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but it was only a Hegel who could realise it. Here from the 'Soul's Tragedy' of that wonderfully analytic and subtle character-reproducing Poet, Browning, is a passage which may illustrate the same subject of Conceptions and Notions :

As when a child comes in breathlessly and relates a strange story, you try to conjecture from the very falsities in it, what the reality was,-do not conclude that he saw nothing in the sky, because he assuredly did not see a flying horse there, as he says, so, through the contradictory expression, do you see, men should look painfully for, and trust to arrive eventually at, what you call the true principle at bottom.

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This suggests another Hegelian characteristic: we, like dupes, are led daily, and blindfolded, by what you call the true principle at bottom,' without the slightest notion of what it is; but he, for his part, must see and know and settle it all as Wesen.

B.

FINITUDE.

The reader will find elements of difficulty here. Let him remember, first of all, the exact point of the development at which he has arrived. He has seen There-being sublate its own determinateness, distinction, or difference by reflexion into its own self as a Something. The sublation has not destroyed the difference, however, which still, as it were, remains outside the reflexion into self, and thus distinguished from the self of the Something is, in that relation, Other. The reader must see that the other is not imported from elsewhere, but that the Something others itself in itself. This is the first point to be observed, and it is one of the greatest importance: we must never part company

with what we have before us, and always see clearly whither we are arrived. At present we have reached Something and Other, which, as such, have, in the first instance, the air of being indifferent in regard to each other. Now, it is important to see that, each being equally a Something and only other because of the other, the element of negation is not in them themselves, but falls out or outside of both. But this involves a reflexion the one from the other, with the result that Something is in itself against its Being-forOther. To understand this, we must see that we have not introduced a foreign other, that the other spoken of is the other which reflected itself in the Something itself, and which still is the Something, but so that the Something there is as Other, or is its own Being-as-Other. This is the true development of the notion implied in the Hegelian Seyn-für-Anderes. The reflexion by which the negation was identified with There-being, and restored to, or incorporated with, the reality—and these were the moments of There-being-gave birth to the Something, which Something again, as negative reflexion into self, involved another from which the reflexion took place. But this other was still its own; and it is the peculiar constitution of every Something in this universe, that it involves, or implies, or contains its own other. There, however, in this region of other, the Something is as Being-as-other, or, as Hegel prefers it, Being-for-other. The peculiar force of the German für, as already seen in the illustrations relative to für mich and für sich, is here to be recalled and reconsidered. We say in English, it passes for genuine, it passes for Gold, &c.: this is the same for as that in the Being-for-other. Something in the determination. so designated, is every way other; it is there where it

is as other, and there where it is in every direction for other.

Now this the region of otherness, is the region also of recognisableness, determinateness. And again the determinateness is the Something's own. But the Something's determinateness reflected into the Something, becomes that Something's qualification or precise determination; meaning thereby its vocation, destination, purpose, chief end, or how else you may name its one manifestible peculiar nature. Then, again, the peculiar manifestible nature passes plainly into the peculiar manifested nature; and that is Beschaffenheit, or so constitutedness, which we may translate, in opposition to qualification (from qualis) by talification (from talis). Talification, then, alludes to Something being constituted such, that when involved with Other it asserts itself thus and thus; or talis (such sort) is just the answer to qualis (what sort).

Now this actual manifestation, identical also (as we have seen) with the potential manifestibility, must, without difficulty, be perceived to constitute, as Hegel says, the immanent and, at the same time, negated Beingfor-other, or the Limit of the Something. That it is the immanent Being-for-other is plain; and that, manifesting itself only as or when involved with other, it is also negated, is likewise plain. Not less easy is it to see that its assertion against or on other is its Limit; or that where it at once affirmatively or immanently and negatedly or with other is, there is its Limit, or there is it in its Limit.

But just such constitution (of assertion with or against other) as characterises Limit, is what we name the immanent determination, proper nature, of any Something.

Lastly, if Limit (End) is the proper nature of Something, Something is evidently the Finite, or that which is of an ended nature-ended and endable, inasmuch as there is reference to a negating Other.

The remark that follows is prompted by this-that Hegel in the second chapter has passed into the moment of the Ur-theil, and he excuses the affirmative nature of the findings under the first division. A-affirmative though the moment is negative-by pointing out that, if in the first instance we had a positive verdict, and the Urtheil almost in the form of the Begriff, we shall now, under the second division, find all as negative as can be wished, and the Urtheil fairly as Urtheil.

Bestimmung

Terms here are thus explained. emerging from the development as the Qualification or what sort which it is, is accurately defined; and Beschaffenheit no less so. Immanent is in every English Dictionary.

a. Something and an Other.

This is certainly very difficult thinking; but it is, at the same time, perhaps, the deepest, the most penetrating, the most comprehensive, which the modern world has ever witnessed. Under the first moment, marked 1, there are three sub-moments: Firstly, to Simple Apprehension, both (Something and Other) are Something; secondly, to Judgment, both are Other; thirdly, to Reason, the Other is the Other for itself, and just so also is it, at the same time, Something, or the Something. That both are Something, and that both are relatively Other, we may take this as quite plain, without more explanation ; but the Other isolated and for itself is more difficult. Yet this is not so very difficult when the true point of

view is attained to. The Other belongs not to the Somethings themselves; it is quite external to them; it is something else than they, then; something independent, sui generis, and on its own account: it may be isolated, then, and considered for itself, and so on. Then the Other as Other must just be this externality as such of Nature: it is always to Spirit its Other, and nothing but its Other, at the same time that it is in its own nature simply the Other as such. Then this Other by self-reflexion sublates itself, and otherness remains simply a distinguishedness—a relativity, not a substantiality and positivity.-These are great thoughts: they are the truth of Idealism, or, rather, they are that idealistic Realism which is the only True, and which extends to each moment of the antithesis its own rights, in such manner that each is seen to be but the necessary complementary reciprocal of the other.

Under number 2, we are to expect a moment of distinction; and that it proves to be, for the poles of the single antithesis, which were at first Being and Nothing, are now distinguished as Being-in-self and Being-for-other. So far as words are concerned, Hegel's own seem sufficient. We may just point out in passing, that a firm view of Non-There-being may be procured by considering the constitution of There-being, in which the element of Negation, which was still, however, There-being, is what is now referred to as the Non-There-being. Again, we may remark that we have all our materials still before us, and need not move from the spot, neither to please Haym, who will have it that we do move, nor Rosenkranz, who certainly, in all conscience, moves enough, and never thinks, indeed, of staying by the spot. The phrase 'their truth is their reference,' or 'their reference is

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