after the body of the work (and)—the Introduction (p. 65, Edition 1841), seems to concern something else, and quite unadapted to develop the reflexion with which we have sought to explain it above. Some such reflexion, we are disposed to believe, Hegel expected from the reader himself here, and quite independently of the Phaenomenology.

The reader will do well to observe the different translations which have occurred in reference to the difficult word Setzen. Gesetzt ist has been translated appears, presents itself, is taken, stated, established, demonstrated, put, placed, set, &c., the meaning always being that Logical Position has been effected in regard to what is spoken of;—what was implicit is now explicit, or technically set. Hegel himself varies the expression by explicirt ist, and also by exponirt ist. When What is is spoken of as Gesetztseyn, we are to understand that it is illative adjectivity. Ein Gesetztes, again, is an effected evolute, an effected attribute, an effected adjective, a term developed from within and referred out in place. Here, again, we see how inward and outward come together. What is implied or implicated is also explicated; it is in Something, yet it is other than, or out of, the Something. Similarly, what is involved is evolved, what is inferred is ef-ferred, what is illated is e-lated, &c. Setzen has thus an advantage over any of these words, for it implies both, or Setzen is just to ex-imply. We can understand now, then, that Gesetztseyn is just implication as to Englishmen - a system of implication; for such system being thoroughly recognised, just amounts to a system of explication. We are to see that im-position involves ex-position, or that what is, is just position. Or we may say, the three moments

of the concrete trinity, in which each is the other, are to implicate, to explicate, and to replicate. Thus, too, one can see that all are but distinctions of selfidentical Thought, or all is but illative reflexion,—a dialectic in which each member sublates itself in itself, and is in itself the contrary of itself,' and the whole seems as a Bacchantic tumult with everyone concerned drunk.' After all, we can see, too, that setzen is not different from bestimmen, for both refer to the placing of the differences. Setzen, however, is hardly so wide as bestimmen, and denotes rather a special bestimmen or determination where the reciprocity is peculiarly overt, as in the mutual relation of cause and effect, or in that of positive and negative, &c. Still, to determine will very generally translate setzen, as well as bestimmen.

C.

INFINITUDE.

Here, in the first place, as usual, the general heading maps out the course of the dialectic that is to follow, and names the principal moments. The point to which we have now arrived is this: The Finite passes away into its other; but the Finite is a passing away: the passing away, then, passes away. Or the Finite negates itself; but the Finite is negation: the Finite, then, negates negation, and affirmatively is. In brief: the Finite goes together with itself, and this is the Infinite. It is difference-less self-reference, at once a Being and a Becoming. These naturally can be used as definitions of the Absolute; but the whole series of the sphere of Particular Being (There-being), as subjected to the first or simple negation, is finite, and cannot be so used.

The Infinite, too, so used, as expressing in itself negation of the Finite, seems preferable to either Being or Becoming, which do not directly express independence of limitatedness, or definitude. The presence of reference to, and so of an implication of, limitatedness, finiteness, negation, in the Infinite, is at the same time hinted. The two Infinites, the true and the spurious, or that of Reason and that of Understanding, being briefly named and even characterised, the division. follows.

a. The Infinite in general.

Here again, as in a moment of Simple Apprehension, there is a difficulty to know what to say, and what is said may be regarded as the summary of all that follows. Indeed, we may say, that the reference to the Finite still implied in the Infinite is the hinge, or pivot, or key to all that follows.

In the first paragraph, we see the joy with which Hegel hails the Infinite as the name at which our true light goes up to us. This is a very overt indication of Hegel's views in reference to the Immortality of the Soul.

It is through its reference to its In-itself that Therebeing determines itself-so far as it is There-being or negated Being-as Finite. Thus it is the nature of the Finite itself to transcend itself into the Infinite. This must be seen to be its own act, and not result of an external force. Neither must we view it as if-which is quite usual-our subjective Reason had simply crossed over the Finite into the Infinite, leaving the former still there. Finite and Infinite are not to be conceived side by side, like as another German says-cat and dog.

What takes place, in short, is a dialectic transition in which both fall together as moments.

b. Alternating determination of the Finite and the

Infinite.

In this a moment of Judgment the differences are, of course, kept apart, and this constitutes the gist of what we are to see, which, however, is one of the most important considerations ever, perhaps, suggested. Hegel is right, then, the separation of Finite and Infinite is but the most extraordinary of human delusions.

If

The first paragraph shows the Infinite-and let us be serious in thinking the Infinite, and not satisfied with a mere logical term,-as constituted, to be Something—with determinateness—with a Limit. The Finite has thus the character of determinate or real There-being opposed to the Infinite: they seem permanently apart, then. As the Infinite is immediately or directly constituted, it awakes the Finite; or the Being, the whatit-is, or as-it-is of the one directly awakes that of the other.

The intention of the next paragraph is to thicken the contrast between the two moments: they are to be exhibited as mutually other. The Finite is Limitation; its nature is perpetually to seek its In-itself. Infinitude. is this In-itself, the To-be-to or Is-to-be of the Limitation, and this, too, as a thing effected. This Infinite is the nothing of that Finite; but this Infinite also, as the accomplished Sollen, the effected and carried-out To-be-to, is reflected into itself, is self-referent affirmative Being. The Infinite, then, is bëent, and it is the negation of the Finite; but as a bëent negation it is other to this Finite. The Finite remaining as determinate real

There-being, is other to the Infinite. Yet the Finite has also the character of being sublated into the Infinite, which is thus the Non-Finite-a Being or Beingness, but in the form or sense of Negation. The Finite, then, is as the sphere of the definite realities, the Infinite as the void which is beyond all such; but still the Finite has its In-itself not in its definite and determinate There-being. The dialectic is so double-edged, that the last welches (the last which' but one) of the paragraph, though construed with the Finite, might, without embarrassment to the sense, be construed with the Infinite-but perhaps not quite as well.

6

This Infinite, which has just been developed, is the bastard or spurious Infinite, that which constitutes to mere Understanding as the separating and abstracting power, the last word of wisdom. In this, nevertheless, Understanding only envelopes itself in contradictions.

The contradiction at once shows in this, that both still are, and an Infinite, limited by another, is only a Finite.

Understanding that would seek its Highest, its Infinite, leaves the Finite still standing: it strives into a far inane which is and is not; while that on which it has turned its back, and only turned its back, also is and is not.

The relation of the one to the other is recognised and acknowledged by Understanding; but Understanding can see in this relation, not their inseparability and unity, but only their difference, distinction, separation, and mutual independence. From Understanding it is quite concealed that the one is just the burthen of the other, or that the one is just through the other. -The reflexion of Understanding whereby it enables itself to persist in the mutual independence of each