very arguments here adverted to, in debate. And a noble duke (of Bedford) now deceased, maintained the same opinions. He remembered a little after, when we were victorious in every quarter of the globe, when all we wanted was money, and all we had to contend with was climate, to prevent us from possessing ourselves of the whole of Spanish America, the same two noble lords, and their friends, justified the peace on no other ground but our inability to raise new taxes. They allowed that conquest was certain, but that the national debt was enormous. Where, then, was the material change of circumstances, after the conclusion of the present campaign, when the debt, which was after a 13 years peace, not reduced above seven millions, where the conquest was not certain, and where if it were, it would be a conquest over our own subjects, operating to our own ruin, unaccompanied by either fame, or advantage? Would not we then, as at the close of the last war, be in a situation, when even to prosecute certain conquest would be the height of folly and political frenzy?

ample matter for serious alarm. In the first place he observed, that they were formed on no sound principle of alliance or reciprocal support. It is true, they were said to be formed on the basis of mutual succour and support, but those expressions imported nothing; they were mere words of course. It was a downright mercenary bargain, for the taking into pay a certain number of hirelings, who were bought and sold like so many beasts for slaughter. There was no common interest which mutually bound the parties; and if there was, the conduct of the foreign princes was the most extraordinary that was ever known. They were to be subsidized. They were to have levy money. They were to have a double subsidy. Their corps were to be kept up complete. They were to be paid till the troops returned to their respective countries; and the subsidies were to be continued according to the tenor of the respective treaties, one or two years after the troops ceased to be of any service to us. But taking it on the other ground, that the treaties were formed on the true basis of alliance, what would be the con- His grace remarked on the danger of sequence? That if any of those powers keeping a body of 12,000 foreigners togewere attacked, or should wantonly provoke ther, under the absolute command of one an attack, for the engagement was left of their own generals; of the possibility, general and unconditional, we should give though he should consent to serve under them all the succour in our power. Thus, a junior officer, of his arriving to the sufor the assistance of a few thousand foreign preme command; and of the confusion mercenaries, we are not only to pay dou- which might be created by a difference on ble, but are to enter into a solemn engage- this head, between the foreign general and ment to exert our whole force to give the commander in chief. He laid great them all the succour in our power, if the stress on that passage in the Hessian landgrave or duke shall be attacked or treaty, in which it is provided, article 9th, disturbed in the possession of his domi-" that his Majesty shall make use of this nions. His grace begged next to recall to the memory of their lordships, the language held by the friends of the present measures towards the close of the late war.

He said a very ingenious gentleman (Mr. Mauduit) at that period wrote a pamphlet, entitled, "Considerations on the German War," in which he introduced several computations of the cost of every French scalp to this nation; and made it amount to 10,000l. per head. He therefore recommended to the noble lords, who then approved of that gentleman's estimate, to consider what an American scalp would cost, when 17,000 foreigners would stand us in at the rate of one million and a half per annum. He observed he had many noble lords in his eye, who professed themselves of that opinion. One noble lord, now absent, (lord Bute) made use of the

body of troops by land in Europe wherever he shall judge proper." He said he could not see what operations they could be employed in, unless it were in this country, in case of a rebellion, which none foresaw but the advisers of the present measures. The foreign troops were to be double officered, which was another weighty and useless expence; so that out of the whole number, upwards of 3,000 men were not to be rank and file, contrary to every rule of war, which, in a given number of men, endeavours to render the rank and file as numerous as the nature of the service will possibly allow; because it is on them that the weight of attack or defence generally rests.

His grace made some observations on the supercession of the several officers in the naval and military departments, in

to the case of Ethan Allen, who being found in arms, was brought home prisoner, yet administration dared not bring him to a trial, even under their favourite Act of Henry 8, either because they knew that he could not be legally tried, or feared an English jury could not be prevailed on to find him guilty. Be that as it may, the present treaties were extremely defective in that point; and if administration were not obstinately determined to act wrong in every particular, they would endeavour to provide against the numerous inconveniencies which must arise from a want of a cartel.

the other. Besides, though the militia had been officered and manned much better, it could not be expected that they could face a veteran army, superior in numbers and discipline. And as for the invalids, every man among them almost, fit for real service, had been already draughted; so that on the whole, the picture which such a scene of internal weakness, joined with a few ships not half manned, presented, was most dreadful. It was however necessary to bring it forward, to see if any thing could stimulate our governors to provide for our national safety, and prevent us from falling a prey to our dangerous and ambitious neighbours.

He concluded, by informing their lordships, that what he was now going to state might be deemed improper, as exposing our national weakness; but if it was essentially necessary, he presumed that objection would be removed; and if the objection could be removed on the ground, that France was perfectly acquainted with the present state and condition of the national force now within the kingdom, that would be another good reason, that nothing respecting our means of defence should be concealed. He then said, that the whole of our military force, now within this kingdom, consisted of the footguards, composed of sixty-four companies, amounting to 2,500 men, 1,000 of which were destined for America; three regiments of horse and body guards, of about 1,500; four battalions returned from America, with officers only, at about 100 each; ten regiments of dragoons, of 200 men each; and three complete battalions of infantry, the whole amounting, allowing for the 1,000 men draughted from the guards, to about 7,000 men. Supposing, then, that 3,000 of those were put into the garrisons of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Chatham, the remainder fit to take the field, after a sufficient number was left to guard London, allowing 1,000 for each place, would not be above 3,000; which, he contended, would be totally inadequate to any military operation, should France and Spain think proper to take an advantage of our defenceless state. He said, indeed, that a militia was to be raised, in order to supply this deficiency: but how-treaties; and if the war should continue ever constitutional that mode of national defence might be, he insisted that it would never answer any purpose of repelling a powerful enemy, while it continued to be so disgracefully conducted as it was at present, when unqualified officers were admitted on one hand, and substitutes on

The Earl of Suffolk. I cannot say, my lords, that the noble duke who made the motion, has stated one solid objection to the present treaties, or pointed out a single instance in which our former treaties have been materially departed from. His grace has taken great pains to swell the account by several items, which do not properly belong to it; but if they did, they would not prove a tittle relative to the comparative dearness or cheapness of the terms on which the troops have been procured. The tenor of the treaties themselves are no other than what has been usual on former occasions. The present, it is true, is filled with pompous, highsounding phrases of alliance: but I will be so ingenuous as to confess to the noble duke, that I consider them merely in that light; and if he will, I allow, that the true objects of those treaties, is not so much to create an alliance, as to hire a body of troops, which the present rebellion in America has rendered necessary: I will likewise give this general answer to his grace, relative to the comparative expence, that should the war be terminated in one year, the bargain will be manifestly ad-. vantageous, because we shall pay but one year's double subsidy, which is equal to two years single subsidy. If the war should continue two years, in that event we shall neither gain nor lose, because two years double subsidy will be equal to four years single, the usual term stipulated in former

longer, I confess that the terms would, in that event, be disadvantageous. But, my lords, though the terms were really as disadvantageous as the noble duke has endeavoured to represent them, if we wanted the troops, we should have been obliged to acquiesce. The proper question is,

Whether we do want them? I must declare for one, that I think we do; and as such, am happy that we were able to procure them on such beneficial terms. sides, the noble duke seems to forget, that even on his own principles foreigners are much more proper to be employed in this war than natives; for if the war be just, of which I have no doubt, and that troops must be employed, and that foreigners can be more easily had than natives, the measure will follow of necessity, and can be fairly justified on that ground. The noble duke, alluding to a passage in the Hessian treaty, says, that the troops being under the command of a senior officer, the supreme command of the whole army will naturally devolve on him, when the British commander in chief happens to be a junior officer. I do not pretend to speak from my own knowledge; but I would appeal to any noble lord in this House, acquainted with military matters, whether the commission given a commander in chief, does not supersede any other; and whether of course a young major-general, acting in that character, will not thereby have an absolute and supreme command over every officer in that service, be his rank what it may. The noble duke says, we brought over Ethan Allen in irons to this country, but were afraid to try him, lest he should be acquitted by an English jury, or that we should not be able legally to convict him. I do assure his grace, that he is equally mistaken in both his conjectures; we neither had a doubt but we should be able legally to convict him, nor were we afraid that an English jury would have acquitted him; nor further, was it out of The Earl of Carlisle. I trust I shall obany tenderness to the man, who I maintain credit when I assure your lordships, tain had justly forfeited his life to the offended laws of his country. But I will tell his grace the true motives which induced administration to act as they did. We were aware that the rebels had lately made a considerable number of prisoners, and we accordingly avoided bringing him to his trial from considerations of prudence; from a dread of the consequences of retaliation; not from a doubt of his legal guilt, or a fear of his acquittal by an English jury.

tion which, from the nature of the increasing power, wealth, and population of the colonies, is, in my opinion, inevitable. Be-It is in the body politic as in the natural body, the seeds of dissolution are contained in the vital principles of both. Sooner or later the event must happen; and the greatest stretch that human wis dom can effect, is no more than to prolong the duration of one, as the greatest care and attention, joined with the best native constitution, may do to prolong the other. If you look on the map of the globe, and view Great Britain and NorthAmerica, and compare the extent of both; if you consider the soil, the harbours, rivers, climate, and increasing population of the latter, nothing but the most obsti nate blindness and partiality can prevail on any man to entertain a serious opinion that such a country will long continue under subjection to this. The question is not, therefore, how we shall be able to realize such a delusive scheme of dominion, but how we shall make it their interest to con tinue faithful allies and warm friends. Surely that can never be effected by fleets and armies. On the contrary, instead of meditating conquest, and exhausting our strength in an ineffectual struggle, we should vote a thanksgiving, and wisely abandoning all wild schemes of coercing that country, we should leave America to itself, and wish to avail ourselves of the only substantial benefit we can ever expect to derive from it, the profits of an extensive commerce, and the strong support of a firm and friendly alliance for mutual defence and assistance.

The Earl of Coventry. I do not rise to speak to the present treaties, further than they relate to the measures now pursuing relative to America, which I shall ever continue to think impolitic. Not that I think the wisest or best concerted measures ever planned, can avert the destruc

that no consideration should induce me to give a negative to the motion, if I had not been perfectly satisfied of the necessity of the measures carrying on against America. It is not, in my opinion, a mere question of party, but involves in it the ruin or salvation of this country. If we should con cede, so as to relinquish every substantial benefit which we might derive from our political sovereignty and commercial con troul over our colonies, what will be the probable consequence, but that this coun try, deprived of the advantages of an immense commerce, will gradually sink into obscurity and insignificance, and fall at length a prey to the first powerful or ambitious state, which may meditate a conquest of this island? If we consider the present condition of several of the great