cases Argued and determined in the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of Indiana. With Tables of Cases and principal matters. By ISAAC BLACKFORD, A. M. one of the Judges of the Court. Vol. 1. Containing the Cases from May Term, 1817, being the first term of the Court, to May term, 1826, both inclusive. Indianapolis. Douglass & Maguire. 1830. pp. 488.

WHILE presenting for the consideration of our readers, the first publication of the cases decided in a new State, so remote as Indiana, it may not be amiss to afford them a short sketch of the history and constitution of the court, and of the circumstances under which the cases were decided.

The Constitution of the State of Indiana, which was adopted 29th day of June, 1816, vests the judicial power of the State, in one supreme court, in circuit courts, and such other inferior courts as the general assembly may from time to time direct and establish. The supreme court consists of three judges, and has appellate jurisdiction only, save in certain cases where the president judges of the circuit courts are interested. Suits are brought to this court in two ways; by appeal and by writ of error. The writ of error does not stay proceedings without the order of a judge, and bond and security being given for the due prosecution of the trial. Appeals must be prayed for at the term when the judgment is rendered and bond and security given as in cases of writs of error. The judges are appointed by the governor, by and with the advice of the senate. They hold their offices for seven years with a salary of 700 dollars, and are removable by impeachment.

James Scott, John Johnson, and Jesse L. Holman, were first appointed. Judge Johnson died the same year, and Isaac Blackford was appointed in his place 10th September 1817. Judges Scott and Holman held their offices until the session of the legislature of 1830-1, when Stephen C. Stevens and John I. M'Kinney were appointed in their places, and Isaac Blackford reappointed for the ensuing seven years.

The volume before us contains the decisions of this court made in the first nine years of its existence, with the exception

of a few which the reporter informs us, having been overruled, were suppressed. Considering that these cases were decided in a small village, where the only books to which the court could refer, were the very limited number in the private libraries of the few gentlemen of the bar in the place, it is not surprising, that the court, on subsequent examination, and since the opportunities for reference have become more extensive, should have changed their opinion in some of the points decided; indeed the only wonder is, that the instances should be so few. This want of books has in part been remedied by the voluntary contributions of the judges of the United States District Court and the Supreme Court, and the Lawyers attending their sittings. These formed themselves into a library company about the year 1821 or 2, and have since been incorporated. The company now possesses nearly twelve hundred dollars worth of law books, altogether obtained by the annual tax on its stockholders.

The litigation of a new State is not generally of an important nature, and especially one situated as Indiana. Being so far in the interior, no questions of moment arising from the intricacy of commercial transactions arise: and the land titles emanating, in so simple a manner, directly from government, can never call for much legal investigation. Nevertheless, the task which this Court had to perform, was important and difficult. A practice was to be settled, differing in many respects from that of every other State in the Union, and a mass of heterogeneous laws to be adjudicated upon, enacted often with two little care, and by those not always the best qualified for the task. The whole, too, as is the case in most new communities, liable to frequent and often injudicious changes. We accordingly find the cases in this volume covering a period in which there has existed three different entire versions of the statute laws of the State.

An instance of the difficulty arising from this kind of legislation is the case of Lewis v. Brackenridge, p. 220. Brackenridge was special bail for Oliver, who was not taken in execution, and an action was commenced against Brackenridge on his recognizance of bail. The capias was returned executed on the 1st day of the March Term, 1820. After various continuances were had and various issues made up, the

defendant, on the 9th day of the March Term, 1822, moved to dismiss the suit at his costs, on the ground that Oliver, the principal, had surrendered himself into custody, in discharge of his bail, before judgment was rendered against the bail; which surrender, according to the bill of exception, was made during that term. The court below sustained the motion to dismiss. This was done under an act approved December 26th, 1821, which provides that, in all cases in favor of special bail, if the principal is surrendered before judgment against the bail, the suit shall be dismissed at the costs of the bail. The court remarks, that, The principal question, arising out of these proceedings, is, Is this case embraced by this act of assembly? The suit was commenced in February 1820, and the act passed December 1821; and will this act operate to destroy the claim which the plaintiff had been pursuing by a legal course for nearly two years? This question is of high importance, and in order to give it an answer we will divide it, and inquire, first, whether an act of assembly should be so construed as to destroy a vested right of action; and, secondly, whether the plaintiff, at the time this act was passed, was in possession of such a vested right.' The court decided both propositions for the plaintiff.

So also the case of Berry v. Marshall, administrator, which, being a short case, we give entire, as a specimen of these reports. 'Error to the Jackson Circuit Court.

Holman, J. Berry recovered judgment against Craig, in October, 1820. Craig died in June, 1822; and administration of his estate was granted to Marshall, against whom the judgment was revived by scire facias.

Marshall, finding the estate insolvent, filed a bill in chancery in the Circuit Court, setting out the amount of the real and personal estate of Craig, and of the demands against it, so far as he was able to ascertain them, with a prayer that all the creditors be compelled to accept of a proportionate part of the assets, and that all proceedings at law against him as administrator be enjoined. Berry demurred to the bill. The demurrer was overruled; and he declining to answer, a decree was made against him, enjoining him from proceeding at law on his judgment, in order to the final adjustment of all the claims in the manner proposed in the bill.

Berry insists on the priority of his claim to subsequent judg

ments, and its superiority over debts of an inferior dignity; and as the subject stood previously to the act of assembly, amending the act regulating the settlement of intestate estates, his claim would be legal; but that act seems intended to abolish all distinction between debts of the deceased when the estate is insolvent. It directs the administrator or executer to give notice, requiring all persons having claims of any description against the estate, to exhibit their demands within twelve months, to the intent that the creditors of the deceased may be secured in their demands entirely; or if the estate should prove insolvent, that they may receive their proportionate dividends of such estate in proportion to their respective claims. See Stat. 1821 p. 140. If this act was intended to place all creditors on an equal footing, without any regard to the dignity of their claims, the prayer of the bill was proper, and the decree of the court correct; and such appears to have been the intention of the legislature, although the language they have used is not so explicit as that made use of in the Rev. code fixing the law on the same subject. It is true, that the judgment was in force before the passage of the act, and the act could not have a retrospective effect so as to suspend or divest any lien, the judgment might have on the lands of Craig. But this lien continued only during the life of Craig. For before the death of Craig, this act was in issue, and directed the manner in which his estate should be distributed. From October, 1820, until June, 1822, Berry had an indisputable right to proceed in his judgment; but after Craig died and his estate was declared insolvent, a new order of things took place, and Berry, lost all the advantages arising from his judgment except that of having his claim established; and was therefore properly enjoined, and placed on a level with other creditors.'

Fully to understand this case it may be necessary to state, that, when Berry's judgment was rendered, it by statute was a lien on the real estate of the debtor from the day of its rendition, and by the law relating to the distribution of intestate estates as it then stood, judgments were to be paid in preference to claims of inferior dignity.

Notwithstanding, that a majority of the cases reported in this volume are of trifling amounts, and the principles decided not of much importance to readers in other States, yet