CHAPTER III.

BEING-FOR-SELF.

Ir this (first) paragraph be read in the light of our general illustration, the Absolute Voice, and, after all, probably the very best name for Thought (especially now that it is viewed as the Absolute and Only), would be the Absolute Voice,-the various expressions which constitute it will spring at once into meaning.

In Being-for-Self, qualitative Being is completed :' that is, the voice, the One, having run through its native constituent notes, its variety, its many, has returned into itself as still the Voice and the One; and thus completion (oneness and allness) is given to its whole qualitative Being; in other words, a complete answer has been given to every question of Qualis, What Sort, in its regard. This, too, is infinite Being;' it

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is unended and unendable; it is entire, totum et rotundum, -the Absolute Voice. The Being of the voice, before a single finite note, the Being of the Beginning,' was but abstract, determination-less.' The Notification, which to the Voice is as There-being' or Thereness (the presence of a definite somewhat) to consciousness, is the sublated and negated voice, the immediately, or directly, and at first hand, sublated and negated voice, just as an object, or the series of objects, is the immediately sublated and negated Being -First Being of Thought or Consciousness (say). It is worth while remarking that the sublated voice is

quite as much the lifted-up voice as the negated one, and just so we may see that the sublated Being, if negated as to its universality (an other being introduced) and apparently for the moment left out of count, is lifted up, made prominent, eminent, or even, as it were, tilted up into the edge of a single, passing, momentary note, or finite object. In this There-ness, this other of a Note, or Object, the Voice, Being, is still retained; but still all for the moment seems to have gone into the single edge of this note or object; there seems nothing but it: the Voice and the Note, Being and There-being, are in simple unity, certainly; but still in the first instance the Note or the There-ness is a usurping one side that seems quite all and other to its own universal. The two sides, then, though in themselves one, are mutually unequal;' they are ungleich, not level, uneven;-as we said, there is a tilted-up edge; or all this — and the whole truth of the case can be conveyed in the single expression their unity is not yet Mutuated.

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We have used for Gesetztseyn Mutuatitiousness; but this is the first time we have used mutuated for gesetzt. This is the place, now, however, for the introduction of such new mode of statement. By mutuated, I mean overtly placed by and for an occult. This sense has been growing on us; and in this we are not singular ; for we hold it evident that it so grew on Hegel himself. There is something of this in our own word set, and accordingly it has been frequently used for setzen in the present translation and commentary. To set in the sense of to stake, or to set to music, indicates substitution, mutuation; and a setter-dog sets the game. Then a set is a certain more of which one sets the other, and without the other were null. The German

setz, however, has in it, like the Latin vice, much more of this reciprocation and exchange than the English set. Thus, es setzt means there arises; es wird Etwas setzen implies a warning that something (disagreeable) will replace the present state of matters, or this that now is, sets that that also is, though in the future; and Setz-schiffer means a substitute captain, a locum tenens, one, i. e., that is for and by another, and in turn sets or implies this other. Implies seems a good rendering for the word in question, but what is implied is, derivatively and otherwise, rather set in than set out, and it is an explicit implicitness that is wanted, as it were, an eximpliedness or eximplicatedness. In fact, the sense of overt statement must be as evident in the word adopted as that of implication. It is easy to see, indeed, that, statement, as also expression, exposition, and the like, really conveys what we attribute to this Setzen it and these are, so to speak, all overts by and for occults. The same thing is to be seen in the Logical form, the Modus Ponens, which probably at least helped to lead Hegel to the term; there we see that the First sets the Second, and it is the second which is left overt. We may allude, in passing, to the use of Aufhebend in the Modus Tollens; and the quotation from Cicero, tollendum esse Octavium, in the remark relative to Aufheben, demonstrates the analogy to have been present to Hegel himself. By mutuated, then, is meant something overt, something expliciter, something formally stated, expressed, put, placed, or set, but still something that is reciprocally stated, &c., and so something consequently that reciprocally states, &c.

The two sides, Voice and Note, Being and Therebeing or Object, are still mutually unequal, uneven, or

their unity is not yet mutuated. We can see now the full force of the mutuated; each side remaining abstract, or separate, there is difference, duality, mutual inequality; but when it is seen that the voice still is in the note, Being still is in There-being, then reconciliation has taken place, the concrete truth is restored, the unity of the two sides is mutuated, is set. What follows about Finitude, Determinateness as such, relative and absolute Determinateness, is now easy. 'In Being-for-self, the Difference between Being and Determinateness or Negation is posited and equated'—this also is plain; the dif-ference between the two sides, Voice and Note, is mutuated and ausgeglichen, levelledout, equated.

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Quality, Otherwiseness, Reality, Being-in-itself, Ought-to, &c., are the imperfect infigurations of the Negative into Being, &c.' The series of Notes is a series of infigurations, indentations, into the voice, and they are imperfect so long as they are held to be different from the voice. Einbildung, however, must be seen to imply its usual sense of subjective conceit and conceiting, as well as its literal meaning of infiguration: the assignments in question have that in them which approximates them to subjective fancies; they are not regarded in their truth when regarded as absolute. The application of our illustration to what follows may now be left to the reader. We may remark in passing on ungleich, ausgeglichen, and Einbildungen as examples of that favourite Hegelian irony in which the direct, literal, structural sense flirts or coquets with the reflex, figurative, and conventional one. Indeed, Setzen, Daseyn, Differenz, and even Vollendet, are in the same key: as regards Setzen, Hegel has gone back to its ancient idiomatic, collo

quial sense; Daseyn is to be seen both as There-ness and as this Being here below; the Differenz is the difference, as the Unter-schied is the inter-cern; and we are even to see that Vollendet applies to what is not only ended, but full. As we have seen, too, this verbal care of Hegel extends itself into a syllabic one: in Vergleichung, for example, we are perpetually made to see that it is a comparison. Then the terminations haft, ig, lich, sam, are never lost sight of; and, as regards the verbs, such prefixes as er, ver, zer, are his very instruments. As respects these, the student of Hegel ought to consult the more advanced grammars.

A.

BEING-FOR-SELF AS SUCH.

Here the notion Being-for-self is completely precised. The distinction between consciousness and selfconsciousness, which is wholly German, ought to be well borne in mind. The expression appearant is a translation of erscheinend which seems forced on us: we are to see that a certain duality is always implied in this word; there is an outer show or shine or seeming or appearance which appears other and independent, but which is still only a moment, only ideell in another and inner. Self-consciousness, though further advanced and more concrete than Being-for-self, is still abstract when compared with the Absolute Spirit.

a. Here-being (There-being), and Being-for-self.-b. Beingfor-One.

The distinctions here are subtle, but they are simple, and they are intelligibly put. In Being-for-self the real and the ideal sides, or the Finite and the Infinite;